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A B S TR A C T

This dissertation examines government reform in Thailand during the
administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006), one of the largest
reform programs in the history of the Thai administrative system. Through a case
study methodology, this study observed the implementation of the Integrated
Provincial Administrative System (IPAS), which represents the complex reform
scheme initiated in 2003. While this study employs documentary research on the
development of Thai politics and public administration in the period before the
Thaksin administration, the investigator used qualitative interviews to analyze the
IPAS implementation and process. The informants included provincial governors,
deputy governors, provincial administrators, and local officers in three provinces
during the period between November 2004 and March 2005.
This dissertation presents the change and continuity of the political and
socioeconomic systems in Thailand that led to and shaped the administrative reform
of Thaksin. It addresses the subject matter of Thai administrative reforms from two
perspectives. First, the institutional and historical contexts of the reforms with
regard to the patterns of Thai governments and international organizations provide a
large picture of the transformation of the Thai administration system. Second, the
study focuses on the m anagem ent and tactical aspects o f T haksin’s adm inistrative

reform to answer questions about choices of reforms, the interaction of reforming
sub-governments, and potential impacts generated by the changes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

With an unprecedented large electoral mandate in 2001, the Thaksin
government of the Thai Rak Thai Party had established a stable administration that
made possible an overhaul of Thai administrative process and decisive policy
choices. T h e changes have two m ajor implications: a rhetorical application of N ew

Public Management methods to public administration and a recentralization effort
under the control of the Prime Minister. These changes shift Thai bureaucracy from
a predominantly hierarchical structure dominated by the technocrats to untenable
business-like administrative practices and strengthen the power of central
government. The findings demonstrate that the management preoccupation of
reform tactics not only contradicted an alleged reform goal concerning
administrative power devolution and reversed an established decentralization policy
for local government, but also politicized groups of senior bureaucrats.
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CHAPTER 1
PROBLEMS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Research Questions

Government administration today is often the subject of “administrative
reform" due to general criticism for being too complex, centralized, bureaucratic, and
incompetent. In formal administrative systems such tendencies are reinforced by
standard operating procedures driven by politicians and bureaucrats. As a result,
the reform concept brings a special perspective to bear on administrative change,
internal leadership, and power relationships among the involved players. Studies in
this issue show that administrative reform often fails and results in disappointment
(Aberbach & Rockman, 2000; Caiden, 1999; Peters & Savoie, 1994). However,
ambiguity and uncertainty do not eliminate strong convictions for administrative
transformation.
Since a military coup in 1991, public sector reforms have been on the mind
of Thai politicians and administrative leaders. Each new administration, from Anand
(1992) to Chuan (1992-1995, 1997-2000) to Banharn (1995-1996) to Chavalit
(1996-1997) to Thaksin (2001-2004, 2005-2006), has been optimistic about new
reform initiatives. However, many reforms and reorganizations failed to achieve
their stated objectives. Among those reforms, some were continuous chains from
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the preceding administration, but some were new initiatives with a higher degree of
comprehensiveness. Before the first Thaksin administration (2001-2004) was
inaugurated in January 2001, the 1997 constitutional amendment was promulgated
to improve the state’s political and administrative apparatus. The onset of the Asian
financial crisis in mid-1997 further demanded a change of leadership to cope with
the pressing social and economic problems.
Founded in 1998, the Thai Rak Thai Party, with the slogan “Think New, Act
New,” presented a reformist ideology in the 2001 national election. The party
became an unprecedented single dominant party in Thailand’s history of elected
premiership. Thaksin introduced a number of public sector reforms to overhaul the
Thai administration.
The first major reform dealt with the reorganization of central administration
and ministerial functions. The reform restructured ministry organizations which
produced new agencies and simultaneously altered the dynamic of bureaucratic
power. The second major reform concerned regional administration, turning
provincial governors into “CEO-Governors." This reform was officially titled the
“Integrated Provincial Administrative System” (IPAS) while it was generally known
as the CEO-Governor, referring to Thaksin’s “CEO prime minister” and his private
sector style of management. These two major reforms were initiated separately, but
many management tactics and practices were designed to support one another in a
comprehensive approach.
This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of these recent
administrative reforms in Thailand. More specifically, it explores the role of the
Thaksin administration in Thai public sector reforms, in general, and the impact of
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sub-government reform on Thai public administration in particular. Thematic
questions in this study can be divided into two levels. At the macro level, it seeks to
explain the institutional context of Thai administrative reforms. The question is,
then, to what degree Thailand’s public sector reforms were influenced by the
international organizations and global economy. Do Thai administrative reforms
reflect variations in the way administrative reforms are implemented abroad? At the
micro level, this research analyzes the implications and impacts on Thai public
administration resulting from reform tactics. The latter investigation asks what
constraints and distortions may have influenced the extent to which the reform
strategies have been implemented. How have the values of involved actors shifted
during the reform processes? How do those actors react to the constraints they
have encountered? The research seeks to answer these questions by examining
the reform called the Integrated Provincial Administrative System.
On a methodological level, the study of public sector reform requires an
appropriate research method. Studying public sector reform in a country with 20
ministerial functions operated across 75 provinces makes the selection of case and
observation sites an important issue. The case of the Integrated Provincial
Administrative System was chosen because it well reflected the reform scheme of
Thaksin’s administration as well as the continuing pattern of Thai government
reform.
Using a purposive sample of a limited number of carefully selected provinces
allowed me to simultaneously provide specific context and complexity on the one
hand, and generalizability on the other. The goal is to develop qualitative case

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4

studies that are both exploratory and explanatory. The details of the research
method and the selection of observed provinces are demonstrated in Chapter 2.

Plausible Findings

Public sector reform is usually thought of as a means to an end, not an end
in itself. To be more precise, it is potentially a means to multiple ends though
unknown effects may occur. A good deal of evidence exists to show that
management reform can go wrong. It is possible, then, that the IPAS reform under
Thaksin may fail to produce the claimed benefits or even generate perverse effects
that render the relevant administrative processes worse than they were previously.
On the other hand, the reform may partially succeed, establishing the structures and
processes that made Thai public organizations operate better. Further, we should
be aware that the administrative reform and reorganization involve politics, not just
what is managerially possible and efficient. Regardless, the process of
redistribution of administrative authority and power devolution by the Thaksin
government is likely to have an impact on the Thai public sector. Discrepancies
between the original goals and outcomes generated by IPAS implementation are
likely to exist. This is due to the complex interaction between politics and
administration in a changing environment. To be adequate, any account of the Thai
public sector reform initiatives will need to investigate the concepts, applications,
and implications of those reforms. This study seeks to describe the relationship
between political executives and technocrats, to analyze how Thaksin’s reform
initiatives influenced change in political power, and to observe the dynamic of reform
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implementation, how the reform tactics and strategies have been used, and how the
norms and values of different key actors influence the outcomes. It examines the
IPAS provincial government mandate under the unprecedented power of the
Thaksin administration and seeks to understand the questions of reform heritage
since the establishment of the elected parliamentary system since 1932. Figure 1
shows the major factors that cause Thaksin’s public sector reform and its
consequences.

Elements of Thaksin’s
governm ent reorganization
Dom estic socio-econom ic
and political changes

and the IPAS

Politicization of bureaucrats,
contradictions of reform tactics

- Promotion of “ New
M anagerialism ” in

11

governm ent al operation
- Creation of the O ffice of

Reversed process o f local
governm ent decentralization plan

Public Sector Development
External environm ents
c ontributing to NPM-like reform

- Shift in social policies and
adm inistrative laws
- Strengthening central and

Centralized political and
adm inistrative power

regional governm ent

Figure 1. Causal Model of Thaksin’s Public Sector Reform

To begin with, the 1997 constitution was the legacy of emerging modernist
business leaders, politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals who sought to transform
the Thai state to keep pace with democratic and political changes in the modern
world (Connors 1999, p. 202). The constitution making reflected a need for
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constitutional reform that emphasized transparency, accountability, decentralization,
independent authorities, and popular participation in the government process. As a
long-term strong military-technocrat polity gradually lost its influence and power,
democratic processes became more firmly entrenched. However, administrative
instability and the short life of most democratically elected governments became a
serious problem. As a result, one of the goals of the 1997 reform constitution was to
achieve stable government through a large political party and revamping
administrative institutions in accordance with international “Good Governance”
discourse (Connors, 2003, p. 175). In many respects, this shift in the Thai political
order and administrative institutions was sketched out in the 1997 constitution.
Besides the contribution of the new constitution, international organizations
have also played roles in guiding the direction of Thailand’s reforms. Under the
direct and indirect influence of globally dominant agencies such as the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations Development
Program, many governments including Thailand have experienced a number of
institutional changes (Christensen & Laegreid, 1999; Farazmand, 2002). These
international organizations have cultivated economic and social values and
objectives through their policies and a wide range of assistance programs. In part,
they have sought to implement a market-based macro economic policy agenda, and
to develop institutions that facilitate free markets. This global economy perspective
informs later chapters.
In response to the 1997 financial crisis, the Thai government sought to
restore the confidence of foreign investors through the reform of various public
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sector agencies (Suwanmala, 1998). International loans were spent on Thai
financial institution restructuring: liberalization of banking, industrial restructuring,
and social safety net reform. To a large degree, successive administrations have
adopted international assistance programs and the package of reform strategies
that came with that assistance, although not all of them have been implemented.
Before the depreciation of the Thai baht in July 1997, the Chavalit
administration revealed a “public service reform master plan” that called for reducing
the size of Thai civil service by one-third by 2001, while adjusting government
officials’ salary to be more attractive. The Chuan government replaced the Chavalit
cabinet in November 1997 and proceeded to downsize the public sector. Among
other reform strategies, the Thai government consciously determined to stress a
managerial approach to public administration such as results-oriented management,
performance measures, and the New Public Management (NPM) approach to public
sector management.
The 1997 constitution embraced a good deal of “agent creation,” the view
that the public sector should operate with established framework agreements and
performance measurement and be mission-driven, decentralized, and separated
from traditional bureaucracy. The constitution provided a charter for creating new
agencies including the Administrative Court, the Anti-Money Laundering Office, the
Constitutional Court, the Election Commission, the National Counter Corruption
Commission, the National Human Right Commission, the Parliamentary
Ombudsman, and the State Audit Commission. Further, numerous elements of
public sector improvements such as efficiency, customer orientation, service
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standards, one-stop service, and performance targets appeared more often in the
language of Thai administrative reform initiatives.
In the decade before Thaksin took office, successive administrations came
under profound criticism for a range of reasons including poor capacity for
governmental management, unsuitable economic policy reform, the public's distrust
toward the bureaucracy, and low transparency. The reform movement vocally
proposed to establish a new constitutional framework to solve existing problems.
The reform pressures rapidly grew during the 1997 financial crisis and ended with
the promulgation of the new constitution in late 1997.
With a new electoral system under the reformed constitution, the new Thai
Rak Thai Party received major support to continue governmental reforms, resulting
in substantive changes to politics and public sector organizations. On the basis of
its successful populist policy following the Asian financial crisis and the change in
the 1997 constitution, the Thai Rak Thai government established a centralized
policy-making system and initiated the IPAS reform as part of Thaksin’s strategies
for improving public policy implementation. The Thaksin administration launched
major initiatives for government reform including ministerial reorganization, legal
process improvements, and a provincial administrative system reform called IPAS
which is the focus of this study.
Through an investigation of the development of Thai political and economic
change, this dissertation presents a large picture of the public sector transformation
that successive Thai governments have experienced. Equally important, this
dissertation seeks to explain the major implications of the reform tactics and
strategies used by elected executives and high-level bureaucrats, why these tactics
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are used, and how they may impact reform outcomes. This dissertation describes
the impact of IPAS's administrative tactics and strategies implemented at the
provincial level. It argues that Thaksin's administrative reform is not likely to
achieve the overarching goals anticipated in the 1997 reform constitution,
particularly the development of accountability and democratic processes. The
Thaksin administration once showed remarkable adaptability to popular demands
and this allowed it to monopolize control over government for an extended period.
But the shortfalls of the reform implementation show that the reform process
strengthened incumbents’ political power and reversed the process of power
decentralization for local government authority.

General Conditions of Administrative Reform

Public administration literature abounds with examinations and reviews of
various attempts to modernize the management of public organizations in changing
political, social, and economic contexts. Why are there so many reforms over time?
What conditions can explain this phenomenon? Kettl (2000, pp. 3-4) argues that
there are four different political-economic forces that have been in play:
First, political pressure after the end of the Cold War generated widespread
debates about the role of government, with a focus on devising institutions that were
more democratic, or rebuilding civil society and reshaping the relationship of the
government with its citizens. The decline of citizen trust and confidence in public
institutions allowed political candidates around the world to make a successful
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campaign on the theme of shrinking the government and reducing its concentrated
power.
Second, economic problems in the late 1990s, in particular, the Asian
financial crisis, brought a profound structural adjustment to many Asian nations.
The crisis caused great urgency for government reform in transitional nations like
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, modernizing their economies quickly to address
the existing problem. Other nations, such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom,
launched their reforms to escape economic stagnation and renew economic growth.
The claim that corporate tax and regulatory policies reduced economic growth and
business competitiveness brought reform strategies such as deregulation and
privatization to the center of the debate.
Third, the struggle to cope with the radical shift from agriculture to industrial
society and from industrial toward information-based production pressed
governments toward administrative reform. Yeatman (1998, pp.138-40) argues that
over the last 30 years the new social movements, such as women’s groups,
indigenous peoples, the environmentalists, and the anti-colonialists have all
contributed to a re-conceptualization of citizenship values and ideas. Many Eastern
European nations have been working to reconstruct their social, legal, economic,
and political systems in part in an effort to adjust to the needs of an informationbased society.
Fourth, global engagement among different institutions requires negotiation
and partnership, transfusing reforming ideas and tactics between partners. While
the international institutions, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization have been playing
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big roles in shaping the world community, nongovernmental organizations have also
become very important in shaping debates on government and the quality of public
services. Many national governments have devolved power down to the local level
while at the same time political power has become more concentrated at the level
above the nation-state and less concentrated in sub-national governments and civil
society.
On a cultural level, Pollitt & Bouckaert (2000, p. 26) have contended that the
perception of elites is at the center of reform initiatives. They further explain that
most of the changes in administrative reforms have been predominantly “top-down,”
in the sense of having been conceived and executed by executive politicians and/or
senior civil servants. Ideas and pressures from elsewhere may heavily influence
these elites persuading them to try to implement reforms in part or in whole. In light
of these pressures, elites’ perceptions of what reforms are desirable and what
reforms are actually feasible may not be the same thing.
In addition, tension is common among various elite groups who may support
or resist change in administrative structure. March & Olsen (1983, pp. 281-96) have
argued that political trading and bargaining among the key decision makers during
administrative reform processes rarely sustain the reform intention because of shortrun changes in political attention. In addition, the reformers are frequently in the
position of desiring something more than what they actually propose, but censoring
their own aspirations in the interests of framing a lesser package that stands a
better chance of being accepted.
March & Olsen (1983) contend that ongoing reform is the nature of political
life in which different participants act on the basis of different definitions of the
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reform situation. In such a case, the ambiguity of administrative reform initiatives
and implementation processes may accentuate the problems and solutions, giving
them a “garbage-can” character. That is to say, the assumptions of institution
rationality which require an exhaustive description when dealing with reform
preferences, alternatives and predicted consequences do not necessarily control the
outcome of intended reform.
Reform ideas seldom get translated in a pure form directly into specific
reforms. Rather, they come from a variety of sources and flow into a larger pool of
ideas, which is used by political and administrative elites (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000,
p. 31). In New Zealand, for example, public choice theory, agency theory and
transaction cost economics were all influentially mixed (Kettl, 2000, p. 9). In
Australia, North America and the United Kingdom, a variety of generic management
ideas have been prominent in the face of public sector reforms. In these countries,
(and other transitional countries) techniques such as Management by Objectives
(MbO), Total Quality Management (TQM), benchmarking, and Business Process
Re-engineering (BPR) have been widely adopted within the public sector.
This flux of ideas has been associated with business schools, corporate
boardrooms, and government seminars. These ideas have been further spread by
international organizations such as Public Management Service (PUMA/OECD) and
the World Bank. In the United States, influential management authors such as
Peter Drucker and Tom Peters and Osborne and Gaebler have influenced the
practices of federal government reform reflected in the Government Performance
and Result Act of 1993 and the National Performance Review (NPR) (Kettl, 2000,
pp. 24-26).
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The conditions and driving forces of government change, arising from
globalization, fiscal stress, social movements, and elites’ preferences, have brought
pressures and challenges for administrative reform in general. For Thailand, the
1997 financial crisis and the needs for political reform triggered the waves of reform
initiatives. Opportunities for specific reform packages depended on the political
agenda of the politicians and bureaucrat elites over time. The new government
under Thaksin (2001-2004, 2005-2006) declared that it would launch a reform
based on a mid- to long-term plan that aimed at remodeling the government's role
and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public affairs.
Under the campaign motto of "new-thinking, new-acting,” the Integrated
Provincial Administrative System (IPAS) was initiated with a focus on decentralizing
administrative discretion to sub-national levels of government, parallel to the
previously mandated local government decentralization. This initiative is the result
of many driving forces, a mixture of theoretical concepts, and is as much a
management decision as a political one.

International Organizations and Reform Impacts

Have particular structural reforms been vigorously promoted in non-Western
and developing countries by external agents such as multilateral financial
institutions and bilateral donors? Have developing countries been forced to take aid
conditions against their will? Such a coercive model may be overstated; there may
be considerable freedom and discretion for the recipient countries. The extent of
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and mechanisms for policy transfer from international organizations to transitional
nations warrants examination.
The basic argument on the issue is that the relationship of developing
countries and their governments with some international organizations represents
the continuation of a well-established strategy. The following are possible
explanations of the international organization’s impact on government reforms.
First, there is no surprise that donor organizations have agendas in assisting
recipient nations, politically or economically. Held and McGrew (1993, p. 272) argue
that "these organizations are at the centre of a continual conflict over the control and
direction of global policy," and have acquired "entrenched authority" over the years.
However, these organizations can only impose policies on the recipient government
whose officials are receptive.
Second, the link between the donor’s influence and the recipient countries
clearly appears in reform options, such as decentralization, good governance, and
free market mechanisms. International organizations may be able to express their
policy goals through the reforms they promote. Particular reform strategies often
appear to go hand in hand with particular policy positions. For instance,
"privatization" and "New Public Management: NPM” are often addressed at
operational and policy levels (Ikenberry, 1990, p. 89). The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) observed in 1995 that “a new
paradigm of public management has emerged, aimed at fostering a performanceoriented culture in a less centralized public sector” (OECD, 1995, p. 8).
Third, international institutions such as the OECD, the European Union, the
World Bank, and the IMF have a role to play in the spread of particular
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administrative reforms. This claim is expressed in the OECD's Public Management
Committee, which produces a series of Public Management Studies. The report on
“Managing with Market-Type Mechanisms” is clearly intended to facilitate policy
learning between member countries to blend the advantages of market
arrangements with the proven virtues of traditional public administration (OECD,
1993, p. 3). By the same token, as the World Bank and the IMF have tried to
advance and ensure "best practice" and “good governance,” the imperative for
aided countries is to tie the aid policies with some kind of political and administrative
reform.
After the Post-Cold War era, the tension of political ideology has been
replaced by a new logic of international influence. Instead of deploying loan
suspension or withdrawal of such aid based on political ideology, the international
institutions now seek to deploy proactive influence through the instrument of
administrative conditionality, to ensure the success of the financed projects (LandellMills & Serageldin, 1992, p. 308). Interestingly, during the 1980s the World Bank
tried to reduce its policy overlap with the IMF. This effort led to conditioning the
Bank’s development loans on the IMF’s economic agenda (Mosley & Toye, 1991,
pp. 29-39). These international institutions advocated “good governance” chiefly as
a technical instrument to advise borrower countries rather than relying on direct
pressure based on political principles.
An observer of international management has noted that the 1996 United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/225 generally urged public sector
improvement throughout the developing countries to develop the capacity and
effectiveness of their administrative institutions (Caiden, 1999). In this regard, the
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1997 Asian financial crisis created an immense opportunity for Thailand to request a
loan package from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian
Development Bank, and assistance from other global organizations for the reform of
economic and administrative institutions. These organizations usually
recommended market-type mechanisms and a variety of capacity-building programs
such as controlling corruption, new agency creation, deregulation, restructuring the
civil service system, decentralization, contracting-out, and privatization.
McCourt (2001) contends that a pattern of the reduction in the size of the
public sector emerged because of World Bank and the IMF loan conditions. The
lender institutions pushed for reducing overall government expenditure with the aim
of restoring macroeconomic stability and facilitating growth through free-market
reforms. The debtors usually called for the privatization of public enterprises, the
contracting out of government services, and the introduction of user fees. To
reduce public expenditures, recipient countries reduced payroll for the core civil
service. Other measures dealing with the bureaucracy included competitive salary
reform and monetary incentives (Polidano, 2001).
It is tempting to assume that transitional nations responded to the implied
coercion of international institutions when shaping their reform efforts. There is no
doubt that many developing countries are experimenting with many recommended
reform strategies. However, there are some important questions to investigate on
this issue. First, are the recipient countries themselves committed to the
international institutions’ prescriptions? To what degree are the recommended
reforms adopted and implemented? Second, are particular reform initiatives specific
to the countries’ problems or a part of the international quest for a market-driven

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

economy? What kind of match is there between a country’s problems and the
seemingly one size fits all prescriptions of the international institutions?
Rather than a command and obey model, there seems to have been the a
process of interaction between prescribed reform models and domestic imperatives
shaping the model to a greater or lesser extent by local conditions. Palmujoki
(2001, pp. 141-64) demonstrates the relationship between the world financial
authorities, the IMF and the World Bank, and the ASEAN countries during the Asian
economic crisis 1997-1998, arguing that the borrowing countries had divergent
reform acceptance. Generally, the ASEAN countries which were forced to apply for
IMF aid were particularly reluctant to accept some of the IMF’s loan conditions.
Some of the countries complained that the IMF’s effort to liberate financial markets
was the reason for the crisis.
In an extreme case, Malaysia did not request the help from the IMF, but
presented a retrenched budget following part of the IMF agenda. Malaysia
represented the crisis as a form of neocolonialism, caused by currency traders and
supported by international economic regimes and some Western governments. In
reacting to the crisis, the UMNO (United Malays National Organization) youth wing
started to demand government reforms and the disclosure of the government’s
relationship with business. Common (2001, pp. 172-73) argues that Malaysia’s
reform initiative has a strong New Public Management appearance; however, the
reality of the reform implementation emphasized the legitimacy and political
consolidation of the elites.
Of all the Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia suffered the most dramatic
political consequences from 1997’s economic crisis. Even before the crisis, the
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political and social situation in the country was turbulent. Indonesia was hit by a
series of riots and social unrest due to national policies of the central government
and the corruption of local authorities. The Suharto government was forced to apply
for the IMF’s aid at the end of 1997, but the IMF’s recommendations were not fully
implemented because of disagreements about loan conditions. Suharto avoided the
IMF’s conditions, claiming that they would not be compatible with Indonesia’s
constitution. After his re-election in March of 1998, the Suharto regime’s resistance
led to unprecedented international pressure for his resignation. The IMF help
package continued only after Suharto’s government was replaced.
Cheung (1997) argues in a survey of global public sector reforms that
various national reforms are not homogeneous, although it is true that the globalized
international environment forms much of the “context” of national policy-making. He
points out that such reforms may have covered some similar policy and instrumental
tools being adopted in different circumstances for vastly different reasons and with
different impacts. That is to say, reforms can be mediated by local politics and
strategies of the governing elites.
The two different cases above indicate that there are the issues of
particularity and generality as far as government reform is concerned, leading to the
second question about local and global factors. Complex matters such as
government reform involve a contradiction between the universalizing and
particularizing elements of the governance discourse. Government transformation,
as a condition of public sector improvement, is recognized as a universally valid
project. This perception comes from the conviction that failures in public sectors
have largely been the result of inefficiency and a lack of motivation. Therefore,
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voluntary policy transfer from international institutions is possible because the
advocacy of administrative reform by those institutions fits well with various local
particularities.
Regarding recent Thai administrative reforms, Bowornwathana (2004, p.
249) argues that high public officials and political executives appreciated the reform
program being assisted by international lenders. Administrative reforms provided
the opportunity for political executives to control the public sector through the
implementation process in accordance with their perceived agenda.
After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Thailand requested full assistance
from the IMF; as a condition of aid, the country had to adopt “an austerity program”
geared toward public sector reform. The program included a cut in public spending
and financial institution reforms. Because these transformations were a condition of
aid, Bowornwathana (2004) argues that many elements of the Thai public sector
reform since the Chavalit administration in 1997 were influenced by Western reform
discourse and that certain applications were not appropriately developed to solve
problems specific to the Thai public sector. However, Bowarnwathana may have
overstated the case, because despite the fact that the suggested policies were
officially endorsed by Thai political executives and senior bureaucrats, the structural
reform efforts of the Thaksin government seem to be contrary to the
recommendatins of the international financial institutions. For example, the first
major ministerial reform initiative under Thaksin led to the structural change of
functional ministries from 13 to 20 ministries, resulting in the creation of new
agencies and high bureaucratic positions. The creation of new bureaus pleased
senior bureaucrats as much as the political executives.
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More generally, although borrowing countries seem to adopt International
advice and agendas, they might not take the entire reform package. Local context
and particular administrations may influence which reforms are adopted from among
those recommended. Also, the reforms recommended by international
organizations may be simultaneously undertaken with other reforms that are
unrelated or even contrary to those prescribed by external actors.

There can also

be considerable slippage during implementation, in part because reform is usually
stated as a set of principles, rather than as a set of details. Implementation may be
shaped by local context. As Polidano (2001) has observed, the rhetoric of reform
tends to outpace the real reform process and intended outcomes.

Typology of Government Reform: Types and Forms

The objectives, forms, and types of public sector reforms vary widely among
the countries around the world. For this reason, it is important to propose a
continuum to simplify the typology of the reforms. By finding a way to disaggregate
and compare elements of different reform experiences, one may work toward
identifying significant and indicative features of generic administrative reforms. One
approach is to sort administrative reforms into three broad categories, to make
clearer the nature of the shift in public sector practices. These categories are 1)
reform guided by a purposive approach (Peters, 2002), 2) reform driven by
environment dependency (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969), and 3) reform based on
institutional intricacy (March & Olsen, 1984).
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The first category of administrative reform is influenced by the assumptions
that the actors involved in administrative reform have particular intentions for the
proposed reform. This type of reform assumes that certain actors-elites, powerful
think tanks, or authoritative bureaucrats--have sufficient knowledge or skills to have
the reform adopted and implemented. They perceive the needs for change and
choose to reorganize the structure of government or parts of the public sector in
order to satisfy various needs such as addressing current administrative problems
or fulfilling campaign promises. The reforms under this category are generally
rationalistic, with a simple means-ends assumption while assuming correct
diagnostics of a problem and a match to the proposed reform. The major aspect of
this reform category is apparently elitist and formal in style.
Peters (2002, pp. 160-66) proposed three sub-categories under “purposive
models of reform" which he refers to as: 1) administrative as usual, 2) political
science, and 3) economics. The administrative as usual is the traditional tendency
of a leader who may see the existing administrative system as an impediment to
achieving his or her goals and therefore attempts to restructure the government.
The political science approach emphasizes the impacts of overall governmental
change on society and economy. Many of the reforms in this approach are directed
toward reducing the size and influence of the government and shifting formerly
public services to the private sector. The third approach, economics, assumes the
rationality of the individual bureaucrat in attempting to maximize his or her utility
through the administrative process. Most of the explanations in this reform category
link the bureau chief with the size of the bureau’s budget allocation. Therefore,
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reform would be seen as a means to gain a competitive position in the budgetary
process.
The second major category of public sector is the environment dependency
approach. This model assumes that governments and administrative systems have
to transform because of the influential environment conditions. That is to say, public
sectors adapt to the environment and create new patterns of organizations for the
fulfillment of collective goals. The external environment, rather than the conscious
choice of a few or group of individuals, plays a large part in administrative reforms
and reorganizations. Various approaches under this reform category explain public
sector transformation in “ex post facto” fashion because they are not specific about
when and how change in the environment signals administrative reform (Peters,
2002, p. 168).
According to Peters (2002, pp. 168-72), the most familiar of the
environmentally determined approaches are “contingency theory" and “population
ecology.” The premise of the contingency approach is that the internal structure of
organizations will, over time, come to adapt their characteristics of the task
environment of the organization (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969). The latter model in this
category, the population ecology approach, attempts to explain the nature of
ecology in administrative reform through the relationship of the population of
organizations and the environment in which the organizations operate (Aldrich,
1979; Carroll, 1984). Just as with biological organisms, all organizations experience
birth and death, and they attempt to survive in their strategic niches either by
creating new organizations or consolidating similar organizations into a single one.
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The final category of organization reform, the institutional models, assumes
values and culture of the organization as the principal force of organizational
change. Rather than viewing organizations as a unified entity directed by politicians
and bureaucrat elites, the institutional models focus on the collective values, culture,
and structure of an organization which may facilitate and or hinder adaptation
(March & Olsen, 1984). This reform perspective tends to emphasize the difficulties
that may be encountered in attempting to produce any rapid or significant changes
in public sector performance through reorganization (Peters, 2002, p. 173).
Peters (2002) discusses the intricacy of reform, which may be initiated by a
rational process, but once it starts the implementation process can become largely
unpredictable. Groups may support particular reforms because they seem to
address problems or provide benefits, but also want reforms to serve as symbols of
their social significance and political influence. When powerful individuals or
groups prefer reforms that are not designed to address particular problems,
organizational change can become a “garbage can” where solutions precede and do
not match problems, which then cannot be solved, and may generate continuing
pressures for reform. Because of differing goals among different groups of actors
what is actually adopted and implemented may not be the same as the original
reform as proposed, and have unintended negative consequences for the
leadership in power.
In the first approach, where reform is directed by rational officials to
maximize their goals, when those who implement reforms have a different set of
interests and goals than the leaders who promulgate them, the result can be a
classical principal agent problem in which powerful bureaucrats resist the directives
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of their political leaders. Administrative reform in this perspective is a struggle
between elected politicians and career bureaucrats. Reforms involve attempts to
introduce mechanisms that reassert control by the principal, the politicians, over the
agent, the bureaucracy. To this end, the reduction in the size and roles of the
bureaucracy are introduced through privatization and contracting-out arrangements.
Jreisat (2001, pp. 541-44) notices that this perspective was applied by OECD
countries in the 1990s and provided the foundation for Canadian reform efforts.
The second perspective on reform, response to environmental pressures, is
often associated with the traditional administrative values of efficiency and
effectiveness. It focuses in part on the ability of the organization to monitor its
environment and to receive and process public opinion or respond to quickly to
complaints. Responsiveness is high on the reform agenda in this perspective and
hence organizing for rapid deployment or redeployment and flexibility count.
Fostering a culture of learning and developing ways of storing and accessing
experience are important. Because decentralized organizations are considered
more sensititve to the environment and more responsive to it, more able to adapt
quickly without sending information up and down a long hierarchy, decentralization
is often emphasized.
The third approach focuses on organizational culture and change, and on
devising incentives so that the goals of organization members will be more similar,
so they will not push off in different directions or undermine reforms. Emphasis is
also on implementation and evaluation reforms, a kind of continual monitoring and
reporting, with goals and milestones carefully laid out and progress measured.
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In sum, the typology of government transformation demonstrates the impact
of different alternative conceptions of reform on the analysis of organizational
change. None of these alternative views is necessarily completely right or wrong,
but each adds a different dimension to the analysis of public sector reform and
implementation. Some approaches emphasize the power of elected executives and
political elites and their policy preferences. Others assume the dependence of
organizations on their environment and hence look for pressures from outside that
may have shaped the reforms. Some researchers focus on the gaps between stated
intents and implementation. When these different approaches are combined, the
result is a rich and textured analysis of complex reforms.

Public Sector Reform Approach: The NPM Discourse

To give an idea of how multiple approaches can help explain a reform or set
of reforms, consider the loose grouping of reforms called New Public Management.
Since there were so many countries which had adopted these reforms, and since
portions of them were pushed by international organizations, for a number of
transitional countries these reforms seemed to be part of the outside environment to
which they had to adapt in some way. Initially, they could be viewed as a rational
response to the economic stagnation experienced by New Zealand, but as other
countries adopted and implemented selected parts, other factors entered in.
Adoption or at least endorsement of New Public Management reforms created an
impression of modernization and efficiency, a certain cachet, or symbolic value, but
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implementation ran into both the internal contradictions among the reform proposals
and different motives and goals of various actors.
Since the 1980s, many scholars have observed the attempted reforms in
advanced industrialized countries and developing countries alike (Aucoin, 1990;
Light, 1997; Lynn, 1997; Olsen & Peters, 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). The
common approach is that those countries have engaged in reforms which have
been generally directed toward reducing the size and increasing the efficiency and
effectiveness of their core public sectors.
In the early 1990s there was a general opinion about the meaning of New
Public Management (NPM) as defined by Hood’s article “A public management for
all seasons?" (Hood, 1991). Hood examined the origins, rise, and acceptance of the
NPM as well as the arguments of its critics. He described it as a set of
administrative doctrines which he and others identified as “new." A number of
scholars conceive these new approaches as a point of view about organization
design in the public sector, though some see them as the application of new
institutional economics to public administration. The application of contemporary
management strategies and tactics in the influential western countries together with
the roles of international organizations like OECD and the World Bank have made
the new approaches to government administration expand worldwide (McLaughlin,
Osborne & Ferlie, 2002, pp. 7-10).
During the 1980s, the Reagan and Thatcher administrations had promoted
an agenda to make the state smaller and more responsive. The linkage of those
reforms to NPM strategies can be seen in using “service charges” as a means to
foster customer orientation and service performance, and in encouraging the
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development of competition. In the United States, the Reinventing Government
movement (REGO) under Vice President Al Gore also contains norms and
principles that closely relate to managerial reforms of other countries including
Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Key initiatives under
REGO such as “cutting red tape,” “putting customers first,” “empowering employees
to get results” and “cutting back to basics” fit well into NPM practices.
The term New Public Management (NPM) has emerged to describe such
reforms. They have in common a particular philosophy, common diagnoses of
management problems, and a set of management solutions and practices. Ferlie et
al. (1996) describe four NPM approaches, based on four diagnoses of the problems
by governments. These models are “The Efficiency Drive,” “Downsizing and
Decentralization;” “In Search of Excellence;” and" Public Service Orientation." The
term New Public Management may include all these models and it refers to a large
category of institutional reform that encompasses devolution, deregulation, market
reforms, and customer service orientations. These reforms often use tools such as
the adoption of performance indicators, total quality management, contract systems,
and deregulation.
Although NPM is perceived as a major paradigm shift, (Kettl, 2000; McCourt
& Minogue, 2001, Osborne & Plastik, 1997) there is no consensus on the content
and almost no systematic knowledge about applied NPM strategies. Some critics
argue that NPM has a weak empirical foundation and consists of a combination of
ideological and instrumental elements (Aucoin, 1990; Frederickson, 1996; L. Leeuw,
1996; Lynn, 1998). Some scholars point out the contradictions within NPM. Its
hybrid theoretical background combines economic organization theory, emphasizing
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centralization and contractualism with management theory emphasizing devolution
and managerialism (Aucoin, 1990).
Jreisat (2001, p. 542) points out that NPM has been many things to many
people, and most reform efforts endorsing some of its tenets remain works in
progress. Even though NPM cultivates economic values and objectives like
efficiency, it also includes different elements that comprise a mixture of
management choices for reformers in the public sector (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1995).
Farazmand (1999) observes that the recent administrative reform in developing
countries has emphasized market-based principles, contracting out, and policyoperation separation, together with a number of institutional changes. These
reforms show the departure from traditional public administration toward one that
emphasizes institutional building and bureaucratization for national and economic
development.
Not only do different countries pick different elements of the reform package
to implement, there are discrepancies between the initial intention of these reforms
and the outcomes of implementation. Those management applications which are
chosen are modified to suit a country’s particular circumstances. A range of
contingent factors such as political system, state strength, ethnic diversity and
economic conditions greatly influence what is chosen and how it is modified
(Common, 2001, Hood, 1996; Peters & Savoie, 1995; Pitt & Smith, 1981). One
would expect therefore that as Thailand adopts various of the reforms they would
not necessarily look exactly like reforms in other countries.
Arguably, the transfer of administrative tactics and strategies from countries
with well-developed bureaucratic apparatus is not a panacea for government reform
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in developing countries. Regarding the applicability of public sector reform
measures, Schick (1998) has noticed that there are important preconditions for
successfully implementing New Public Management-style reform initiatives,
especially the introduction of performance-based mechanisms of accountability.
Schick argues that a sharp dichotomy exists between formal and informal rules of
the game in developing countries, and the informal often predominates during
reform implementation. Countries’ administrative cultures are unique and
distinctive, and in many ways resistant to standard application of public sector
reforms. Administration in those developing countries has come to appear like
Riggs’ description of a prismatic administration in which traditional cultural rules are
fused with modern administrative structures (Riggs, 1966, p. 378).
One of the most important issues in the transferability of NPM reforms to
developing countries deals with the devolution of power in centralized states. The
NPM approach generally advocates devolution of authority to lower levels over how
to accomplish tasks with increased accountability for results to political levels of
government. The issue of power devolution in administrative structures raises the
question of what should be strengthened or be relaxed with regard to the central
controls. From the NPM’s viewpoint, central control as a check on abuse of power
by government officials affects traditional procedural accountability as much as it
does NPM-style performance-based contracting (Polidano, 2001, pp. 55-59).
How easily reforms developed in advanced democracies can be applied to
developing countries also depends on the structures of accountability already in
place. If, for example, a reform model assumes accountability and reporting to an
elected parliament, in a country where the bureaucracy is strong and the parliament
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is weak, the reform may either not be selected or be sabotaged during
implementation.
In Thailand, borrowed administrative innovations have always been adapted
to fit local conditions and political context in Thai administration. Given the
differences between Thailand and the countries where the NPM reforms were
originally created, there is reason to expect that these reforms as well will be
selected and adjusted to match the local context.
The application of reform strategies in the Thai public sector shares many
features of NPM, including the introduction of a more contractual, performancebased, discretionary style of organizational management. The relationship between
different levels of organization such as control agencies and operating units has
shifted to contractual agreements with quantifiable performance measurement. As
a result, old structures have been replaced with new ones, organizational divisions
have been merged or transferred, and responsibilities have been changed along
with the relationships among those agencies. All of these public sector
transformations have often involved considerable investment of money, time, and
political discussion.but they have not resulted in the expected or claimed
administrative outcomes.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK

Theoretical Arguments

With the dramatic change of the public sector during the twentieth century,
many scholars have questioned the implementation and the result of public sector
reforms. These reforms included various attempts by different countries to produce
change in public service provision. Though the theoretical domination associated
with the politics-administration dichotomy has been on a decline (Simon, 1947;
Waldo, 1946), the retreat of the separation of politic-administration perspective
following the 1950s did not alter the institutional nature of government. The search
for new explanations of public administration caused a good deal of theoretical
struggle with mixed success to explain governance in relation to bureaucracies, civil
servants, and the citizen. With the need for public administration theory to account
for the changes in the role and practices of government during the last decade, it is
not clear that there is a particular theory to meet this challenge. These phenomena
can be seen in the worldwide movement to develop alternate methods of carrying
out policy and providing public service.
These reform movements challenge the traditional roles and responsibilities
of the state that have been defined by the Weberian model of bureaucracy and
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management, the classical hierarchy of command and control, and the reliance on
central authority. Although the movements were not centrally planned and varied
widely across countries, they were characterized by common core elements which
included adoption of market-based management, performance control techniques,
an increased reliance on private sector management, and a deliberate effort to
downsize and decentralize government’s roles. A number of scholars have
observed this wave of public sector reform world wide (Farazmand, 2002; Kettl,
2000; Light, 1997; McCourt & Minogue, 2001; Olsen & Peters, 1996; Peters &
Savoie, 1998; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004b; Schneider & Heredia, 2003).
Though the pattern of public administration has changed, one needs to be
careful to distinguish principles of new approaches to the public sector that have
guided practitioners or reformers from those theories which scholars and analysts
utilize in their attempts to understand the changes in the public sector. Given that
there are complex socioeconomic and operational conditions involved with public
sector reform, understanding this phenomenon is an extraordinarily difficult task.
There has been an argument that the public sector needs to implement new
approaches to public administration that should secure economical, efficient and
effective provision of public services. This approach to the public sector is presently
influential in the practice of public administration and is widely known as the New
Public Management or the “new managerialism.” Though there are many variations
of NPM, the majority of these can be described in two models (Kettl, 2000; McCourt
& Minogue, 2001). These two models are the Westminster model, which originated
in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and the reinventing
government model in the United States. In terms of theory, NPM represents a
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serious model of governance. The NPM model of change assumes a rational
approach, with a clear means-ends connection between a diagnosis of a problem
and the remedy. It seeks to improve public sector performance through “business
like” management practices, the devolution of decision power, and the privatization
of state-owned enterprises. Theoretically, the NPM’s explanatory orientation and its
prescriptions stem from public-choice theory, emphasizing competition and selfinterest (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991; Politt 2002). The NPM has become part of the
nature of the modern public sector, despite research on NPM’s implementation that
indicates that NPM principles may result in only selective, short-term cost reduction,
and are negatively associated with fairness and equity (Harrow, 2002; Newman,
2002; Pollitt, 2002; Taylor, 2002).
On the other hand, alternative approaches present an ambitious synthesis of
the field of public administration with a more holistic explanation of governance
(Frederickson, 1999; Heinrich & Lynn, 2000; Lynn et. al., 1999; Peters & Pierre,
1998). According to Frederickson and Smith (2003, p. 245), theory in public
administration should have a capacity to assemble facts into a coherent narrative
with explanatory power and provide guidance for practice. Lynn et al. seek to
establish a logic of governance through a heuristic theory that could be a starting
point for explaining and improving the nature of public sector as opposed to one that
is fully developed. In brief, their logic of governance highlights the multilevel nature
of governance that describes the ends and means of governmental activity and how
these elements connect. These components include policy domain, type of
government, cooperative networks, and competitive market forces. Operationally,
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Lynn et al.’s approach reduces their model into a proposal for econometric models
of government performance or outputs (Lynn et al., 2000, p. 15).
Although Lynn et al.’s concept of governance has attracted scholars,
Frederickson argues that the general governance model may probably be unable to
generate conclusions because “governance regimes seem to be shaped by their
policy domains, and different types of policies lead to different sorts of governance
problems” (Frederickson & Smith, 2003, p. 214). Frederickson contends that the
basic problem of public policy is that it is inherently a political process in which
design, implementation, and administration involve multiple actors with multiple
objectives. Even as a heuristic theory, Frederickson sees that the attempt to include
many factors to explain governance may be risky because of the difficulty of
capturing a loosely defined concept such as management in a heuristic model.
Lynn et al. recognize this problem. However, Lynn et al. never claimed to have a
fully functional theory of governance; their goal was simply to foster a research
program that theoretically addressed the governance of public policies and
contributed to an implementation of administration (Lynn et al., 2000).
Frederickson (1999) refers to the rise of governance debate during the last
decade as the repositioning of public administration that seeks to replace existing
public administration frameworks with a new form public sector and a new language.
Given this, it is unsurprising to find that public administration theory is steadily
moving aw ay from traditional public administration to nontraditional m ethods of

making and implementing public policy. For example, Kettl (2000, pp. 1-2) argues
that the reform movement of public administration theory and practice is predicated
on six important issues: 1) productivity, 2) marketization, 3) service orientation, 4)
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decentralization, 5) policy capacity, and 6) public accountability. These elements of
public sector reform present considerable challenges for the practice and theory of
public administration, as they depict a shift in the relationship between the public
and private sectors and their relative roles and responsibilities in providing public
services (Peters & Pierre, 1998).
The governance and the NPM frameworks share some similar theoretical
arguments. They both have an assumption that the public sector has become
inefficient and government is distant from citizens and society because its
operations were insulated from competition in an open market force (Peters &
Pierre, 2000). Both models seek to use competition to correct the inefficiencies
inherited from government monopolies over public service production. In contrast to
traditional models of public administration, the NPM and governance are oriented
towards the control of output rather than inputs. Essentially, both the NPM and
governance embrace the concept of steering, which means relaxing traditional
hierarchical control of the public sector by using new forms of supervision such as
devolution of authority to lower level bureaucracy, decentralization of decision
making power, and public service contracts. In the NPM’s perspective, Osborne &
Gaebler (1992) are generally credited with coining the phrase “steering
government,” that suggests top-level government officials should set broad policy
objectives rather than taking the actions that fulfill those objectives.
Although the NPM and governance advocate similar underlying changes in
public administration, particularly those nontraditional approaches to public sector
reform, the two models have different intellectual philosophies (Peters & Pierre,
1998). The NPM approach attempts to inject corporate values into the public sector
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- it sees no cultural and societal role for the public sector, and makes no distinction
between the public sector and the private sector concerning a method of
management operation to fulfill public goals. The NPM’s targets are efficiency and
customer satisfaction, values anchored in public choice theory. In contrast,
governance is concerned with the understanding of the process by which public
policy is created under a democratic society. Although there is an institutional
component to both the approaches, governance is essentially a theory of politics
that seeks to explain why government does what it does - it recognizes a
relationship between government and the rest of the society. Hence, governance
does not share the same ideals or ideological goals that seek to bring about a
market-based institutional change in the public sector that characterizes the NPM.
Peters and Pierre’s (1998) argument about governance as opposed to the
NPM is a serious attempt to distinguish between the two theoretical frameworks.
They contend that the theoretical foundation of governance is more encompassing
than the NPM, which leaves governance in an undefined status as a theory. As a
theory, governance encompasses the public sector, the private sector, and society
more broadly in the realm of public policy. In fact, governance is less hostile to the
traditional model of public administration and is less likely to force the creation of a
competitive market for public goods and services. Even if this is so, however,
governance does not anchor to particular points of ideological perspective. These
distinctions directly address the problem of equating governance with the NPM
although the overlap between the two is undeniable.
The overlaps, differences, and areas of theoretical vagueness make it
difficult to explore how NPM and governance have been implemented in real-life
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reforms around the world The models suggest the importance of interactions
between levels of government, and the importance of politics as well as
administration, but perhaps understate the importance of environmental threats, or
external actors, and of changes over time as one reform effort blends into the next
when administrations change. As a result, using these frameworks to examine the
Thai public sector reforms requires some invention and adaptation.
Many neutral experts in Thailand have been more interested in technical
issues dealing with organization development, learned experiences of individual
public sector reform schemes, enhanced productivity programs and practices, or
individual privatization programs, rather than the political dynamics and historical
intricacies involved in the administrative reforms. Further, Thai administrative
reforms have been scattered and intermittent, unable to sustain the interest of many
scholars for long.
Initially, studies on the impacts and consequences of government reforms
were not important in the view of the relatively small group of Thai technocratic
elites and public administration scholars. The appearance of different public
improvement projects in various public agencies, without any underlying coherence
or apparent ideology, made it difficult to implement good and reliable studies. But
political and administrative reform became increasingly significant in the late 1990s
when the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 1997 reform constitution began to
generate calls for a comprehensive change in public service provision and methods
of administration. The need for studies and scholarly interest increased, but the
reforms were so complicated, multilayered, and responded to so many different
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internal and external pressures and influences that investigating the Thaksin
administrative reforms required prior development of a framework for understanding.
This research is going to study the issues that have been poorly addressed
in the literature. This research views the literature on public sector reform with a
critical perspective. It proposes a framework for understanding Thai government
reform under the Thaksin administration via a multi-level approach. This framework
examines and relates both macro and micro issues.
On the macro level the study examines the relationship of external forces
such as internationalization of the market, the New Public Management reform
approach with the particular Thai domestic context that provided a plausible reason
for Thaksin’s administrative reform. The macro level covers the development of
political and administrative institutions in relation to economic and successive
administrative regimes. Specifically, the important events in the 1990s such as a
reform movement, the 1997 financial crisis, and the 1997 reformed constitution are
discussed. However, this is not to discount the period before the late 1990s when
one considers the incremental nature of the Thai public sector reform.
At the micro level, this research investigates the design and implementation
of the Integrated Provincial Administrative System by examining three provinces in
detail using qualitative methods. Interview was the primary method of data
gathering. Since an excessive reliance on official literature and government
publications may have distorted the investigation of the IPAS reform
implementation, interviews with provincial administration including governors,
representatives of central ministry, and local government officers were conducted
during the field research. The provincial observation and interviews were expected
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to capture the context surrounding real reform implementation and actual events,
which may explain how particular reform tactics function, who is engaged and
affected in the reform process, and what the responses to reform implementation
are in different places. The framework offers an appropriate map to examine the
related issues and research questions raised in Chapter 1.

Research Methodology

Methodological approaches to public sector reform can be divided into two
groups, comparison studies across countries and individual country studies. Among
the former group, Olsen and Peters (1996) propose a cultural-institutional
perspective on reform experiences, drawn from eight democratic countries:
Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. The assumption is that each country has a unique culture,
identity, and institutional experience that accounts for potential differences in
reforms across cases. In developing countries, Heredia and Schneider (2003)
provide political economy explanations for administrative reforms, based on
variations in reform schemes across six countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hungary,
Mexico, and Thailand. Drawing on these countries’ cases, the authors maintain that
the effects of the global economy are as important as the social and political
institutions embedded in each society.
Cross-country comparisons are not as common as single-country scenarios
that use contextual variables to examine administrative reforms. Some studies
develop individual cases into cross-national comparisons, drawing a broader picture

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

of international administrative reform. However, difficulties still remain when
comparing multiple countries, as the reforms take place in different political,
economic, and social contexts. Commentators have noted the lack of reliable
comparative data for general administrative reform studies (Pollitt, 1995; Wright,
1994), and recent literature has addressed both the impact of specific changes in
particular countries and general methodological problems in studying administrative
reform (Farazmand, 2002). This information suggests the importance of
understanding the socio-economic and political context around the institutional
structure in which administrative reform takes place.
Despite disagreements over the best research methodology to examine
public sector reform, prominent scholars agree that the dynamic relationship
between political institutions, central agencies, and reforming organizations is a key
element in understanding public sector transformation. Political leadership can
fundamentally reshape government structures and operations through reform
initiatives (Peters & Pierre, 2004). Because the political and organizational contexts
of administrative reforms are unique, observing reforms across agencies is as
important as assessing reforms within agencies (Flynn, 2002). This is not to deny
the important of global economic forces or local factors. Rather, any study on public
sector reform should recognize that the broader forces of economic and political
changes are mediated through networks of institutions. The specifics of these
networks such as economic and political institutions frequently have a profound
effect upon what actually happens during the course of reform and the final
outcomes of the reform implementation.
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To be truly comprehensive, Thai government reform must be investigated at
both a macro level such as international economic forces and a micro level,
including domestic actors such as heads of government, central agencies, and the
reforming organizations. Senior civil servants and executive politicians often initiate
reforms and monitor their implementation, but various levels of public agencies also
interpret the reforms being imposed on them. A fundamental question, then, is
whether a reform is best understood through political and administrative elites, or
rank-and-file civil servants (Barley & Kunda, 1992). This argument suggests that
both the senior civil officials and political executives in Thailand account for degrees
of a reform’s success or failure. Lack of commitment and declining support from
either leaders or rank-and-file can make reforms uncertain or problematic.
Central agencies may have little incentive to advocate for a reform that
decentralizes authority and decision-making. Under high domestic pressures to
deal with a problem, a political leader may choose a quick reform scheme simply to
mitigate the pressure. As Kamensky (1996, p. 248) notes, "conventional wisdom
has long suggested that governmental reform is undertaken largely as a political
symbol.” However, critics have argued that local public agencies tend to resent and
resist reform schemes that are imposed on them (Peters & Savoie, 1994). One
example of this tension occurs when Thai central agencies appear to expand and
increase their power while suggesting other public agencies to slim down and give
up power over policy.
In practice, Thai central agencies such as the Office of Civil Service
Commission and political executives have been at the center of reform design and
process. When the central agencies adopt a highly differentiated reform strategy
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allowing choices for implementation, they risk placing a heavy burden of analysis
and information on themselves, and creating dissent among different groups of
public servants. Hence, the central government’s reform strategy usually requires
uniform practices or mandates to be followed by reforming public agencies (Peters,
1998b). This practice has generally characterized Thailand’s IPAS reforms, which
were enforced across all provinces regardless of the differences in the
characteristics of provincial administrations. Peters (1998b) argues that this
approach is not realistic because a public sector organization is not a uniform entity,
but contains a vast degree of variation in organizational formats and cultures, as
well as managerial problems. Given the degree of variation in management practice
and reform implementation, agencies may perform in significantly different ways.
These arguments suggest that organization theory in the public sector is not
sufficiently advanced to adequately guide an analysis of administrative changes that
captures the differentiation within the public sector (Common, 2001; Hood, 1996;
Peters & Savoie, 1995; Pitt & Smith, 1981). For the majority of public sector
reforms, the principal administrative problem is to solve overlap, duplication,
fragmentation, and restraints in decision-making. The rationality behind the effort is
to encourage lower-level government or reforming agencies to find their own ways
to achieve desirable outcomes. This issue of differentiation of reform practice and
response by the reforming agencies suggests a methodological argument for
observing multiple locations when investigating a public sector reform at the
operational level of front-line public sector agencies.
In a study classifying management change by “high,” “medium,” and “low,"
Hood (1996) finds that the level of reform implementation for his study's observed
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cases cannot be explained by the single variable of economic performance. He
suggests a contingency approach for public sector reform study that includes other
variables, such as the size of government and the degree of integration. Other
literature suggests that front-line agencies are hardly a unified group, since their
interpretations of reform plans and management practices produce various
outcomes (Olsen & Peters, 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). Although certain global
reform movements may influence local public agencies, local constraints may
facilitate or hinder the reform’s implementation, due to internal differentiation of
public sector organization, local context, and certain norms.
Thai public sector reform is ongoing, involving changes in ministerial
structures, administrative processes, and management strategies, and it is a
complex phenomenon, involving politicians and bureaucrats at the national, sub
regional, and local levels. Concerning the stated factors, qualitative interviews are
well suited to collect observations of concepts, norms, and practices (Rubin &
Rubin, 1995; Yin, 1994). In addition, guided by the literature discussion stated
earlier, a single-country observation offers an appreciation of the uniqueness of the
Thai public administrative context, as well as an in-depth qualitative study of
particular Thai concerns such as a major change in economy and politics. Within
this single-country test case, the investigation selects three out of Thailand’s
seventy-six provinces, to capture the different ways in which the IPAS reform is
being implemented and to see some consistency at the provincial level. This study
emphasizes the unique context of Thai politics and economics within which the
Thaksin’s public sector reform operates. The researcher hopes to explain not only
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the macro-level changes in social institutions that constrain or affect reform, but also
the micro-level changes in which the reality and the impact of reform occur.

Provinces as Sites for Observation

As addressed in the first chapter, this study seeks to explore and explain two
pivotal questions regarding recent Thai administrative reform. First, it seeks to
uncover the origin of the Thanksin’s government reform initiative by investigating
both the ideas and norms that key supporters and high-ranking bureaucrats hold,
and macro-level factors that influence the reform. Second, it attempts to describe
the implications and impacts of administrative tactics and strategies imposed on
public sector organizations, provincial administrations, and field ministries. The
latter objective involves an understanding of the interactions and attitudes of key
groups in the reform process. The degree of variation in public service provision and
operations in Thai provincial administration suggest some degree of difference in
reform interpretation.
The finding that different public agencies respond to administrative reform
differently suggests that it is important to understand the specific organizational
context of reform implementation and practice (Common, 2001; Heredia &
Schneider, 2003; Hood, 1996). This study used data on provincial characteristics
(including per capita income, population size, party domination, and IPAS’ pilot
status) to narrow the number of observation sites from 75 provinces down to
seventeen candidates for the first stage of site selection. This work proceeded in a
series of steps.
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To organize a provincial classification, the study established three provincial
classes to be considered for grouping per capita income information based on 2000
and 2002 data: 1) group one, provinces that have “high” per capita, 2) provinces that
have “medium” per capita, and 3) group three, provinces that have “low” provincial
per capita income. The selection process narrowed the provincial list of those three
groups to seventeen potential sites using three population categories: 1) “high”
population provinces, 2) “medium” population provinces, and 3) “low” population
provinces. Finally, those provinces that were categorized in this way were then
screened according to differences in partisan domination within the provincial
territory, and whether the province had been involved in IPAS pilot projects at a prior
time. Following the series of steps, a result of sorting out using the latter criterion
produced three provincial observation sites: 1) province “A”, the site of “high” per
capita income and “high” population with the Democrat Party predominance, 2)
province “B”, the site of “medium” per capita income that has “medium” population
size with the Thai Rak Thai Party predominance, and 3) province “C”, the site of
“low” per capita income and “low” population size with the influence of the Thai Rak
Thai party. Table 1 illustrates descrete provincial class by provincial population and
provincial percapita income.
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T able 1

Selection Criteria for Provincial Observation

Discrete
Provincial Class
High

Provincial
Population size
(FY 2003)

Provincial per
Capita Income
(FY 2000-2002)

1,045,850-1,294,442

66,496 - 479,442

Medium

935,512-498,714

34,190-63,823

Low

370,627-482,181

21,625-32,007

Income in baht (40 baht = 1 U.S. dollar)

In general, budget allocation among provinces is proportional to the size of
the population; a province with a larger population receives a larger percentage of
available resources. The size of provincial population suggests a degree of
administrative sophistication and public service provisions that provincial
administration have to carry out. The study expected that provinces with a
comprehensive administration and high local economic development would have
more capacity to implement the IPAS reforms than would rural provinces with less
comprehensive administrative structures and low economic development. Based on
this presumption, the steps of site selection reflect different degrees of local
economic and administrative advancement.
A province’s political environment can be seen as a historically developed
response to political executives and policy agenda given by central ministries. This
also includes the current intra-organizational relationship among the various field
agencies in the province. Those provinces in which the dominant political party is
the same as that of the incumbent government may be more willing to implement
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reforms, due to government support and political rewards in the form of approved
development projects.
Apart from political climate, experiencing IPAS in the pilot phase is
considered to be one of the most important factors. The study expected that
provinces involved in the pilot phase should be able to more effectively implement
reform practices and deal with obstacles than provinces that were not involved in
the pilot phase. In this study, only province “B” was in the pilot project (See Table 2
for the characteristics of the selected provincial sites).

Table 2
Characteristics of Three Sites Observation

Observation Sites
Province

Province

Province

“A”

“B”

“C”

77,162

44,084

28,825

7,394

12,534

6,539

Socio-economic Characteristics

Relatively high

Moderate

Relatively low

Administrative Structure

Comprehensive

Fairly

Less

comprehensive

comprehensive

316,000,000

267,000,000

248,000,000

Provincial Budget (2004)

5,868,929,589

2,226,026,443

1,833,467,530

Provincial Budget (2005)

7,583,456,068

3,250,416,254

2,131,916,502

Provincial Per Capita Income
(Baht)
Area (square kilometers)

IPAS Governors’ Budget (2004)

Provincial per capita income in Baht (40 Baht = 1 U.S. dollar)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

48

The Three Provinces

The information in this section concerns the general characteristics of the
three provincial administrations where the IPAS reform was observed. This study
selected the three provinces for primary attention from a continuum of Thai
provincial administration. There are distinctive features of these provincial
administrations in term of local economy, size of public services, administrative
sophistication, and IPAS experience prior to the official mandate of reform
implementation in 2003. Among the characteristics are those that were
demonstrated earlier in the steps of site selection. These include provincial per
capita income, size of population, and partisan domination. Additional diversification
of provincial backgrounds is also provided in each individual provincial presentation.
Province “A” is considered a large province, with a population over one
million. Its population density is larger than 150 inhabitants per square kilometer.
Compared to the majority of Thai provinces, province “A” has seen relatively high
economic development. One of its cities is known as a business center. According
to the National Economic and Social Development Board, average provincial per
capita income is higher than 75,000 baht (2000-2002). This factor places Province
“A” in the highest per capita ranking among the three selected provinces. Thailand
has long been the world’s largest rubber producer and exporter, and the province
contributes to this rubber business and production. Economic, social, and political
factors within the scope of the province are dynamic.
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With its large population and economic development, the provincial
administration and all field agencies, headed by the governor, have to be
comprehensive and responsible for a variety of services. This means that province
“A” is given a relatively high budget. Each field agency varies in its number of
divisions and officials, depending on the prescribed function by central ministries.
Many field agencies occupy their own buildings, located fairly far from the provincial
hall. Like other provinces, the provincial office is the center of various types of
activities and formal meetings, though the agencies’ routine operations are divided.
Due to a large administrative structure, the researcher experienced some difficulties
approaching target interviewees. It took more than one week to set up an interview
with the governor because of his tight schedule. In other cases, the researcher had
to travel to different cities to meet and interview heads of field agencies.
Regarding its politics, unlike the other two provincial sites, political support in
province “A” has long been established for the Democratic Party. All eight electoral
districts belong to the Democratic Party’s representatives. In 2004, many observers
believed that the Thaksin administration’s popularity had declined since 2002, and
that Thaksin himself was unlikely to achieve an absolute majority for his own party.
However, Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party dominated most of Thailand's regions in
the 2005 legislative election. Only in the south was this landslide resisted: the Thai
Rak Thai Party won only one seat in the region. The Democratic Party continues to
be the only major opposition party in the parliament. This political climate in
province “A” affected the IPAS reform to some degree. Politicians in local
government were suspicious about the regional reform scheme. Table 3 shows the
administrative components of province “A.”
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Table 3
A dm inistrative C om ponents o f Province “A ”

Administrative Components

Number

Sub-district

127

Total Local Government Authorities: PAO, Municipality, and TAO

141

Member of Higher House

4

Member of Representative

8

Central Administrative Unit

179

Regional Administrative Unit

16

Province “B” has a population slightly less than 800,000 (2003) in an area of
over 10,000 square kilometers; the province has a population density of about 60
inhabitants per square kilometer. Among the Thai provinces, province “B” is ranked
moderately in term of per capita income of nearly 50,000 baht (2000-2002). There
are more than two hundred ceramic factories in and around mineral sites in the
province. The province also houses a large power plant located in its lignite mining
area, which uses lignite for fuel. According to this study’s criteria, the province has
a medium level of economic development, with relative moderate provincial per
capita income. The Thaksin government chose province “B” as one of five pilot
provinces prior to the IPAS mandate.
It is clear that officials in province “B” were mostly aware of the IPAS reform,
which had been implemented during the pilot phase of reform implementation.
There are posters displaying ideas and charts concerning IPAS in the front offices of
major agencies and bureaus. The majority of ministry offices are located in the
complex of provincial administration buildings. The provincial hall was relocated
from an old downtown area to its current location in the outskirts of the city, which is
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designated for government agencies. The old provincial building is occupied by the
office of the Provincial Administrative Organization, a local government unit. Some
central agencies are located near the old provincial building in downtown. Given
that many field agencies are located in the same area in the provincial building,
officials have a higher chance of interacting and physically meeting each other.
Concerning politics, representatives in province “B” are all from the Thai Rak
Thai Party. During Thaksin’s 2000 electoral campaign, a number of different
political party members in the Northern and Eastern regions, who were well
acquainted with local people, switched to the Thai Rak Thai Party, giving Thaksin a
political base in the northern region. The Thai Rak Thai Party has directed much
government spending toward the Northern and Northeastern regions, policies that
are very popular among the poor. As with other provinces, a number of national
policies are channeled through the provincial administration and various ministry
agencies. However, the fact that the Thai Rak Thai party is predominant in province
“B” has raised people’s expectations toward the governor of province “B.” The
governor and field agencies faced demands from the Thaksin administration to
implement government policy, and from local people who raise particular problems
at the provincial offices. All these forces press the provincial administration to
respond effectively to the reform mandate. Table 4 illustrates major administrative
components of province “B.”
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Table 4
A dm inistrative C om ponents o f Province “B”

Administrative Components

Number

Sub-district

92

Total Local Government Authorities: PAO, Municipality, and TAO

106

Member of Higher House

3

Member of Representative

5

Central Administrative Unit

70

Regional Administrative Unit

14

Province “C” is located in the northern region of Thailand. It is a province of
about slightly less than 500,000 (2000) population in an area of about 6,500 square
kilometers. With a population density of over 70 inhabitants per square kilometer,
the province is in the fourth quadrant in rank order. Province “C” has been
considered a remote rural administration whereas 80 per cent of the territory is
mountainous area. The major natural product of the province is teak wood from a
rich natural forest. Almost 70 per cent of the province’s spatial area is forest which
is divided into zoning for conservation, local economy, and agriculture. The per
capita income of province “C” is less than 30,000 (2000-2002), making it a low
economic activity site in the view of this study’s criteria. According to the field
interview in this provincial administration, most middle-rank civil servants wish that
they could transfer to other provinces where social and economic activities are more
exciting.
In fact, this province is considered a temporary workplace for those
bureaucrats who are on the waiting list to be promoted upward toward a larger and
comprehensive provincial setting. Given that many of the representatives of
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ministerial administrations feel that they were in the same situation - looking for a
chance to be transferred elsewhere, and the fact that province “C” does not have a
comprehensive structure, they regularly held informal meetings and gatherings for
both entertainment and work discussions. The relationship among the civil officers
in the provincial administration is very close. Because of the absence of regular
visiting by central officials and politicians to the province, their routine work is not as
interrupted by ceremonies and the need to accommodate high ranking visitors as is
work in provinces “A” and “B.” There are 52 central agencies, and 14 regional
administrative units located mostly in the building complex of the provincial hall.
In the 2001 election, two representatives from the Thai Rak Thai Party and
one from the Democratic Party were elected. As with other provinces under IPAS
reform, a number of national policies are channeled through the reform measures
which focus on local economic growth. However, the biggest challenge for province
“C” was to utilize its forest-rich resources and reserved forest land for economic
development. The general idea behind this utilization, as part of Thaksin’s policy,
has been to transform those forestry lands into profit-making enterprises, such as by
opening forests for concessions. While general government policy is against
deforestation of valuable teak wood in preserved forest areas, the implementation of
the IPAS plan, which concentrated on quantifiable economic measurements such as
increasing local wood craft products, reduced the primacy of the former policy.
Further, the forests make province “C” an attractive target for local politicians to
seek pork-barrel policy concerning the utilization of forest land. In such cases, both
politicians at the national level and local politicians working at the local government
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level were reported to have a narrow interest in promoting public responsiveness.
Table 5 illustrates the administrative components of province “C.”

Table 5
Administrative Components of Province “C”

Administrative Components

Number

Sub-district

78

Total Local Government Authorities: PAO, Municipality, and TAO

87

Member of Higher House

2

Member of Representative

3

Central Administrative Unit

52

Regional Administrative Unit

14

Data Collection and Investigation

Any investigation of dynamic phenomena such as administrative
transformation requires a methodology focusing on administrative processes,
interaction between different groups, and non-rational decision-making. Qualitative
case studies allowed the researcher to investigate the current stage of Thai regional
reform in a real-life context, in which the boundaries and perceptions of
administrative authorities among public agencies are not clearly evident. The
researcher can verify points through observation of processes and through
conversations. Interactions overtime, including actions and reactions, cannot be
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studied effectively except through interviews and observing persons in real
situations.
Most of the data in this study were derived from semi-structured interviews,
observation, and archival information. Approximately thirty-five interviews were
conducted over a six-month period between October 2004 and March 2005. Field
research covered provinces “A”, “B” , and “C.” The interviews sampled key
administrative officers in the central administration, the three provincial
administrations, and other provincial public organizations, including local
government units and provincial chambers of commerce, which have played a key
role in provincial economic development since the 1980s. Interviewees included the
executives from the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), the
governors and vice governors, the representatives of field ministries within the
provincial territories, the executives of the chambers of commerce, and local
politicians from provincial administrative organizations and municipalities.
The study’s goal of seeking to understand the complexity of the IPAS
reforms was announced through letters of consent and verbal introductions. The
researcher approached interviewees by telephone call, accompanied by letter of
introduction when requested. Access to the provincial administration was made by
establishing relationships with referred local staff members. The starting point for
making a short list of interviewees was the official appointment of reform
committees. According to government mandate, provincial administrations had to
appoint committees to oversee provincial reform, called Integrated Provincial
Administration Committees, which included the governor, vice-governor, and heads
of field ministries, civic groups, and non-government agencies. The majority of
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committee members were provincial staff. Chambers of commerce, which are
considered government partners, were also scheduled for interviews, to assure
balanced information. None of the interviewees knew the researcher personally;
they consented to be interviewed either because of a reference from local staff, or
because they trusted that the researcher was in fact a Ph.D. student.
The IPAS mandate has a long time span that affects official transfers across
provinces. However, the personnel replacements and transfers within the province
may not shift the reform plan and central policy on regional administration
significantly. Principal guidelines, such as contractual agreements, devolution of
administrative power, strategic planning proposals, and quantitative target
measurements, are still the fundamental strategies of reform implementation.
Although government procedures and new rules have been applied to the regional
administration over time, the main components of IPAS remain the same. In short,
changing rules and personnel should not affect the validity of this study
substantively.
Following a qualitative interview methodology, the respondents were
encouraged to express their opinions and understandings about the implementation,
advantages, potential drawbacks, and perceived difficulties of the IPAS reform
process. Interviewees were asked to what degree administrative power devolved to
lower level organizations, how they evaluated the level of cooperation under the
reform, how certain problems emerged out of provincial strategic planning and
management, and how particular reform tactics affected the command and control
structure, as well as collaboration among involved field ministries. The interview
discussion also emphasized the extent to which reforms were implemented and how
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the local bureaucrats experienced it. By talking with the key decision-makers who
were engaged in the Integrated Provincial Administrative Committee, the researcher
had a chance to double-check the cohesion and points of departure in their
responses.
Multiple sources of information are necessary for qualitative analysis. Apart
from interview data, this study used archival information, including a literature review
on issues dealing with administrative reform, government reports, news, and articles
from the Thai press. Official IPAS documents, such as reform guidelines, were
mainly from the Office of Public Sector Development. Internal reports and
publications from provincial administration were also collected and analyzed. These
documents not only serve for studying IPAS reform, but also extend the opportunity
to trace the continuity and change of major reforms that preceded the current reform
under the Thaksin administration. The qualitative approach in this study offers a
rich variety of data types. The analysis includes a fresh view of IPAS
implementation as given by the informants through interviews, the analysis of
archival material and internal reports, and the observation of organization context.
Multiple provincial sites enable the researcher to verify related activities across the
spectrum of IPAS administrative reform.

Conceptual Framework

“Administrative reform,” as it is used throughout this dissertation, refers to
deliberately changing the structures and processes of public sector organizations to
improve their performance (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004b, p. 16). The public sector
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changes incessantly, but not all changes are necessarily intended. The word
“reform” implies deliberate transformation from a less desirable state to a more
desirable state; administrative reform involves those who have the responsibility to
carry out public service and policy intentionally rearranging the public sector toward
specific objectives.
The actual effects of intentional change can be less rather than more
desirable. Most scholars are aware that administrative reform is an inherently
political process, as those who engage in it make decisions from various
standpoints and perceptions, playing different roles. As Rubin (1992, p. 20) put it,
reform means change in a direction advocated by some groups or individuals. It
does not necessarily mean improvement. Put differently, reform is a value-laden
concept, and may carry more significant social and political values than is often
perceived (Peters, 1998a). The various sets of influences and dynamics of reform
implementation may facilitate the process or hinder it, with undesirable results.
Various intentions and socio-economic conditions can make a particular
reform mean one thing to politicians, another to different group of bureaucrats, and
still another to the citizen. As many contemporary efforts at public sector reform
have shown in Australia and New Zealand, through widespread market-based
mechanisms and the practices of business management, it is necessary to
understand the drives and perceptions that underlie certain reform approaches.
Public administration scholars have discussed an overwhelming trend away from
traditional public management and toward the New Public Management approach
described elsewhere. The principal questions to be addressed about public sector
reform in Thailand nowadays are apparent. What drives the current administrative
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reforms? How do the various drives translate into reform strategies and tactics?
And what impacts do the reform strategies have on the implementation process? Is
the reform scheme promoting, hindering, or simply accompanying what is
considered a desirable goal of the public sector?
The general discussion above contains two related conceptual frameworks
within which this dissertation proceeds. They are accounting for IPAS reforms, as
well as the implication and impact of reform tactics and strategies toward provincial
administration. This study considers IPAS and the Thai public sector reforms from a
different point of view.
Rather than rely solely on global public sector reform as a major source of
Thai reforms, the researcher also draws on the accumulated observations of Thai
institutional development, the 1997 constitutional reform, and the political and
administrative institutions in Thailand to build the conceptual foundations for this
study. The cultural context and social institutions are among the complex forces
driving administrative reform in Thailand. In examining how IPAS reforms began
and continue, three fundamental concepts will be considered: changes in political
and administrative institutions, management’s paradigm of administrative reform,
and the implementation of reform strategies and tactics.
Institutional change is defined here as the struggle of public organizations
with values and cultures; this struggle is the principal force of organizational
transformation. This concept of change views administrative reform as a process by
which political elites and senior bureaucrats contest and cooperate with one another
to gain or maintain values. Besides formal rules and procedures, public institutions
acquire values, moral models, and cognitive schemes to achieve their goals. Major
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government institutions may cope with constraints and pressures applied by their
social environment, but common policy values can allow cooperation to occur with
little disruption of organizational routines. These concepts will be used to investigate
the role of major domestic institutions, political-administrative institutions, and
international institutions with regard to Thaksin’s public sector reforms.
Various conditions affect the Thai state’s ability to rationalize administrative
reforms within certain political, economic, and social contexts. As Heredia and
Schneider (2003) argue, significant administrative change and economic factors
redistribute power resources and affect public bureaucracies by influencing the
opportunities and constraints they face. In such an environment, socio-economic
problems influence institutional transformation, interweaving existing problems and
causing unpredicted new problems. Governments facing a rapidly changing
environment may be tempted by reform strategies that offer a quick solution as well
as political advantage. Thus, one of the questions raised in this study is how the
socio-economic environment, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the 1997
constitution, in particular, provided an opportunity for IPAS to occur. Especially, the
new constitution mandated the establishment of new type of public sector that would
realize international organizations’ concept of “good governance” and toward that
end ordered the revision of various public laws.
The second concept addresses the design and implications of particular
management strategies and tactics of the Thai public sector reform. This study
specifically looks at some elements of the NPM approach to public sector reform.
Although the approach is widely used, the NPM has been defined in various ways
because of its hybrid theoretical background, combining economic organization
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theory emphasizing centralization and contractualism, and management theory
emphasizing devolution and managerialism. In addition, policy determination in the
NPM agenda is primarily top-down, while its philosophy seeks to free the public
sector from traditional public management as it promotes deregulation and
decentralized administrative power. There seems to be considerable debate over
whether the NPM approach is effective or not, with both sides presenting evidence
and arguments (Heredia & Schneider, 2003; Kettl, 2000; McCourt & Minogue,
2001).

It is tempting to describe IPAS through the NPM’s perspective, because
IPAS contains a typical mix of privatization, deregulation of public sector
management, devolution of management responsibility, performance monitoring,
and contractual agreements and strives to separate policy and implementation.
However, there may be differences between what is described in official documents
and what happens during reform implementation. One the one hand, the rise of
NPM led to an uncompleted search for a new public administration paradigm in
Thailand, producing tensions between bureaucratic power and the new
managerialism. On the other hand, significant tensions operated between political
centralization and managerial devolution and between traditional and private-sector
models of accountability. This study examines a range of management tools that
the Thai central agencies imposed on public organizations as part of the reform
scheme. As forms of coercion, several IPAS management practices do not merely
represent a new approach to Thai public administration, but also entail a crucial
change in paradigm affecting Thai public institutions. The introduction of public
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service contracts between the central government and provincial governors is an
example of a new form of accountability relationship.
Third, the implementation of reform strategies and tactics to which this study
refers means the practices and reactions that the selected provincial administrations
have experienced. It is crucial to recognize when the existing public agencies are
deficient, or too rigid to perform effective service and policy. Under such
circumstances, public sector reform provides an opportunity to put in place a new
and more constructive implementation structure. The tactics of reform
implementation are critical to the dynamics of a given administrative reform. In
investigating the IPAS implementation, this study not only seeks to understand how
reformed public agencies operated on the ground, but also to observe the interplay
and operations of a host of reform schemes and how they relate to provincial
administration.
How to bring about behavioral changes in reforming agencies raises the
question of the appropriate incentives and controls. Also, how does the scope of
reform intervention affect the reform’s implementation? There are tradeoffs that
present a paradox. Lipsky’s (1983) seminal work on street-level bureaucrats sets
out the basic dilemma about the discretion and accountability of field-level officials.
On the one hand, field agencies often need discretion to interpret rules and
implement programs if they are to be responsive to the special needs of diverse
clientele. On the other hand, inconsistent discretion can result in policies that differ
greatly from original intentions. Although the notion of street-level bureaucrats
appears in direct social service provision, the concept applies more generally to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63

public programs for which those at the front lines of service delivery must deal with
complex situations that might challenge the original intent of the policy.
In the interplay between policy design and actual implementation, particular
attention should be paid to exploring the change of provincial organizations when a
new reform scheme was implemented. At IPAS’s operational level, this study
specifically examined the following management issues in the three provincial
administrations: 1) strategic plans and management, 2) performance target
measurements, and 3) power devolution and accountability. These three tactics of
the Thai public sector reform are the core components of the reform design that
reflect the goals of reformers, changing provincial administration in a way that
departs from traditional public administration and management, yet maintains a
centralized structure by central government.

Themes of the Study

In recent decades, the Thai government has increasingly undertaken public
sector reforms. Whereas the government reforms in the 1980s appeared to be
incremental, concentrating largely on economic adjustment policy, the public sector
reform in the 1990s, particularly during the Thaksin administration, has been more
comprehensive and far reaching.
Why were such broad reforms introduced? How have they been
implemented, with what likely consequences? Scholars of public administration
suggest that drivers of reform have varied from country to country. While reform
practices may appear to be similar, particularly with regard to the NPM, there is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64

evidence that the tactics and contents of reform implementation vary considerably
among countries. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the divergence of reform
strategies and the implications of this can be seen in both developed and
developing countries, as the forces and the consequences of public sector reforms
have been affected by political demands, socio-economic factors, and institutional
change.
In addition to these developments in reform and practice, the most important
premise of this research is that administrative reform matters. The Thai IPAS
presents significant challenges to transforming the Thai pubic sector, and the
present analysis is unique in the literature of administrative reform on two levels.
First, it bridges the gap between macro-level and micro-level elements within the
framework of the Thai public sector reform. Second, it reflects on both the dynamics
of public sector institutions and the political and economic context within which they
operate. In addressing these concerns, the researcher presents several important
themes, which will be addressed through this study. These themes may be
overlapping, but can be summarized as follows:
1.

The changes in Thailand’s social and political structures since the 1990s

have increased the perceived need and incentives for Thai government reform,
resulting in a radical shift in the Thai constitution in 1997. The process of
democratization following the ouster of military administration in 1992 forced the
constitutional drafting assembly to transform Thai political institutions, the public
sector, and the whole administrative process to match the transformations in socio
economic and political structures. Apart from prior fragmented attempts of
government reform, the introduction of the new constitution led to a number of
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changes in the Thai public sector and management innovations. There was
evidence that international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank had
influenced the Thai elites to incorporate “good governance” concepts into a
domestic reform scheme.
2. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 created opportunities for strong political
leadership in its aftermath. Perceived as the best choice among competing parties,
Thai Rak Thai, led by Thaksin, won an unprecedented majority of seats in the
parliament through the new electoral and party systems, which strengthened the
power of the administrative regime. In part, a strong administrative regime was
needed to cope with the consequences of financial crisis and constitutional
changes. Consequently, Thailand under Thaksin experienced the strongest
government regime in the history of civilian governments. This kind of
administrative stability facilitated the change in major public sector institutions,
including the reorganization of central ministries and the reform of provincial
administration. The Thaksin administration seized the opportunity presented by this
reform climate to facilitate the Thai Rak Thai’s political agenda by creating political
clientelism through populist policies in regional Thailand.
3. Public sector reform is a complex matter. Successful and unsuccessful
reforms in the past, with a variety of influences, have contributed to the design and
strategies of IPAS under the Thaksin administration. Political executives and senior
bureaucrats agree that reform is necessary, though their reasons for supporting
reform differ. On the one hand, Thai bureaucratic institutions have tried to avoid
politicization by introducing modern management approaches - the new
managerialism or the NPM. However, political executives have interpreted the
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reform implementation in a way that seeks to control both public policy and
administrative processes. As a result, the implementation of reform measures
seems to be contradictory and confused. These were evident in factors
discouraging IPAS implementation, including contradictions in reform measures and
political control superseding the goals of power devolution for provincial governor.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LEGACY OF THAI SOCIOECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

Introduction

Before anyone can understand how much progress has been made in the
Thai public sector due to recent reforms, the political development and
administrative heritage should be reviewed. Typically, the notion of government
reform involves a set of complex historical development and evaluative structures
that tend to stay in the memory of members of the society. These generally shared
psychological orientations are inherited political and administrative cultures that
place at the forefront some norms concerning a country’s public administration. By
using a historical perspective, one can see how social conditions and economic
transformation set the boundaries on the action of government.
However, this is not to say that society’s cultural values are immutable. On
the contrary, there is a constant interaction of culture and politics that redefines the
role of government. For example, the breadth and depth of Thai’s public
participation in political and administrative reform at present would have been
unthinkable before the 1980s. The military regimes had been controlling freedom of
speech and free press to limit the power of communist propagation. The remainder
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of this chapter examines the historical development of politics and administration
that constrains and informs the Thai administrative system.

Reform Historical Landmark under Absolute Monarchy

The development of the modern Thai nation-state has its origins in the reign
of King Mongkut (1851-68) when the Kingdom was known to the world as Siam, a
feudal territory headed by the absolute monarchy. The monarchical administrative
system governed the territory through a hierarchy topped by minor royalty and
aristocrats. They in turn were paid tribute by various levels of officials with the
serfdom at the bottom of the social structure. Like other regions, this was the period
when the Siamese regime had been intimidated by a flux of change driven by the
Western competition of political and economic influences. To survive being
colonized, Siamese kings had to open the country to European trade on terms that
ended the royal commercial monopolies. The Treaty of Friendship and Commerce
(the Bowring Treaty) in 1855, which provided a great extension of British trading
rights and included extraterritoriality provisions, marked a new era in the relationship
with Western states (Siffin, 1966, p. 42).
Amidst the course of Western colonialism, King Mongkut had to make similar
agreements with France and the United States in 1856 (Siffin, 1966, pp. 47-48).
The engagement with the West during this period caused two major consequences
for the socio-economic structure of Siam: 1) the kingdom lost control over taxes and
duties on all of its monopoly trade and commodities, causing major reduction in the
treasury and 2) Siam pursued strategies by accepting drastic skills and knowledge
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of the West necessary to transform the traditional state. The King’s efforts to
balance cultural relationships and economic treaties with various Western nations
greatly reduced the threat of particular economic conquest. In turn, further contacts
with Westerners helped lay a foundation for potential administrative reform for later
monarchs.
Although the beginnings of Siamese reform started in King Mongkut’s
seventeen years of rule, his son King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) is credited with
the establishment of the basic modern administration. By the time Chulalongkorn
ascended the throne, the social and economic transformation had already affected
Siamese society. The major reforms taking place under King Chulalongkorn were
the very first revamping of the overall system. The reforms included the gradual
elimination of slavery and serfdom, the creation of a professional military, the first
state sponsorship of public education, the territorial survey to create the map of the
kingdom, the construction of telegraph lines and railroads, the creation of functional
ministries, and the development of a new pattern of provincial administration (Siffin,
1966, pp. 54-59). Other significant development included the formation of a
Supreme Court, the Ministry of Interior and municipal government, Tesapiban,
though the latter was minimal during the period (Siffin, 1996, p. 87).
By the time of King Chulalongkorn, the Siamese faced three principal issues:
maintenance of independence, internal political consolidation, and development of
economic and administrative strength. The consolidation of central control over
previously loosely administrative outlying regions was vital to prevent territorial
encroachment by Western countries. As a few hundred noblemen and aristocrats
were involved in the work of the King’s administration, outer provinces continued to
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be ruled as lesser kingdoms. Governors were becoming participants in
entrepreneurial activities, and they exploited the subordinates in the territory more
than before. Further, France or England claimed some border areas under which
the Bowring and subsequent treaties were involved. To address this central
strategic problem King Chulalongkorn turned his attention to the integration of
hinterlands into the Kingdom.
The King’s reaction to the exploitation of provincial government was
advanced by a new generation of princes and nobles, particularly those who had
been educated in Europe. For example, Prince Devawongse went to England to
study the cabinet and ministry structure of British government. In 1887, a group of
princes and progressive officials submitted a petition to the king expressing their
concerns on immediate problems facing Siam and suggested that a constitutional
monarchy be instituted (Wyatt, 1969, pp. 89-93). Among other suggestions, this
document proposed that the reform of administrative structure with a clear-cut
ministerial responsibility and a more broadly based political structure could
successfully save Siam from being colonized by the West. However, King
Chulalongkorn expressed doubt about the appropriateness of Western political
models and practices. Instead, the King opted for the reform of the executive
branch of government.
King Chulalongkorn reacted to the progressive suggestions by issuing the
reorganization edict in 1892 that resulted in the sweeping reformation of the basic
structure of the government. These included the creation of a new Ministry of
Justice to control the entire judicial system of the state, a new Ministry of Defense to
control the old Ministry of Military Strategy, as well as the Marine Department, the
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Elephant Department, and the Armament Department, and a new Ministry of Land
and Agriculture to manage agricultural taxes, for example (Siffin, 1996, p. 59). The
young princes supported the administrative reform though their original demand was
to adopt broad-based political participation such as elected parliamentary
government. Hence, the 1892 edict served to cope with the group of old noble
families and the group of young princes and progressive nobles. The reorganization
was instrumental to mollify the disaffected groups while regaining the control of state
power.
Bureaucratic reconstruction during the reign of King Chulalongkorn occurred
simultaneously with the modernization of the Siam state. A major feature of the
reforms was the employment of a large number of foreign technical specialists and
advisors. To balance the influence of different Western nations, most administrative
departments drew their foreign employees from only one nation. Thus, the Ministry
of Justice employed French lawyers, the Railway Department employed German
engineers, Danes advised the Navy, Americans assisted the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the British dominated the Ministry of Finance (Brown, 1978, pp. 193-15).
Technical assistance from the foreign experts to the development of infrastructure
and administration not only served to limit a dominant influence of particular nations,
but also to provide a certain knowledge to the course of Siamese modernization
(Dixon, 1999, p. 32).
One important aspect of the reformation is the modernization of the Ministry
of Interior. Prior to the radical reform of the late nineteenth century, Siamese
provinces generally enjoyed considerable autonomy (Riggs, 1966; Wyatt 1969).
Essentially, the outer regions were characterized as tributary states. Governors
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received no salary from Bangkok, while their positions were based on heredity.
Thus, the reform of domestic affairs was critical for two reasons: 1) it was the
domestic government that sought to capture the administrations that existed outside
the capital area, and 2) it was aimed to supplant the deeply rooted traditional
administration with the modern institution. Siffin (1966, p. 85) stresses that the
Ministry of Interior was seen by the reformers as necessary for national security as
well as administrative purposes, specifically establishing control over the outer
areas. Scholars have agreed that there is a direct connection between the new
bureaucracy following the 1892 reorganization and the shift of norms within the
Siamese administration.
In conclusion, the comprehensive reform during the reign of King
Chulalongkorn created the foundation of modern Thai bureaucracy. During his
reign, relations with Western powers were rapidly approaching stability. The
reconstruction of the bureaucracy had been the central element for the effectiveness
and rationality of the state in dealing with domestic and foreign affairs. Siam
attempted to centralize control while poor transportation and communication
facilities made a large degree of decentralization of power inevitable. Thus, the
reform had to create new functional ministries as well as provincial administration to
effectively control outer territories but not to permit independent provinces. A new
emerging bureaucratic class gradually developed a sense of relationships between
government modernization policy and group interests that were beginning to appear.
The process of making the bureaucracy within the structure of functionally ministries
and departments not only concentrated the decision-making power in Bangkok, but
also expanded the echelons of government to include field staffs potentially capable
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of implementing enacted laws, regulations, and programs in the Kingdom-wide
territories.

Cliques, Power, and Bureaucracy after the 1932 Coup

The basic principles of Thai bureaucracy in the two decades following 1892
enabled enormous development by modern administrative concepts. However, the
administrative system which had been built during King Chulalongkorn’s reformation
period was largely dependent upon the leadership and governance of the King and
his ministries. This major reformation was continued until 1910 when the King died.
The period after the death of King Chulalongkorn produced two significant impacts
on the Thai bureaucracy: 1) an abrupt decline in monarchic administration and
leadership and 2) the growth of educated young men seeking bureaucratic careers.
Economics and internal difficulties during World War I caused emerging frustration
against an inherited monarch which led to military dissidence in 1932. The coup of
1932 did not involve a mass of rural people, neither did it impact deeply on the
bureaucracy. On the contrary, control of government passed to a shifting
succession of cliques led by a small number of military cliques and bureaucratic
elites.
The observers of Thai politics have widely studied the transformation of the
Thai political system in the period of constitutional monarchy where the conventional
Western institutions of constitutional government took place (Morell &
Samudavanija, 1981; Riggs, 1966; Wyatt 1969). Riggs notes that the main arena of
politics and administration in Thailand following the 1932 coup had come to be the
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cabinet as the heads of the ministries with their respective departments. Members
of the cabinet post-1932 constituted the core of the elite who exercised political
power to an exceptional degree. Contrary to western political institutions, the
successive cabinets had been taken in terms of clique rivalry for power. Thus, the
cabinet after the post-1932 period represented a dominant group of political
contenders, often military, whether in the form of one party or a coalition of parties.
Morell and Samudavanija (1981, p. 19) notes that most Thai people in the 1930s
remained essentially separate from the coups and faction struggles in the
parliament.
In Riggs’ intensive investigation about the elitist political culture, he argues
that cliques and factions are often bound by ties of friendship, typically reaching
back to school days and kinship, frequently by marriage. A clique may form an
alliance with other cliques, often producing a “coup group,” to seize the power from
an existing government. A coup group which seized power but lacked members
with enough experience to administer the cabinet position must restore peace and
order by inviting nonmembers-experienced bureaucrats with prestige-to join the
cabinet. Since it is apparent that there are limited positions in the cabinet and ruling
posts in the bureaucracy, the short-term appointment of bureaucrats is regarded as
expendable as soon as the ruling military has gained enough experience and has
consolidated its own power. Frequently, the ruling group chose to hold new
elections and new parliament to legitimize its control by obtaining international
recognition.
Given that significant changes in the state had already occurred in the
1890s, Riggs argues that the Thai public administration following the coup of 1932 is
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merely the “substitution of one oligarchic elite by another” (1966, p. 112). The 1932
coup can be viewed through the alliance of two broad elitist generations, the senior
clique and the junior one, who were members of the small class of military and
civilian bureaucrats. The economic difficulties and recession during the period
1928-32 gave additional impetus to the movement against the absolute monarchy.
These counter-elite groups had been discontented with the monarch’s reluctance to
open up the political system and with the limitation of administrative positions
dominated by the royal family. Although the coup group, calling itself the People’s
Party (Khana Rassadorn) agreed to end monarchical absolutism, different factions
among themselves brought splits and rivalry to the existing government immediately
after the 1932 coup. The power struggle between the military generals and their
bureaucratic allies remains a major characteristic of Thai politics between 1932 and
1992.
Traditionally, the Siamese administrative system had centered on the
monarchy as the basis for its legitimacy. The dynasty and royal family were the
organizing forces to both development ideology and political rules. The end of
absolute monarchy in 1932, however, introduced the new state with the legitimacy
that was based on “representative democracy.” Although Siam escaped formal
Western colonization, the military, social progress, and modernization of the West
greatly influenced new elite groups. The new emerging elite embraced the
democratic institution and the people as the justification for its act. The
announcement of the People’s Party issued during the 1932 coup reflected the ideal
transformation of the Thai state in the 1930s. Pridi Phanomyoung (a Frencheducated lawyer), an intellectual leader of a junior military faction, introduced a
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social reform that combined the principle of liberty with economic development and
a modernization plan (Connors, 2003, p. 40). The plan reflects a nature of oligarchy
in the development of Thai political and administrative culture.
Because of the fact that some elements of the military and bureaucrats
associated with the palace remained a threat for the new regime, free speech was
not allowed through the passing of the Protection of the Constitutional Act of 1933.
On the other hand, the People’s Party enforced a guided plan for a parliamentary
system that would be composed of two categories of members (MP): 1) the
representatives from locally elected constituency who would then further elect
members for national parliament, and 2) the members who are appointed by the
coup group which would be abolished in a specific time. To control and secure the
stability of the administration, the government introduced various measures that
contradicted the concept of democracy. One of the measures manifested itself
when Prime Minister Phibun Songkram (1938-44 and 1948-57), the leader of the
military faction in the People’s Party, extended the role of appointed MPs for a
longer period while the freedom of political party remained restricted. It was not until
the 1997 constitution was promulgated that all members in Thai parliament were
nationally elected.
The emergence of the military power in the state administration was rooted
in the rivalry between the army, navy, and opposing elite groups. Soon after the
end of absolute monarchy, disaffected members of the senior clique within the
People’s Party and the old officials associated with the royal family turned to
counter-revolution activity. Rebellion attempts indirectly contributed to the effort to
consolidate the power of the junior clique within the 1932’s coup group. With
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several successful counter-rebellions headed by Phibun Songkram, the junior clique
gained a momentum of power among the ruling elites while the senior clique
became liquidated. Muscat (1994, p. 38) argues that it was under the leadership of
Phibun as the Prime Minister that the unification of power, economic policies, public
consciousness, and social mobilization took place.
In an effort to implement more rapid modernization that would strengthen the
country’s position in the course of turbulent international environment, the Phibun
administration eliminated vestiges of old Siam by adopting the concept of a nation
state, creating nationalist ideology, building up the military and paramilitary forces,
and prescribing standard behavior for the people including the use of modern dress
and eating and bathing codes. The country’s name was changed from Siam to
Thailand to emphasize the predominant Thai ethnic group and to fuse people
toward the nation-to-be through the rhetorical device of democracy. Connors (2003,
p. 41) notes that the xenophobic nationalism was expressed well in a number of
anti-Chinese measures and the promotion of civilized Thainess through the decrees
of state preferences (Rattaniyom). With the Thai nationalism propagation, the ruling
elites could reclaim economic sectors dominated by the domestic Chinese.
In his second administration (1948-57), Phibun held the premiership for over
nine years. But this administrative continuity did not provide the country with
political stability. The Thai economy had been seriously damaged during the 194143 period of Japanese occupation and by the aftermath of the Second World War in
which the Phibun government collaborated with Japan in 1941 and declared war
against the United States and Great Britain. However, the Phibun regime
essentially belonged to the 1932 coup and People’s Party who had the educational
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and political aspirations of “Western” democracy. The strong anti-communist
scheme of the Phibun government made it particularly acceptable to the United
States as a new emerging hegemonic country (Muscat, 1994, p. 48). Into the early
1950s Phibun had faced several failed coups attempted by a rival clique, particularly
the navy. In September of 1957, power was seized from the administration by the
key rival clique within his own faction, headed by Sarit Dhanarat (the commander of
the First Army) (Siffin, 1966, p. 240).
From the end of absolute monarchy to the creation of nation-state during the
Phibun period, bureaucratic members, mostly high-ranking military officers, had
created the fusion of politics and administration of the Thai state. In their roles as
members of a ruling circle they had shown themselves more responsive to the
interests of bureaucratic subordinates than to interest groups or political parties.
While consolidation and centralization of state power shifted from the royal authority
to the new ruling cliques, ministerial functions and bureaucratic institutions largely
remained the same. The reform proposal following the 1932 coup was hastily
prepared for the transformation of the political system, rather than administrative
advancement of Thai bureaucracy. The clique in the Thai cabinet, as a ruling
institution, was as foreign to Siamese tradition as the house of assembly. As a
result, the cabinet gained control over the assembly because the former had an
effective administrative arm, the bureaucracy (military and civil), while the latter
apparently lacked effective constituency (electorate and political parties).
The new role of the Phibun government was redefined as creating a nation
state, Thailand, where private interests and political participation were restricted to
merely administrative stability. The style of leadership appealed to the bureaucrats
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and the public to remain obedient since old cultural norms provide an easy
rationalization for accepting a “status quo” (Riggs, 1966, p. 325). Thus, when the
political doctrines of administrative authority facilitate the practices of bureaucratic
rule, it becomes possible for subordinates and the “average” Thai people to follow
the leader. One important policy that stresses this norm was the passage of the
Cultural Maintenance Act of 1940, which prescribed the duty of Thai people to
practice national customs and to promote prosperity of Thailand by conserving and
revising existing customs (Connors, 2003, p. 41). The implementation of the law
was expressed in the Department of Interior’s “Manual for Citizens” which reflects
the growing area of administrative control over the population through bureaucracy.

Military Rule and Development Administration Period

The executive branch of the Thai government in the post-1932 period was
headed by the Prime Minister and the cabinet, which was predominantly held by civil
servants or military officials. It is this essential characteristic of Thai politics for
which Riggs (1966) suggests the term “Bureaucratic Polity.” Thai public
administration in the following two decades remained substantively static. Basically,
the 1932 constitution remained the formal framework of government until the
Second World War ended. At this period, political parties were formed and played
limited roles in the National Assembly. Members of the Free Thai (Seri Thai)
movement (a Thai underground movement to collaborate with the West against the
Japanese), who originally took part in the 1932 coup, organized themselves into
political parties. A group of intellectuals and loyalist officials who had not joined the
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coup also formed a progressive party. By 1957, several parties had become active
on the Thai political scene.
In the flux of the post-war years, Phibun’s nationalist policy diminished its
stance. Political debate in Parliament became more and more acrimonious among
different parties and cliques within a party while corruption in the government
increased. In the election of new members of parliament on February 1957, a clique
within Phibun’s faction, Phao Sriyanond, won decisive support at the polls but was
accused by another military clique, headed by Sarit Thanarat, of foul play (Siffin,
1966, p. 166). The Sarit clique staged a military coup in October 1958 against the
newly elected government and declared the temporary suspension of the 1932
constitution. Unlike Phibun’s period where elections and parliament were resumed,
the military coup group led by Field Marshal Sarit governed the exact opposite.
After Sarit’s death in 1963, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, who rose to power
during Sarit’s rule, retained domination of Thai politics and administration for over 10
years until 1973.
A significant transformation of Thai politics, economics, and public
administration came in the late 1950s under Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (19591963). Sarit called his administration a “revolution" in order to distinguish his
government from the political scene of the immediate past (Muscat, 1994, p. 87).
The administration deliberately revised a “Western” ideology of democratic
government by imposing political stability and using harsh measures in order to
maintain administrative stability. During the authoritarian regime, the Sarit
government effectively suppressed all potential opposition. Factional politics
disappeared while disaffected elements kept silence. Sarit's foreign policy in
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reversing the course of potential relations with Communist China initiated in the
Phibun regime was not only appealing to the royalist and conservative elites but
also useful for the regime to enhance the legitimacy associated with the traditional
heritage of monarchy (Morell & Samudavanija, 1981, p. 64). Hence, an ideological
recovery of the royalist revived many traditional ceremonial functions, reopened the
opportunity for royal rural development projects, and occasionally engaged in state’s
matters.
Scholars of Thai study mark that the modern economic development in
Thailand started with the advent of the Sarit administration (Dixson, 1999; Ingram,
1971; Laothamatas, 1992; Muscat, 1994; Riggs, 1966). Unlike the Phibun
government, whose economic policy was constrained by a nationalist policy, the
Sarit administration encouraged domestic Chinese business and private enterprises
to join a new approach to economic development assisted by the World Bank and
the United States. The new era of state modernization has also affected Thailand in
two respects of some significance. First, central national development agencies
were established. These included the National Economic Development Board
(NEDB), the Board of Investment (BOI), and the Bureau of Budget (BOB). In 1959,
the NEDB and the BOI were created as national planning agencies followed by the
First National Economic Development Plan (1961-66). The plan essentially
prepared Thailand for domestic and global economy with the aim of maximizing
economic growth, entailing a degree of liberalization and of import-substitution
strategies (Dixon, 1999, p. 80).
The BOB was created in 1959 the same year that the Budget Procedures
Act was passed. Siffin (1966, p. 176) observes that old budget preparation and
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management processes were almost chaotic, involving large-scale lending and
borrowing of money among individual agencies collaborating with foreign advisors.
Previously, these budget processes were done by a division in the ComptrollerGeneral’s Department of the Ministry of Finance. As part of a technical assistance
program, foreign advisors suggested that the new budget bureau control contested
resources and integrate budgetary process into one coherent unit under the
authority of the Prime Minister’s Office. With the change, Riggs (1966, p. 332)
concludes that this reform substantively strengthened the power of financial
allocation by the head of the government. In hindsight, Muscat (1994, p. 92) reflects
that the creation of new central agencies and related activities appears to lack
sufficient coordination while the institutional role of the World Bank and American
assistance appear to have been decisive.
Second has been the increasing power of Sarit’s regime and a certain group
of leading technocrats who held senior positions in the new organizations. The
junior staff positions whose values and experiences have grown with the
organizations serve as apprentices in these new agencies. In the observation of the
idiosyncrasies of Thai bureaucratic behavior, Siffin (1966, pp. 159-64) discusses a
set of norms relevant to the dominant cultures of Thai bureaucracy. These norms
include hierarchical deference, distaste for open confrontation or criticism, the
reliance upon personal relationships and factions, and the concentration of decision
making at the top. The lack of technical skills for modern management and culture
which was incongruent with legal-rational bureaucracy attracted great attention by
foreign assistance. Muscat (1994, p. 112) points out that it was because of these
acknowledged weaknesses that United States Operations Mission (USOM) financed
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a project starting in 1954 to work in conjunction with Indiana University and the Thai
higher education institute, Thammasat University, to establish an Institute of Public
Administration, the first academic unit in Thailand that would offer a graduate
program in administration.
Under Sarit’s regime, economic and administrative reform contributed to the
expansion of bureaucracy and its penetration into regional development and the
periphery through numerous development projects. Through the framework of
national development plans and other newly established central agencies, the
military, technocrats, and business elites gradually became involved in formal and
informal patron-client relationships (Girling, 1981, pp. 72-78). Politicians were not
significant in the alliance of this period due to the authoritarian rule. The
technocrats saw themselves as the driving force of national development and were
ambitious to cooperate with the military in various development programs.
Economic institutional reform not only created incentives for foreign and domestic
investment but also provided a source of wealth for large numbers of influential
members of government and the military in major private enterprises. In his
investigation on military factions of Thai polity, Riggs (1966, p. 272) demonstrates
that the participation of Sarit and his clique on business boards was predominant
prior to and after his administrative regime.
More importantly, a strategy in the planned expansion of state’s
administration and private market was the grandiose scheme to deter communist
ideology. The state’s role to confine communist threat strengthened the dimension
of security and development. Consequently, the military regime did not develop the
country along the democratic approach but emphasized security measures while
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enhancing control and centralization through administration arms. Dhiravegin
(1992, p. 160) contends that Sarit’s strong administration reflects his perception that
the election and the party systems were not suitable for Thai society because they
led to disunity, confusion, and disorder. Therefore, the public sector became the
institution to be accountable for the demand of the people based on national
security and political stability. This meant pursuing the consolidation of
administrative hierarchies while implementing various governmental projects in
remote provinces and villages as pre-emptive measures against communist
insurgency. Part of this thrust into the provincial territories was made under various
departments under the Minister of Interior, which had been established in 1898 as
the major part of King Chulalongkorn’s reformation.
By the end of the 1960s infrastructure development and economic plans
throughout the regional provinces quickly become established. The Second
Economic Plan (1967-71) was a considerable technical improvement over the First
one. After the death of Sarit in 1963, the military regime under his cohort continued.
His successors, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (1963-68) and General Prapas
Charusatien, continued to rule the country in a similar manner as Sarit except for
some difficulties arising from factional struggle and internal conflict. The Thanom
administration was also pressed by civilian and political opposition groups to put into
effect the new constitution which had been drafted and delayed for a considerable
time since the Sarit period. When the political situation was aggravated by the bitter
conflict with rival cliques, Thanom allowed the new 1968 constitution in which a
semi-parliamentary system was established with a two-house legislature
(Dhiravegin, 1992, pp. 193-95).
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As noted above, Thai military regime was institutionalized. A decisive action
to access political and economic resources is considerably attractive for military
cliques. In the aftermath of the 1969 election, elected members of parliament in
both the government and opposition parties intensely voiced various conflicts in the
parliament. In fact, Thanom himself did not run in the election but received the
support of his organized political party to hold the premiership. Finally, in November
1971 Field Marshal Thanom, with the support of the army within his clique, staged a
coup and continued a dictatorial rule. The new regime abrogated the Constitution,
and banned political parties and political speech. Under the dictatorial rule, Thanom
had attempted for a further period to create political stability but his administration
proved to be disastrous for the middle class in Bangkok and rising liberal-minded
bureaucrats (Connors, pp. 60-61).
Deep resentment against the regime culminated in the student uprising of 14
October 1973, demanding a return to constitutional rule. The riot led to a bloody
massacre of student protesters but a disaffected military clique, with General Krit
Sivara as the army commander, refused to cooperate with the government in the
repression of the student demonstration. Thanom and other leading rulers went into
exile when the King requested peaceful withdrawal of involved groups. Amidst a
political vacuum, the king appointed an interim administration under Dr. Sanya
Thammasak (1973-75). Concerning this important intervention, Morell and
Samudavanija (1981, p. 69) note that it was the first time in the history of Thailand’s
constitutional monarchy that a premier was bestowed on Thai democracy by the
King.
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In the following period came civilian governments between 1973 and 1976.
Once again a parliamentary experiment was attempted. After long years of military
rule, several civil groups, especially student organizations, labor unions, and
farmers’ groups, began to press the government to alleviate their grievances and
social problems. These demands were in stark contrast to organized right-wing
offensive groups such as the militant Red Guards, Village Scouts, and Navapon,
which were believed to have been mobilized by conservative forces including the
Buddhist Church (Dixon, 1999, p. 97). The governments had to contend with rising
liberal intellectuals and the conservative forces while it was clear that the civilian
government was unable to cope with the situation. As great political turmoil and
street demonstrations arose after the sudden return of Marshal Thanom to Bangkok
in September 1976, a coalition of military, bureaucrats, and capitalist forces backed
a military coup to bring political stability to the country (Connors, 2003, p. 62). The
military returned to power in the wake of the crushing of student demonstrations in
the bloody event on October 6, 1976.

Democratization, Market Force, and the 1991 Coup

The progress of Thai politics and administration in the earlier period
illustrated the decision-making structures and processes that resulted in
bureaucratic and military unification. Security and development dimensions were
fused with political dimensions and various policy reforms. The 1948-73 period of
dictatorial rule saw the consolidation of anti-communism and development
administration as the rationale for political stability. Administrative institutions were
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used to strengthen management capacity, and economic development, as well as to
tarnish political opponents, including those who called for a constitution and
parliamentary forms. The period of 1974 -1976 renewed civilian governments and
the progressive movement that challenged state power. With economic growth and
demand for liberalization, broad social participation put pressure on the securitydevelopment to respond to the changing environment.
The bloody events of October 14,1973 and October 6, 1976 can be
characterized as the natural outcome of an incongruity between social-economic
change and political development. The lack of appropriate institutions to
accommodate societal demands was expressed in the uprising against the militarybureaucratic regime to open the state’s political-administrative institutions to nontraditional groups, including the middle class (Dhiravegin, 1985), business
entrepreneurs (Laothamatas, 1992), and provincial notables (Pongpaichit & Baker,
2000). Between 1973 and 1992, the military-bureaucratic regime gradually lost its
power in the parliament and the cabinet. Consequently, the character of Thai public
administration began to shift from bureaucratic domination toward a democratic
system, “democratic polity” (Neher & Marlay, 1995). This can be seen during the
period between 1977 and 1988 when the government of General Kriangsak
Chamanand (1977-80) and the government of General Prem Tinsulanonda (198088) had attempted to relax their grip on power.
After the crisis of October 1976, the cycle of extremists, the sharp swings of
the political and civil pendulum, took another year to resolve. The military first
supported a civilian administration under Thanin Krivichien (1976-77). As noted
above, the long period of anti-communism resulted in the overreaction of the state
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and the underdevelopment of civil participation. Thanin’s administration also
banned political activities and required students to gain permission to hold even
social activities (Connors, 2003, p. 91). A number of students and intellectuals were
driven into remote regions in the South and Northeast to escape government
persecution. The administration proclaimed a “democratic socialism” policy,
meaning a limitation of rights in favor of more economic equality. Thanin spoke the
language of land reform, economic justice, and equal opportunity, but also related
these to traditional institutions, “a democracy with the king as head of state.” It soon
became apparent that the political reform was counterproductive. Thanin’s failure to
cohere liberal and conservative groups around the new administration came to an
end in October 1977 when the army staged a coup and installed General Kriangsak
Chamanand as Prime Minister.
Under the Kriangsak administration (1977-80), the government survived
coup attempts by various military factions. Although the administration lacked
strong support in both the parliament and the military, efforts were made to stabilize
and expand the economy and to reduce rural insurgency. However, the end of the
Vietnam War and the withdrawal of the U.S. military in Thailand in 1976 reduced the
inflow of aid and transfer payment. The salient external event that affected the Thai
economy was the impact of world inflation in the late 1970s. These factors caused
the Kriangsak administration to allocate substantial resources to national security
(Dixon, 1999, p. 98). The interaction of the shifting domestic events and the
external economic shocks changed the framework of state policy toward mild
authoritarian and economic management. The military started to lose control of
many strategic areas and was unable to cope with the economic policy effectively.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89

During the 1979 international oil shock, the Kriangsak government failed to
handle the economic and financial stability of the country. He was harshly criticized
by the public and support from the House of Representatives and the Senate
eroded. Thus, Kriangsak submitted his resignation in early 1980. General Prem
Tinsulanond (1980-88), the army commander and minister of defense, who was
overwhelmingly supported by major parties and the business community, led a new
cabinet. These two administrations were characterized as “semi-democracy,” in
which the constitution of 1978 allowed extra-bureaucratic players while seeking to
entrench bureaucratic and military power in the upper house. The administration
recognized political activities and social activist groups within a legal framework.
Prem’s administration, like that of Kriangsak, was based on a combination of civilian
and military leaders with the greater influence of business groups tied into state
policy. This is expressed in Prem’s cabinet members, as almost half of them were
people with business backgrounds (Laothamatas, 1992, pp. 33-34).
Economic management was becoming more complex during the 1980s. The
military and bureaucratic elites sought to maintain their control on national policies
by forming an effective alliance with business groups. These had been
implemented through the strategic positions in the National Economic and Social
Development Board (NESDB), the Minister of Finance, the Bureau of Budget, the
Minister of Defense, and the Minister of Interior. In his analysis of business
associations in Thailand, Laothamatas (1992) points out that the Joint Public and
Private Sector Consultative Committees (JPPCCs) had played significant roles
during the Prem administration. The JPPCCs had given key business associations
formal access to an unprecedented discussion on government policies. The
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importance of these committees expressed itself in the rapid expansion of central
JPPCCs in all provinces during the Prem period. Within a framework that
development programs would remain consistent with policy objectives, Muscat
(1994, pp. 180-84) argues that NESDB’s fifth plan (1982-86) has been a “milestone
document” in Thai development planning.
Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Thai economy suffered
from the impact of the oil price rise, subsidized energy, inflation, and a budget
deficit. Many commentators had pessimistic pronouncements on economic
progress. The negative aspects played a significant role in the policy changes
during the Prem administration. The technocrats suggested a transformation that
focused on long-term structural adjustment and austerity programs aimed at
curtailing inflation and the balance of payment deficits. With the assistance
provided by the World Bank, these measures and proposals were incorporated into
the Fifth National Plan (1982-86). Between 1982 and 1983, the Thai government
accepted two Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) as key elements to pursue the
national plan (Muscat, 1994, p. 176). The major contribution of the SALs was to
help the institutional development of central agencies, chiefly NESDB, the Bureau of
Budget, and the Ministry of Finance, to organize the policy concerns within a
rationalizing framework.
In part, the liberalization of politics and economics of the 1980s facilitated
economic recovery and growth in the late 1980s. Although Prem’s cabinets were
threatened by the rivalries among coalition parties and some military factions, Prem
was able to establish the alliance of the bureaucracy, especially the economic policy
technocrats, and the senior military. Working against the military-bureaucrats were
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political groups whose power derived from minor business and civilian-based
political parties. Within the constraint of public-sector capital projects, the political
parties and their respective cabinet members voiced intense interests involving
large-scale capital projects. Although the reform of macroeconomic policy was
stabilized, political rivals associated with competing interests among the coalition
parties increased. In his late government, Prem appeared to lose the coherence
within his administration and announced that he would not accept the premiership
again.
The double-digit economic boom in the late 1980s created the rapid rise of
new groups of provincial business and domestic firms. Essentially, the liberalization
and expansion of the capital market facilitated business groups to raise money from
domestic and overseas capital markets. Increasing rural wealth can be seen in the
growth of the provincial banking system. By the 1980s, the number of bank
branches outside the Bangkok and surrounding metropolitan areas had shifted from
239 in 1960 to nearly 1,500 in 1988 (Ockey, 2000, p. 80). Much of the increase was
forced by national policy to promote growth in the provinces. Among the most
profitable businesses that emerged throughout the provinces were associated with
government local infrastructure projects and illegal operations. Pongpaichit and
Baker (2000, pp. 36-41) argue that the new business groups acquired political
influence as a strategy to extend or defend their business position by participating in
democratic politics. Economic development was not the only factor to generate the
local power that would challenge the bureaucracy. Equally important, the return of
elections and parliament after the Prem period provided the path to power of these
new groups.
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Following the election in July 1988, the Chart Thai party’s leader, Chatichai
Choonhavan, was chosen to be Prime Minister among the coalition parties. Under a
new dynamic interaction between the ruling bureaucrats and technocratic elites and
civilian government, the latter increasingly demanded political change as opposed to
"semi-democracy” and bureaucratic prerogative. A significantly larger number of
cabinet positions in the Chatichai administration (1989-91) were occupied by elected
politicians who rose from provincial private businesses (Pongpaichit & Baker, 1995).
All cabinet members under the administration were elected civilians, which was a
significant departure from the predominantly unelected members in the past.
Muscat (1994, p. 171) points out that in the wake of the disappearance of the
communist insurgency and with the new income in the economy, the military might
have considered that coups were becoming less acceptable. It seemed that the
direct military intervention in politics was over. However, the democratic
government under Chatichai was overthrown by the military coup of February 1991.
When entering into office in 1989, the civilian Prime Minister Chatichai
already had the plan for administrative reorganization. Chatichai immediately
moved to reduce the power of the bureaucracy by relaxing the policy process
established during the Prem period. Although the basic economic policy framework
had not been changed, the administration suspended the policy apparatus and
processes that it inherited while leaving the economic technocrats with only
marginal influence. Chatichai interrupted structural adjustment reform by replacing
the technocrats and NESDB and other agencies with new personal advisors who
were young academics. Muscat (1994, p. 223) stresses that the Chatichai
government ignored the policy reform maintained during the Prem years because of
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the economic boom of the late 1980s. Apparently, the changes of personnel
technocrats and policy engaged the administration with disputes and incidents
involving the army.
Although the administration received popular support in the beginning, it lost
the support of the press and the middle class in Bangkok within a short period. The
rapid move of Chatichai appeared to involve a series of bribery scandals,
particularly in connection with major infrastructure projects and factional rivalries
within the military. These, widely believed to have extracted personal and factional
benefits from political offices, attracted swift public attention. When the bloodless
military coup finally occurred in February 1991, it appeared to have wide
bureaucratic and public support. It was corruption that provided the excuse for
military intervention. However, this incident was not a simple return to authoritarian
rule in which power would be held by the military to protect the nation. With a
significant social and economic change, it was not surprising that the National
Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) announced their intention to restore parliamentary
government in the near future.
In hindsight, Samudavaija (1997) argues that a principal reason for the
success of the overthrow of the Chatichai administration was consensus among
military and civilian bureaucrats and big-business interests. During the Prem period,
several coups failed miserably since there was no consensus on the need for a
change of government. Conversely, Chatichai interrupted the rule of state
decisional power by negotiating directly with members of the business community
while offsetting the influence of technocrats. The administrator kept decisionmaking among his cabinet instead of consulting with the NESDB and the central
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JPPCC, as Prem had normally done when making major economic policy decisions.
From an economic policy perspective, the Chatichai administration represented
mainly a pause, characterized by preoccupation with political games, selected large
projects, and the pursuit of economic rents.
While the 1991 coup contained significant support from various groups, this
power seizure was distinct from previous coups in that the military group was not
able to exert complete control over the political agenda. The NPKC appointed a
respected business and bureaucratic retiree, Anand Panyarachoon, as an interim
Prime Minister, followed in three months by General Suchinda Kraprayoon (1992)
after a national election. In a short period, the Suchinda and Anand administrations
introduced reform policies which strengthened the power of bureaucrats. The
military and bureaucrats were in control of top positions, including the Ministry of
Interior, which controls provincial administration. The NPKC also changed the
boards of major public enterprises and replaced them with its leaders and allied
technocrats. Following the April 1992 election the military attempted to keep control
of parliament through the nomination of the coup’s leading officer, General
Suchinda, as Prime Minister. In May 1992, hundreds of thousands of citizens
protested in Bangkok, deeply disappointed over the return of unelected military to
power and the planned political outcome. The public call for Suchinda to resign
culminated in massive demonstrations which led to “May violence” when the
administration decided to crush the uprising. King Bhumiphol intervened personally
in the political crisis, resulting in the withdrawal of the army and the collapse of
Suchinda’s government.
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Conclusion

The main points of this chapter can be briefly summarized. Features of the
existing politico-administrative regimes are likely to exert a significant influence over
both the choice of government reforms to be adopted and the feasibility of
implementing certain types of policies. Political structures, the nature of central
executive government, the relationship between domestic forces and international
institutions, the global economy, and the prevailing administrative culture all have
effects on which reform strategy was introduced and implemented. Thus, certain
administrative regimes look as though they are nationalism-oriented, while others
are more open to democracy and market-oriented reform. The remarkable
reformation of Siam during the middle and late nineteenth century (King Mongkut
and King Chulalongkorn) was primarily a response to the threat of British and
French colonialism. Reform strategies were expressed in bureaucratic
modernization.
After the monarchy was overthrown by the 1932 bloodless coup, a
constitutional monarch was substituted. A new elite group of military men and
civilians were primarily concerned with state-building rather than democracy or
reforming the public sector. Although a constitution was promulgated, this only
served to guarantee the existing regime. The military coup has become the usual
means for transferring power among rival cliques. During most of the military-led
administrative periods, elections and political parties are allowed. However,
elections are not held for the purpose of change in policy reform but as elitist
contests. Thus, administrative reforms were initiated by the group of military-
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bureaucrats under individual governments in response to their perceptions and
socio-economic circumstances, especially the communist threat during the postWorld War II period. During that period, Thailand received a large number of grants
and support from the United States and international organizations for military
security and institutional development project. This assistance made technocrats
emerge in the center of a national economic and social development process along
with the ruling group.
A significant change to expand popular control over the military-bureaucratic
elite emerged in the aftermath of student and popular uprisings late in 1973 during a
military authoritative regime. The military elites were thus confronted with the
groups outside the official parties and parliamentary institution. Despite militarybureaucrats becoming institutionalized, gradual transformation toward civilian
parliamentary institution has been increasingly significant. Participation within
democratic rule becomes the counterbalancing force against the prevailing military
and technocrats. It is tempting to conclude that the collapse of short military
intervention in the coup of 1991 has propelled Thai society in the direction of
democratic politics based on civilian government. With such a political environment
as well as the force of globalization, demands for liberalization and participation
have put pressure on the Thai state to reform its political and administrative
institutions and to accept more responsibility.
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CHAPTER 4
THE 1990s REFORM AND THE RISE OF THAKSIN

Introduction

Administrative reform cannot be adequately comprehended without
reference to the crucial relationships that exist in a complex political and economic
environment (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004a). Changes are likely to be influenced by
the actors who are involved in the state’s affairs: politicians, civil servants, external
consultants, and citizens. Administrative reform in any country is the product of
local preoccupations and priorities as governmental and private actors respond to a
changing environment. In Thailand, what were political executives and bureaucrats
seeking to accomplish and what barriers did they face under the given
socioeconomic situation? In this regard, it’s crucial to consider both the continuities
and changes in the reforms since the 1990s in order to grasp the pattern of reform.
Politics and administration in Thailand can be characterized by competing
tendencies towards democracy and authoritarianism. When the absolute monarchy
was brought to an end in 1932, it was followed by authoritarian regimes with
constitutional rules, dominated by a small group of military-bureaucratic elites.
During the 1980s, Thailand was ruled by an unelected ex-military premier with the
support of an elected parliament. However, since the coup of 1991, the military has
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become less politicized while popular participation and parliamentary democracy
have become the dominating forces in the political sphere.
As Thailand’s economy modernized, characterized by a thriving
agribusiness, an export-oriented industry, and a successful tourist industry, political
and administrative institutions seemed not to keep pace. The resulting tension was
reflected in the reform movement following the 1991 coup and later the advent of
the 1997 constitution.
Despite various attempts to introduce new laws and newly designed
institutions to relax the state’s centralization, functional redundancy, bureaucratic
expansion, and corruption in all levels of government, observers of public
administration found that the same negative patterns continued. Whereas
piecemeal public sector reforms between 1992 and 1996 could not effectively
transform the Thai society, the theme of reform specified in the 1997 constitution
was, in many respects, the most important reaction to institutional inertia. The
constitutional goal of making Thai politics more open, including increasing local civic
participation, decentralization, inclusion of non-governmental agencies, and the
creation of independent public agencies, was unprecedented. Some reforms have
been sweeping changes, such as those involving the electoral system, local
decentralization decrees, and the creation of independent oversight agencies.
Other reforms have been more incremental in order to improve the way functional
ministries and departments administer policies.
While much of the reforms were internally generated, international influences
also played a role in modernizing the state’s institution. Thailand was more open to
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international influences as its economy modernized, and especially as the country
adapted to the Asian fiscal crisis.
This chapter will consider pivotal factors that contributed to fundamental
reform during the Thaksin administration (2001-2006). The chapter first discusses
the global context that influenced Thai governmental reform during the past
decades, including the impact of international economic transformation, the diffusion
of relatively common ideas about reform tactics, and the roles of international
organizations in Thailand’s institutional changes. The other significant factors that
have generated political change are discussed in following sections.
The chapter will analyze the drive toward an ideal constitutional democracy,
social participation, and decentralization. This movement culminated in the 1997
constitutional amendment which is popularly known as the “People’s Constitution.”
The second contributing factor to the reforms was the 1997 financial crisis and its
consequences on economic structural reform. Lastly, the chapter will briefly explain
the rise of Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party as a new political force of Thai
politics following the 2001 general election.

Global Context and Local Reform Receptivity

Typically, global economic forces have been a vital factor in prompting
consideration of public sector reform. However, such forces do not determine the
precise timing, form, and degree of administrative reform. Scholars who observe
public sector reform argue that the pattern of management change has differed
considerably from country to country, suggesting that the effects of the global
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market vary from one country to another. Changes in the global economy may
provide the pressure, but they do not supply ideas or models of how the public
sector could be better organized. Although economic globalization seems to be a
major influence on institutional change, a number of other intervening variables
should be analyzed to completely understand the reform in particular countries.
One of these forces is international organizations that may influence countries’
administrative reforms.
The roles of international organizations and Western countries have long
been recognized as important factors that contribute to socio-economic changes in
a number of individual countries. For many transitional economic countries,
institutional reform has been done through structural adjustment programs with the
support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (World Bank,
1983). Political leaders and senior bureaucrats have shown sensitivity to economic
pressures and requests from international organizations in their designs for
structural reform. Global economic forces influence the work of international
organizations. Assistance from these organizations has often been accompanied by
approaches to institutional reform that result in some degree of policy convergence
through a process by which reform tactics became increasingly similar over time
(Bennett, 1991, p. 219).
In countries collaborating with the European Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), rising government expenditure coupled with
poor economic performance inspired a set of fundamental questions concerning the
effectiveness of public bureaucracies (OECD, 1995). Since 1989 the OECD has
developed a wide range of administrative reforms for the member countries through
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its Public Management (PUMA) program. OECD and other international
organizations developed a shared emphasis on improving the effectiveness,
efficiency, and performance of recipient countries and members. These common
principles do not mean that the reform approaches and the practices of member
countries would be identical in all respects, but they do suggest that when a
government wants to gain support of these international organizations it is more
likely to adopt reforms to achieve the goals these organizations support; hence
different countries’ reforms began to look somewhat similar.
Scholars who study international relations generally agree that the activities
of supranational and intergovernmental organizations affect the ability of individual
states to make policies appropriate to their particular political, economic and social
contexts. Stallings (1992) has argued that there are three major channels through
which the policies of supranational organizations can have an impact on domestic
policies. First are short-term fluctuations and long-term developments in
international trade and financial markets. Second, the leverage that creditors have
on borrower countries can limit the latter’s policy options. Third are transnational
social and political networks, especially business and technocratic collaboration that
link domestic and international actors.
Stallings explains that high economic growth, freely available financing, and
competition among industrial and socialist countries in the 1970s allowed the
recipient countries to avoid high pressure to reform compared to the 1980s when
lower growth rates, less availability of finance, and emerging consensus on the
advantage of markets put heavy pressure on domestic reform. The incentive for a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102

borrower country to reform was reinforced when a lender’s threats and promises of
rewards are credible.
In Thailand, the influence of the IMF and the World Bank is apparent in the
country’s economic development history following World War Two. Three policies
that were directly and indirectly prescribed by the supranational organizations were
communist containment, efforts to modernize public organizations and management
systems, and the introduction of the first national development plan which
emphasized a free market economy.
For most of the post-war period, successive Thai governments explicitly
promoted industry while implicitly discouraging agriculture. Consequently, the
institutional transformation and economic policies of subsequent governments
largely focused on infrastructure projects while attempting to develop a secure
environment for export and domestic investment.
Supranational forces, such as the World Bank, focused their policies on the
close relation between policy makers in Thailand and other recipient countries while
suggesting a rapid economic development approach for key government agencies
(World Bank 1983, 60-3). Typically, major contributions from international
assistance programs were intended to enhance Thailand’s policy apparatus,
especially to organize the management capacity of central agencies, like the Bureau
of Budget, the Ministry of Finance, the National Economic and Development Board,
and other central planning agencies. In part, long-term strategies to encourage
foreign investment included the removal of various free market obstacles such as
state enterprise monopolies, state subsidies to certain business sectors, minimum
wages, and price controls. The intended result was high levels of economic growth.
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By 1970, the Thai economy included roughly seventy state enterprises.
Although many of these enterprises were seldom profitable, the state-owned
enterprises as a whole earned net revenues for the government prior to the oil price
rise in the mid 1970s. The successive governments following the 1970s were
unable to make major state enterprises recover rising costs and they faced
problematic financial conditions, forcing them to refinance their capital expenditure
from external sources, especially the IMF and the World Bank. As the supranational
organizations’ view of state-owned enterprise shifted toward privatization, the idea
of improving the state enterprises of Thailand arose in the early 1980s (Muscat,
1994, pp. 196-204). Despite strong encouragement from the international
organizations to privatize to improve the state enterprise efficiency, each of these
early privatization initiatives became enmeshed in a political contest among various
groups.
Thai economic development policy shifted from nationalism and
protectionism to a more open economy, with the assistance of supranational
organizations. The economic policies between the 1980s and the 1990s saw the
introduction of private concessions, contracting out of public service to private
business, and various kinds of privatization measures. The World Bank continued
to argue for the privatization of state-owned enterprise and state decentralization
(World Bank 1996, 1997). The Thai government response to these external
pressures can be seen in infrastructure projects such as telecommunications,
energy, and expressways that were encouraged under the privatization schemes.
In principle, the policy was to reduce the burden on public spending, to increase
efficiency, and to control construction projects. The privatization of state-owned
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enterprises has become part of the common language for almost all government
agencies in Thailand.
During the 1970s, there were delays in the structural adjustment program
and unexpected difficulties in most borrowing countries. To this point, the World
Bank insisted that developing countries needed to develop better management with
regard to public spending, public enterprise, and civil service reform programs
(World Bank, 1991, p. 2). It appears that the World Bank came to the conclusion
that privatization is not necessarily the only solution for transitional economies,
although privatization seemed to work better in developed countries. The new
perception promoted by the World Bank was that improved governance would
produce better policy outcomes in individual countries. Stalling (1995) points out
that the shift towards the issues of governance and a gradual reassessment of the
usefulness of privatization as an economic policy in developing countries began in
the late 1980s when the consensus of a “reduced government role in the economy”
started to dissolve.
The World Bank’s interest in the notion of governance can be traced to the
publication of its report in 1989 (World Bank, 1989). The Bank concluded that “good
governance” is central to creating and sustaining an environment which fosters
strong and equitable development, and it is an essential complement to sound
economic policies. It was the advancement of a revised lending program that led
the Bank to focus on improvements of overall public sector management and the
improvement of sector-wide institutions. This concept of good governance was
emphasized in the succeeding World Bank documents as the response to adverse
policy consequences in borrower countries (World Bank, 1992). Consequently, the
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World Bank’s role in the diffusion of “good governance” language among borrower
countries in the late 1980s was expressed in its general guiding principles attached
to loan conditions and assistance programs.
However, it was not only explicit conditions of loans and assistance that
favored the adoption of a particular set of governance reforms. It has been argued
that “globalization,” particularly the acceleration of global economic integration and
interaction, has facilitated the adaptation of ideas and lessons across the public
sector worldwide. Ikenberry (1990, p. 101) argues that international competition and
cooperation spreads ideas and policies by suggesting that decision makers adopt
the efforts of leading capitalist countries concerning economic and governance
approaches. Hence, countries might consider the policy solutions available within
the international community.
For example, more than twenty delegations from foreign governments visited
Britain in the 1980s in the search for the “best” policy. At that time foreigners were
particularly interested in how Britain’s privatization policy was working (Henig et al.,
1988, p. 458). Through the process of seeking solutions, political elites and
bureaucrats observed changes in the social and economic reform of other states
and came to expect similar standards at home. Thus policy learning provided a
channel for the diffusion of particular administrative reforms. The receptivity of
decision-makers to new ideas is not automatic, but the new practices and
experiences from abroad offered reference points for potential reform policy.
Following the worldwide economic recession of the mid-1970s, most Western
countries responded to the consequences of economic contraction with an
increased emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness as the key to public service
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delivery. Emerging in the 1980s, a new approach to public administration was
prevalent especially in the policy reforms of the Reagan and Thatcher
administrations implemented in the United States and the United Kingdom (Dawson
& Dargie, 2002). The reform measures promoted in the 1980s by these
administrations and subsequent governments were to introduce various
management innovations, to reorganize public agencies, and to emphasize marketbased mechanisms as the primary instrument of cost reduction. The U.S. and U.K.
experiences introduced a variety of new management terms, such as special
operating agencies (SOAs), executive agencies, “next step” agencies, reinventing
government, contracting-out, service agreement, deregulation, and one-stop
service. Some scholars who study organizations labeled a particular cluster of
these management improvements and techniques New Public Management (NPM)
(Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004a).
In line with the external influences prominent in the last two decades, the
Thai public sector experienced many reforms. These reform measures
encompassed all public sector entities, including the central government, local
government, state-owned enterprises, government-funded research institutes, and
other government-affiliated organizations (Bowornwathana, 2000). Essentially,
administrative reform approaches in the Western world were considered sources of
examples and options. Organizational and personnel restructuring, innovations in
the operating system, and changes in the culture of those public sector
organizations were prominent reform efforts. Most attention was given to
organizational performance, work force reduction, and privatization of state-owned
enterprises and other government-affiliated organizations. The focus was primarily
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on budgeting, management techniques, and personnel adjustments. New Public
Management, with its emphasis on business planning, performance management
and devolved administrative power, increasingly takes part of the reform discourse.
Cerny (1994) argues that globalization has caused state policies to converge
toward more liberal policy and deregulation because of the character of the
international system, which typically transforms the behavior of countries within the
broader system. Thus, the demands of foreign capital and investment on economic
and administrative policy may intensify policy diffusion and emulation. As state
control over economic, political, and social activities has eroded, states become less
resistant to global capitalist democracy with the internationalization of interest
groups and social movement activities.
The power of globalization and the international organizations in promoting
liberalization policy can be seen during the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
When banking and financial institutions in Asia began to collapse in country after
country (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea), Thai
government representatives were sent to ask major countries and other international
bankers to postpone short-term debt, which accounted for two-thirds of the country's
total debt. However, the reaction of supranational institutions such as the IMF and
the G7 countries was to protect the lender institutions which had invested in private
companies in debtor countries (Laird, 2000, pp. 85-88). Instead, the United States,
as the world’s leading financial power that supports the World Trade Organization
and the IMF, pressed the Asian countries to open up the poorly equipped financial
sector for outside competition, as it expected that the crisis would be overcome by
infusions of foreign capital induced by privatization, liberalization, and legal reforms.
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Thailand’s 1997 crisis is indisputably a part of a global process of capital
accumulation and cycles of growth and downturn. While domestic capital did
exceptionally well half a decade before the crisis when these private companies
suffered from a global downturn in the economy, domestic capital was insufficient to
rescue the economy. The immediate need was to expand international capital. The
IMF’s response was in line with the need to restore the profitability of capital and the
lender institutions rather than to restore the economy of a particular nation and
society. As the Thai government needed the IMF assistance, it had to accept
numerous demands, including reform of alien business laws, revisions to duties,
taxes and customs procedures, privatization, and relaxation of a range of rules and
policies, all of which would increase opportunity for international assistance.

Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Administrative Reform

Politicians and bureaucrats in Thailand appear to be extremely conscious of
the potential impacts of Western democracy and economic globalization. This can
be seen in the history of political and administrative reforms of the Thai government
since Thailand’s absolute monarchy was transformed into a modern parliamentary
democracy in 1932. In fact, the end of absolute monarchy was brought about by a
small group of Western-educated bureaucratic elites and the royal family who had
dominated the Siamese court. As addressed in Chapter 3, one of the most
extensive reforms of the Thai bureaucracy following the end of absolute monarchy
was made by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-63), who sought to modernize the
state mainly to challenge communist expansion.
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Although a constitutional democracy, Thailand was dominated by a
hierarchically organized bureaucracy controlled by a small group of administrative
elites at the top (Siffin, 1966; Neher, 1987). Bureaucratic elites determined the
direction of socioeconomic development according to their preferences. The
elected politicians remained a weak force for change and their relatively short time
working in parliament weakened them compared to the civil service. As analyzed in
Chapter 3, from Field Marshal Sarit’s (1959-63) authoritarianism without parliament
and parties to General Prem’s (1980-88) parliamentary-based coalition politics with
an unelected Prime Minister to Anand’s (1991-92) technocratic cabinet installed by
the military, the character of Thai government has varied, reflecting both internal
context and external influence. Throughout these changes, the bureaucratic elites
remained the most influential force for change.
To offer some context for the recent design of the Thai public sector reform,
this section will briefly describe the reform efforts of successive governments before
the Thaksin administration entered the Thai parliament in 2001.
In the early 1970s the expansion of the Thai public sector became an issue
of discussion among bureaucratic elites. The reorganization of government
structure was discussed at a policy level in almost all successive governments.
In a study of bureaucratic expansion in Thai bureaucracy, Chandarasorn
(1985) documented that the growth rate of public agencies within the government
structure was enormous. Between 1933 and 1979, the number of ministries’
departments increased from 45 to 121, and the number of divisions expanded from
143 to 1,264 (Chandarasorn, 1985, p 15). The administrative reform during this
period was in the context of “bureaucracy” as a root cause of the expansion. Other
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contributing factors included socio-economic variables. Long administrative stability
during Prem’s administration enabled the Thai government to adopt certain reforms
including civil service reforms and the reorganization of the functional ministries. It
was for this reason that the Office of the Cabinet Secretariat proposed a structural
reform of departments to the then National Administrative Reform Commission.
Muscat (1994, p. 264) concludes that there was a clear diminution of public-sector
size and government functions in the 1980s, and a shift toward the private sector
and the market institutions.
During the period of the so-called “quasi-democratic” system of General
Prem’s government, a number of appointed technocrats achieved considerable
success in economic policy against a backdrop of global economic impacts due to
the oil crisis. In early 1991, Thai public administration gained new momentum when
the military staged a coup against the Chatichai (1989-91) government and installed
a successful ex-technocrat businessman, Anand Panyarachun, in the interim
government. Anand used to serve in the Foreign Ministry and moved to the
chairmanship of a major textiles conglomerate in 1997. Throughout the 1980s, he
took a prominent part in business associations (Schmidt, 1996). Following the crisis
of confidence created by Chatchai’s civilian government, the Anand government
reasserted technocratic attention to economic and administrative reform as an
attempt to revive international confidence by providing a contrast with the Chatchai
civilian party politics in which rent-seeking propensity and inappropriate economic
policy were generally noticeable.
The shift of administration can alter the structural reform policies of a
bureaucracy (Bowornwathana, 1994). This observation exactly happened in the
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Thai public sector during the short period of the General Suchinda and Anand
administration. After Anand took the premiership, he expanded a significant number
of ministerial departments. Bowornwathana (1994) recorded these reorganizations:
1) four new environmental-related agencies were added to the Ministry of Science,
Technology, and Environment, 2) four new departments of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs were created to reflect geographical global strategies, 3) a new Intellectual
Property Department was created in the Ministry of Commerce, and 4) the National
Energy Policy Committee Office and the Land Traffic System Committee Office
were established under the Office of the Prime Minister.
The Anand administration maintained parts of the Prem government's
agenda. In addition to some administrative reforms that were implemented during
the Prem years, Anand’s interim government promulgated an extraordinary amount
of legislation and liberalizing deregulation. The administration confirmed marketbased mechanisms and recognized the need to curb public sector problems that
were caused primarily by a bureaucratic expansion of the civil service during prior
years.
As discussed above, multilateral development agencies such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and their regional counterparts had
imposed conditions to aid before Anand took the office. These conditions took the
form of a “complex policy covenant" that Thai bureaucrats made with the
development agencies when the economic and political conditions made
international assistance necessary (Muscat, 1994, pp. 123-25). The Anand
government found that it would not only have to adopt, but also implement those
agreements. The government had to prepare an administrative apparatus to
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facilitate policies such as free trade, foreign investment, and stable employer-labor
relationships. Thai public service reform was thus linked to the underlying change in
the interaction with international organizations and the internationalization of global
economy.
Public sector reform initiatives which were associated with market liberalism
and New Public Management emerged by the early 1990s when the Anand
administration ordered a landmark civil service reform in 1991 within the authority of
the Office of Civil Service Commission (OCSC). With this change, many of the
bureaucratic solutions were incorporated in the 1992 revision of the Civil Service Act
that was passed hastily during the interim administration. The act laid a firm legal
basis for the future reform activities dealing with the quality and integrity of public
service, the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, and the legal clauses
involving important implications for all government officials. These innovations
facilitated a direction -- principles and procedural guidelines to create a more
efficient and responsive Thai public administration within a competitive environment.
The main driving concepts for institutional reform were “development,” “planning,"
and “efficiency” while the principal goal was a more market-oriented economic
system.
The appointment of Anand in the interim government also demonstrated the
increasing role of the middle classes from the commercial and industrial sectors.
The increasing internationalization of the Thai economy in the early 1990s driven by
transnational businesses engaged in export and import forced the need for political
stability as a precondition for economic growth. Economic growth and the
international environment were considered the reform framework within which
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government operates. Without a parliament, the cabinet of senior technocrats,
military, and metropolitan business elites enacted a set of reforms designed to
complete the transition to an economy based on export-oriented industrialization
and liberalization policy. Anand’s reform scheme was confined to economic
performance and selected elements of bureaucratic reform. It was not oriented to
meaningful political reforms.
Samudavanija (1997) argues that the globalization and internationalization of
capital have made Thai elites, especially military-bureaucrats, no longer the main
groups dominating the allocation of resources and the distribution of benefits. The
1991 coup under the National Peace-Keeping Council (NPKC) had provided an
opportunity for the claim that the Prime Minister need not be an elected politician.
Given the imperative of implementing important programs and policy reform to
maintain the legal basis for a viable capitalism in the era of globalization, the
military-backed administration detracted from Thailand’s international reputation.
Conversely, the dominance of the military and technocrats in the 1990s had been
gradually reduced, both by their own miscalculated coup and by the international
and domestic social and economic changes. Consequently, the democratization
demanded by various social groups, especially academics, social activists, and the
middle class, became significant.
During the 1990s, political crises that had typically been reflected in army
intervention and military coups was redefined through the process of partisan
political crisis, in which the ruling government was to be removed by non-military
force: mass protest, media pressure, parliamentary indictment, and the
fragmentation of coalition administrations (Hewison, 2003). Lack of transparency
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and lack of disclosure within bureaucratic and administrative systems have driven
the public to participate directly in acute problems. Since the retreat of the military
from an active governmental role in the early 1990s, wider societal forces have
helped redefine the political and administrative relationship, reforming government
functions and purposes, and readdressing the rights of government and the
governed. Clearly, the movement provided a continuous climate for democratic and
bureaucratic reform in response to a variety of political, social, economic, and
technological forces.
Between 1992 and 2005, no military coup has taken place and no elected
civilian government has reached its full parliamentary term of four years.
Successive governments have come and gone starting with Chuan Leekpai, a
leader of the Democratic Party who took office in May 1992. The Chuan
administration dissolved parliament in May 1995. The Democrat Party lost to
Banharn’s Thai Nation Party in the subsequent election. However, the Banharn
government (1995-96) held the office for only a little more than one year when
Banharn was forced to dissolve the parliament in a controversial parliamentary
debate. Following the national election in November 1996, Chavalit Yongjaiyudh
formed a coalition government and became the Prime Minister for a short period
(1996-97) when his cabinet ended in the wave of distrust rising from managing the
financial crisis of 1997. The onset of the 1997 financial crisis and the 1997
constitutional reform movement caused him to hand over power to Chuan Leekpai
in November 1997.
Between 1992 and 2000, some elements of administrative reform had been
proposed by all parties and were reflected in the policy statements of most
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administrations. While the incumbent political executives could assert their policy
choices, technocrats also utilized the power of administrative process to influence
the specifics of implementation and to shape bureaucratic rules. Discretionary
recommendations, specific legislation proposals, and implementation of programs
were important elements of Thai bureaucratic power. Hence, central agencies had
opportunities to influence public sector reform. This was shown when the Chuan
administration approved the Office of Civil Service Commission’s plan on manpower
downsizing policy throughout the government. In 1995, with technical assistance
from the United Nation Development Plan, the Office started to direct public sector
reform toward the performance measurement of bureaucratic agencies through
performance-monitoring tools and quantifiable criteria. The performance
measurement in public agencies became one of the major reform tactics in
successive administrations (Office of the Civil Service Commission, 1996).
Concerning decentralization of power, the mass protest against the short
life-military rule in 1992 suddenly shifted the military power onto a civilian
government. The Democrat Party led by Chuan, as a new administration, continued
to rely on the bureaucracy when it came to implementing decentralization policy.
Before the Chuan government, sub-district administrations were a quasi
bureaucracy body in which the leader of each sub-district had twin duties, being the
chief of people in the village while simultaneously being local government servants
under the Local Administrative Act of 1914 (Nelson, 1998, pp. 32-33). The Chuan
government transformed the sub-district councils into juristic entities (sub-district
local government) while allowing the Interior Ministry to expand its roles over the
new local self-government. For example, the administration expanded central
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government functions such as sub-district health stations and sub-district community
development offices in parallel with the local development role of the new type of
local authority. In part, the main reason was to ensure that the behavior of locally
elected government strictly complied with the prescriptions of the central
bureaucracies.
When the Banharn government came to power, the Thai economy was
already experiencing a slowdown. The growth rate shifted from 8.6 per cent in 1995
to 6.4 in 1996, and then it turned to recession in 1997. King points out that
Banharn’s cabinet was composed of mostly provincial business people turned
politicians and lacked support from politically influential technocrats (King, 1999).
Banharn ignored the economic warning signs posted by the IMF and did little to
reform government institutions to cope with arising economic problems. This
brought the Banharn government to an end with a no-confidence vote. He dissolved
the parliament and announced a new general election in late 1996.
This incident indicates that Thai governance has not always been obedient
to the policy directives of international forces. In fact, political parties typically
lacked both substantive policy stands and ideology while depending on technocrats
to decide strategies concerning policy implementation. It has been argued that
party formation in Thailand has been characterized by ambitious political individuals
and factions who have limited skill and often have not been interested in broader
policy issues (Shuchit, 1990).
Following the November election in 1996, Chavalit and his New Aspiration
Party defeated by a narrow margin the Chuan-led Democracy Party. Having formed
a government, Chavalit installed a new economic policy team. In the middle of the
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financial crisis, in May 1997, the Office of Civil Service Commission recommended
that the Chavalit administration approve a master plan for bureaucratic reform that
attempted to reduce the number of civil servants by thirty percent by 2001 and to
seek more efficiency and effectiveness of the existing public agencies. The public
sector reform measures included possible merging and dissolving of government
units, devolving administrative power, contracting out to the private sector, and
developing key performance indicators (Laird, 2000, pp. 196-99). Chavalit’s
administration survived less than twelve months while being forced to pass the 1997
constitutional draft in late September 1997 followed by his resignation.
After Chavalit resigned in early November 1997, the Democrat Party with a
six-party coalition formed a second Chuan government. In the course of continued
crisis, the government was not able to manage the situation but did get financial
support from the IMF, and the successive government had to implement sweeping
crisis-management measures that accelerated government bureaucratic
transformation. Following the passage of the 1997 constitution, various reform
strategies were implemented as the new constitution required more concrete reform
implementation. Foreign models were studied and adapted into the Thai public
sector transformation plans (Bowornwathana, 2004, pp. 247-59). This can be seen
in the approval of the Decentralization Plan and Process Act of 1999, the National
Education Act of 1999, and the effort to create autonomous and independent bodies
specified in the new constitution during the Chuan government.
The adoption of the reform constitution in 1997 signaled a shift in the political
and administrative transformation. Both the emerging policy agenda and the
program of institutional reform were underpinned by a discourse of new public
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management. The core of public sector reform during the Chuan administration
departed from the focus on general public sector improvement that had
characterized many prior reforms. The focus began to shift to what would motivate
the technocrats to change, as they were seen as part of the institutional problems.
For instance, the Nukul Commission, which investigated the failings of the Bank of
Thailand (BoT) during the 1997 financial crisis, identified a number of organizational
defects that challenged the belief that these elite, technocratic agencies were any
different from the rest of the bureaucracy (Nukul Commission, 1998). In fact, it
revealed that there was in-fighting between departments: seniority, favoritism and
loyalty had supplanted the merit system.
As the 1997 financial crisis unfolded, a number of factors converged to
produce massive political and administrative reform. Rapid economic restructuring,
increasing social problems, new governance structures, and a host of other forces,
including the acceptance of international assistance, all contributed their share. The
need for technical and modern management solutions on the one hand, and the
serious shortfall in technocratic professionalism on the other, produced a situation in
which scope and urgency of recommendations for reform grew to an unprecedented
level leading to a need for constitutional overhaul that, in part, addressed structure
and management of the public sector. Proposals for reform prescribed by the Civil
Service Commission placed a heavy emphasis on the idea that government should
be run more like businesses. Even when the reform-minded technocrats ostensibly
acknowledge differences between management in the private and public sectors,
specific suggestions have often been based on business practices. This was
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evident in reform proposals with respect to a variety of management issues during
the Chuan administration and successive governments.
NPM-like reform strategies appeared to meet the goals of administrative
reformers while satisfying political objectives. Political executives of the new
government adopted a management perspective and NPM techniques in the name
of administrative reform, while seeking to consolidate their power. At the same time,
technocrats deployed their technical expertise and control of detailed operations in
advancing the competency and effectiveness of the government that included
familiar old ideas and new public management discourse such as shrinking
government, use of private-sector performance-management and motivation
techniques, treating citizens like customers, and separating public administrators
from the public policy process. This uneasy coexistence of reform ideas and tactics
offered potential repositioning for the bureaucrats to cope with a declining
bureaucratic prestige.

Political Reform Movement and the 1997 Constitution

Following the 1950s, administrative power in Thailand was firmly held by the
military and economic technocrats pursuing relatively liberal capitalist development
policies along lines recommended by the World Bank (Muscat, 1994). Political and
adm inistrative crises and reform s generally resulted from tensions w ithin the

military. Power changed hands frequently, both through elections and through
military coups in which the successful regimes sought to legitimate themselves by
promulgating new constitutions which embody their attempts to reform the political
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order. The 1980s saw the decreasing role of the military while ruling technocratic
elites merged with the new capitalist elite, with the latter vesting their political power
in the parliament and cabinet (Laothamatas, 1992). The extra-bureaucratic forces,
such as the Chamber of Commerce and other business and trade associations,
have played prominent roles in politics and have influenced public policy.
Through the 1990s the pattern of political crises and reforms changed. As
provincial entrepreneurs were able to organize themselves to gain representation in
the parliament, wealth and business networks proved highly effective in electoral
politics as a means of promoting and protecting their interests. To many political
observers, the absence of military intervention since the mass protest in May 1992
was a sign of democratic progress. However, the instability caused by
parliamentary conflict and coalition governments was a disappointing setback as
various parties and factions struggled for power. When a political crisis looms, the
dissolution of parliament or the simple ouster of the Prime Minister engineered by
opposition parties and by other elements of opposed middle class is more likely than
a coup. The factional conflicts of parliament and mass demonstrations became new
sources for the change of administrative regime. In capturing the new political
pattern, McCargo (2000) concludes that the function of the Thai parliament is
characterized by the struggle of opposition parties to join the government's cabinet.
For generations, the mass of Thai people rarely participated directly in a
political crisis or attempted to present themselves in force against illegitimate
governments. Further, the military regimes usually sought to keep political order
through the promulgation of new constitutions, frequently contributing to political
suppression and new crises. But in the 1992 political crisis, Thais outside Bangkok
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took part in the struggle for democratic process on an unprecedented scale. Unlike
the student uprisings in 1973 and 1976, the mass demonstration against General
Suchinda’s government in May 1992 was attended by various professional
associations, activist groups, and educated people in major provinces around the
country (LoGerfo, 2000). Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of
Bangkok and other provincial cities to curtail the government and its 1991
constitution. After the ouster of Suchinda, these forces continued their pro
democracy activities and pushed for political reform.
In retrospect, by the 1980s business associations and a variety of social
networks had formed a democratic movement. As Thailand became increasingly
pluralistic, the political process was more oriented to engaging extra-parliamentary
forces trying to change what had been a flawed and somewhat limited democracy.
Despite some political transformation, mass vote buying and, particularly, corruption
within the cabinet remained commonplace. Although political parties represented
wider groups in the society, they did not seek political change that would widen
political participation or institute more public controls over ministers and politicians.
Many Thai scholars argued that the emergence of a new aristocracy of
money subverted the development of democratic processes through bribery and
vote buying (Connors, 1999; McVey, 2000; Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000b;
Samudavanija, 1997). As this new class grew, so did the democracy movement.
Political upheaval continues, but a wider range of actors and forces have become
involved in the operation of a Thai capitalist state.
In this transition, the bureaucratic and military elites have attempted to
pursue formal democracy and promote a regulated economy. An irreverent fraction
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of the new capitalist class, based in the provinces, began to enter national politics
and began to apply the same kind of illicit tactics they had used in local-level
business and politics (Pongpaichit & Baker, 1997). Provincial capitalists sought to
expand their influence in the parliamentary arena as a means of furthering their
interests while metropolitan businesses opted for a more technocratic form of
democracy. Increasingly, sections of these groups also had successfully benefited
from the liberalized economy and had integrated into a more pluralistic system.
While in the 1991 coup big business proved willing to work with the military and
bureaucracy, the events of May 1991 fed skepticism about a return of military
regimes.
It was in this context that the political reform movement became increasingly
important in providing a platform and leadership for business and for reforming
technocrats. It should be noted that the mixture of social class also forged a loose
and largely intellectual alliance to address the flaws of the existing constitution and
political system. Non government organizations (NGOs) or, more broadly defined,
civil society organizations which united to oppose the 1991 coup had found common
cause in the need for better human rights and community rights and for reforms that
would bring more power to local community (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000b, pp. 11112 ).

After the May 1992 incident, democracy groups and some NGOs focused
their attention on ensuring clean elections, and later, pushing for the election as
opposed to central appointment of provincial governors. Essentially, the 1991 coup
and the constitutional deliberations of 1991 provided an opportunity for the
articulation of needs for political and administrative reforms during the period of the
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administration of Chuan Leekpai (1992-95) and the rise of government under
Banharn Silpa-Archa (1995-96).
Following the election in September 1992, the Democracy Party leader
Chuan Leekpai won a majority vote and formed the core of the new government.
Prime Minister Chuan was the first non-military leader since the mid-1970s. The
party’s image was represented as a force for stability and moderation, against both
the rogue politicians in the pro-military parties and the activist politicians who had
taken to the streets and opposed Suchinda's rise to power. With the installation of
the government elected by due process without the military’s intervention,
democracy was reestablished and the democratization process continued. Chuan
restored international trust and improved the economic environment by continuing
the conservative fiscal policy of the past and by the appointment of professionally
educated business technocrats who represented the new industrial and commercial
elites (Muscat, 1994, p. 227).
The Chuan government declared its support for political reform, especially its
desire to make the constitution more democratic. The actual reform efforts were
focused on the sphere of business and commerce. For example, the emphasis was
seen in March 1993 when the Bank of Thailand introduced the Bangkok
International Banking Facility (BIBF) which arguably contributed to a quick rise of
foreign debt during 1994-1996 (Siamwalla, 1997). As various groups outside
parliament such as the Student Federation of Thailand and other NGO activist
groups had been calling for political reform through constitution amendment
(Connors, 2003, pp. 160-63), the administration evaded the pressure by appointing
a commission called the Democratic Development Committee as an alternative to
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an uncontrollable reform movement. Faced with social demands outside parliament
and conflict within the cabinet, the administration dissolved the parliament in May
1995 when one of the coalition partners withdrew its support over a land reform
scandal.
Later in the Chuan regime, NGOs and political groups increased their
demands for political reform as a way of opening new channels for political
participation, particularly after the attempt to press for political decentralization
failed. The booming urban economy’s impact on rural resources contributed to a
movement of local communities and NGOs to defend their causes. On the other
hand, Bangkok-based business elites were reluctant to facilitate a distribution of
power that would be potentially dominated by provincial politicians and local
communities (Case, 2001). The technocrats and urban business elite feared that
they would lose their influence of economic policy to the provincial capitalist
politicians who had made the parliamentary system their power sphere. This
tension between reformist groups prevented them from uniting to mobilize significant
forces in support of a common reform agenda. The tension was temporarily
reconciled when the administration of Banharn (1995-96) set up a political and
administrative reform committee in an effort to make his government attractive to the
urban middle classes and provincial based constituency at the same time
(Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, p. 116).
The debate on the need for reform emerged in 1992-1995, during the Chuan
administration, and became intense during Banharn’s time in office. The important
point is that there was not just one discourse on reforms, but a variety of different
social groups with different agendas. Earlier in 1996, the House of Representatives
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created a committee to find an approach to amend the constitution (Connors, 2003,
p. 163). As a result, parliament amended the 1991 constitution, allowing the special
reform mechanism called a Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) which would be
independent from parliament, and the latter would have the power only to accept or
reject the final draft proposed by CDA. Although there was a consensus among
academics, the mass media, the urban middle classes, and NGOs groups about the
reform, this amendment reflected the divisiveness among various power forces in
modern Thai society (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 119-22). As the
constitutional process became the focus of the reform movement, a number of
socio-economic groups pushed for their candidates.
The CDA had provided the opportunity for a possible alliance between liberal
and conservative. Anand Panyarachun, who was appointed the Prime Minister of
the 1991-92 interim government, was elected President of the constitution-drafting
committee. Equally important, the leadership of Anand reflected the influence of
business elites and liberal-reformist groups. Other key figures within the drafting
committee included liberal academics and specialists working on the technicalities
of the draft. Among this group, there were representatives of conservatives and of
lawyers interested in human rights. Anand had promoted the idea of “good
governance” meaning honesty, accountability, transparency, and efficiency that
incorporated management and public administration in the constitutional reform
process. For NGO groups, the idea of good governance was interpreted to mean
strengthening the local community, reducing the state’s power, and creating new
forms of direct democracy (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 124-27).
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During the course of constitutional drafting, NGOs and liberal academics
contributed many suggestions to the CDA. They provided an extensive definition of
human and civic rights, and also of the duties of the state to enforce and uphold
such rights. These included the issue of rights and freedoms, community rights over
resource management and access to public information, an elected Senate, an
independent electoral commission, an administrative and a constitutional court,
electoral reform measures, and citizen initiative on legislation and a recall of political
position. The NGOs and liberal groups were successful in presenting this demand
through CDA’s members. The rhetoric of issues and debates allowed various
reform groups to articulate the need for political reform in terms that encompassed
the concerns of the bureaucracy, the people, and the central government. This
unity was achieved by mixing political reform ideas, the enhancement of
government stability and the expansion of political participation.
One of the important aims of the reform initiative was to prevent vote-buying
and the influence of money politics through the new electoral provisions. The set of
proposals from all parties concerned the mechanics of parliament and
representative bodies. Okey (2003) summarized the important features of election
reform that affect the political party system. First, multiple-member constituency
was replaced by single-member constituencies with a centralized vote-counting
center. Second, a change was made in the election methods to provide dual-track
representatives, the number of MPs elected by local constituencies was maintained
at 400, and another 100 MPs would be elected by the “Party List” system -a national
vote on parties, with seats divided proportionate to votes among all parties which
secured at least 5 percent of the turnout. The addition of the party list would
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increase the number of MPs who represented “national” interests while constituency
MPs would no longer be allowed to serve as ministers. Further, ministers would
have to resign their parliamentary seats to disrupt the long-term patronage
relationships between ministers and constituencies. Third, MPs were required to
hold at least a B.A. degree or equivalent.
The intention of the new electoral measures in the draft constitution was to
separate the executive and the legislature: parties are expected to place senior,
reputable figures on the party list so that they can readily assume ministerial posts,
while elected local MPs will be confined to representing their districts. An appointed
senate was replaced by an elected senate of non-partisan figures and was
supposed to stand above partisan political interest while bringing wisdom to ponder
legislative matters. However, the greatest contentious issue for most political
parties was the separation of executive and legislative powers. The proposed
changes in the electoral rules left most political parties ambivalent, while a minority
in both houses of parliament was against the draft (Connors, 2003 pp. 169-72). The
political parties were anxious that implementing the new system might weaken the
power of the existing administration.
When the government of Chavalit Youngchaiyudh (1996-97) assumed power
after the collapse of the Banharn administration, it was clear that Thai society was in
a national crisis. Amidst the final phase of constitutional drafting process, the public,
including business supporters and pro-democracy groups, rallied in support of the
draft. The CDA orchestrated a campaign to push parliament to pass the
constitution. In part, the supporting groups had hoped that passing the law could
restore the confidence of international investors and alleviate the shortcomings in
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government management. During the eight-month period of the constitutional
drafting process, Thailand experienced a crisis in the banking institutions, the
devaluation of the baht in July 1997, the acceptance of the IMF recovery plan, and
political maneuvering in the parliament. Chavalit’s economic management
worsened the crisis and exacerbated the public’s loss of confidence (Siamwalla,
1997). In September 1997, the parliament ratified the new constitution; ratification
was followed by the fall of Chavalit’s administration.
The 1997 constitution provides a comprehensive system of political and
administrative reforms that greatly increases governmental checks and balances for
the citizens. New governance institutional arrangements such as a parliamentary
ombudsman office, an administrative court system, an election commission, a
decentralization procedure act, a national counter-corruption commission, a
constitutional court system, and a public finance audit commission are mandated to
enhance transparency and democratic society. At the same time that Thailand
sought financial assistance from the IMF and the World Bank, it appeared that these
institutional arrangements reflected the principles of good governance that were laid
out by the international funding agencies (Bowornwathana, 2000). The new
constitution provides civil society with various channels to control the government,
and to play the role of partner in the new social arrangements (Connors, 2003, pp.
191-95). All these changes presented a radical departure from the past Thai
bureaucratic system which was embedded in the culture. Consequently,
implementation was likely to prove challenging.
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Thai Governments and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis

The dominant force for changes in Thailand has usually involved the
economy and the market. The ideology of capitalism holds that the market
approach to government will increase public sector efficiency and effectiveness.
Introducing market-based reforms means privatizing activities that had been under
the direct ownership and control of the pubic sector. For many scholars, public
sector reform occurs as a result of the adaptation of the state to both domestic
imperatives and international economy. In general, the Thai government followed
free market economic principles. However, as Thailand encountered pressures
from international organizations to adjust its economy to greater market
involvement, the degree of market liberalization and public sector reform increased.
The reality of the change has been more complicated. One should not exclude the
context dealing with politics and administration.
In the early 1990s the Thai financial system was greatly liberalized. In
hindsight, the appointed technocratic administration under Anand (1991-92) made
most of the major decisions on financial reform. In the view of technocrats, the
move toward market liberalization would not only spur the economy but also make
Thailand a financial center for the region. The Thai government accepted the
obligations under Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, which demands the
com plete deregulation o f the current account transactions and fe w e r restrictions on

capital accounts, making the trade and financial system more liberal (Trisorat, 2000,
pp. 119-25). When elected governments were restored in late 1992, the Chuan
administration pursued a liberalization policy by establishing the Bangkok
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International Banking Facility (BIBF) in March 1993. The BIBF sought to facilitate
the flow of foreign money into the Thai financial market. This policy was seen
conventionally as a necessity for Thailand’s liberalization policy (Hevison, 2003).
Although the liberalization policy was under control of the government, a set
of prudent measures was not developed. According to Pongpaichit and Baker
(2000a, p. 25), the private sector’s foreign debt increased approximately ten times
from 7.8 to 73.7 billion U.S. dollars between 1988 and 1996. A large portion of this
borrowing was invested unproductively, in property and stock market speculation.
Much investment was poorly planned, resulting in falling rates of return.
Nonetheless, investors were attracted to Thailand because of the prospects of
explosive growth of an emerging economy. Soon it became apparent that the Thai
business and financial community lacked the capacity to manage its financial
resources wisely. Essentially, a hasty adoption of financial liberalization by the
technocrats without sufficient control measures was dangerous. As the patronage
relationship between elite businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians has played a
dominant role in the Thai financial system, this role was part of the emerging crisis
in 1997. In this perspective, the crisis can be seen to have resulted from
shortcomings with deep cultural roots in Thai society.
A series of further liberalization measures by government accompanied
imprudent controls over the flows of foreign currencies into and out of the country.
On one hand, the ineffective functioning of the administration was the core of the
problem leading to the crisis. The lax and incompetent supervisory authority
opened up the behavior that could be seen through the weakness of the disclosure
system and the failure to oversee the macro economy. Some scholars captured this
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incompetence in their descriptions of the patronage and rent-seeking that prevented
effective policymaking (Christensen et al., 1993, pp. 1-8). In contrast, an ensemble
of private sector representatives, such as financial institutions and business
associations, actively took part in the damage by their misallocation of capital and
the mismanagement of funds. In other words, it was the weakness of the private
sector and the government policy that simultaneously drove the growth and brought
the economy to the crisis (Siamwalla, 1997).
Before the 1997 economic crisis struck Thailand, there were signs of
deterioration in financial institutions. This can be seen through a series of banking
crises and scandals since the 1980s. Essentially, banks and financial companies
were operated mainly for profit by the business elite, who sought close connections
with the government. The expansion of democratic elections following the 1980s
increased opportunities for business elites to participate in the politics of business.
A transformation from technocrat-led policy to elected politician-led policy
was an important factor that brought about greater financial liberalization. Before
1995, the Bank of Thailand, a national central bank, was regarded as one of the
best of Thailand’s bureaucratic agencies. However, the Bank’s failure to regulate
the financial system and several fraud cases during the mid-1990s such as the
collapse of The Bangkok Bank of Commerce (BBC) and the Finance One Company
severely affected the reputation of the revered central agency (Trisorat, 2000, pp.
84-90).
Although historically the Thai government has been sensitive to international
sentiment and to the reactions of the international capital markets, the sensitivity
increased dramatically after August 1997. In July 1997, there was strong urban
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protest against the politicians in general and the Chavalit administration in particular
for mismanaging the onset of the crisis that resulted in the controversial devaluation
of the Thai baht. Business leaders and the urban middle class welcomed the IMF
since they had lost faith in the government’s ability to manage the crisis.
Necessitated by the nation’s depleted reserve funds, the government agreed to the
IMF’s aggressive macro economic policy and greater liberalization of state
enterprises. Subsequently, Thailand’s economic policy makers were bound by
certain guidelines and were subjected to advice from the IMF, World Bank, and
other multilateral organizations on related reform agendas.
In essence, the IMF diagnosed Thailand’s problems as similar to those in
Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America (Hewison, 2003). As with the assessment
of the broader Asian crisis, the IMF noted that too much government intervention in
the economy, too much corruption, and a lack of transparency were fundamental
institutional problems. As reflected in the first three Letters of Intent signed between
August 14, 1997 and February 24, 1998, the initial restructuring policy involved a
severe tightening of monetary and fiscal policy. At the policy implementation level,
this policy framework includes privatization of state enterprises, civil service reform,
reform of the regulatory environment, improvements of corporate governance,
foreign investment, and increased private sector participation in infrastructure
projects (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 38-40).
The 1997 financial crisis was not only a problem of financial institutions but
also a problem of political and administrative institutions. As a result, there was
tremendous support for economic and political reform by sections of the
bureaucracy itself, political parties, and the urban middle class. In an effort to
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mitigate the problem, the Chavalit government accepted the IMF financial
recommendation to open up the banking sector to 100 percent foreign ownership.
The crisis created a climate of intense reform pressure which pushed for passage of
the 1997 constitution. Following the resignation of Chavalit, the cabinet was
replaced by the Democracy party-led government. The need for reform was
accepted by the second government of Chuan Leekpai (1992-95, 1997-2000) that
began to implement a series of reforms including the banking system, public
enterprises, public sector management, and the public laws required by the 1997
constitution.
During the first phase of the IMF assistance program, the Chuan
administration fully committed to fulfilling the conditions required to obtain loan
assistance. The short-term objective of the IMF restructuring measures was to
separate the distressed financial institutions from the healthy ones and to enhance
investor confidence. However, these measures failed to create public confidence in
the Thai banking and financial system (Trisorat, 2000, pp. 140-45). The IMF’s
aggressive strategy began to provoke political reaction when, during the next Letter
of Intent in 1998, the IMF proposed stringent interest rates and liquidity stipulations
(Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 45-49). Business leaders attacked the IMF
program for paying no attention to adverse economic impact and social
repercussions resulting from the fast-track restructuring program.
The late 1990s crisis saw a decrease in demand and seizures in the
domestic credit system. The bankruptcies and layoffs in businesses and industries
led to rising social stress and growing political pressure. The social impact brought
about an historic and unprecedented resistance to the assistance of the IMF.
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Thailand experienced a series of demonstrations against privatization and a
nationalist campaign to protect Thai businesses (Tejapira, 2000). The government
was under pressure from labor groups, NGOs, social activists, and opposition
parties who accused the administration of concentrating its efforts on saving a small
number of financial sectors while ignoring the impact on the mass of the people. In
response to this political pressure, the Chuan government began to distance itself
from the IMF while seeking an alternative strategy in responding to the existing
problems.
The IMF had been warned by the World Bank and by the Japanese about its
lack of concern about the social impacts of its strategy. In fact, in late 1998, Japan
offered the Miyazawa Scheme for promoting social recovery in the Asian crisis
coupled with hasty support by the U.S. on the initiative to issue bonds for funding a
stronger stimulus program (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 59-62). Deepening
social impact provided support for an alternative approach that matched the
requirements to manage unemployment, provide welfare, reduce the school drop
out rate, and stimulate small and medium-sized business enterprises. Because the
Miyazawa plan allowed for many potential uses of the funds, the Chuan government
accepted the assistance and quickly distributed the funds for country-wide job
creation, local infrastructure projects, and other channels that would direct the
money into the local economy.
The Chuan government also worked to implement the new constitution,
creating major oversight organizations. These newly established organizations
included the Constitutional Court, the Auditor General’s Office, and the National
Counter Corruption Commission office. With assistance from the World Bank, the
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administration approved the Office of Civil Service Commission’s public sector
reforms, including the development of a multiyear budget framework, the
reorganization of functional ministries, and the public sector standards program.
Further, the Office of Civil Service Commission initiated a number of ideas to
improve the efficiency of the civil service, including fast-track career promotion,
delegation of power and decentralization, and a generous incentive pay system.
Rising government problems coupled with global economic transformation
inspired fundamental questions about the role and definition of the public sector.
Kettl (2000, pp. 5-6) contends that at the heart of global reform movement is a
debate about governance. The management reform movement builds on the
overarching concepts that good governance is a necessary condition for economic
prosperity. In fact, Thai economic stagnation in the 1990s and its association with
lack of bureaucratic responsiveness, the erosion of trust in the successive
governments, and the climate created by the local reform movement had forced
Thai technocratic elites to seriously think about their model of governance and the
functions of the public sector. All these elements combined to create a push to
forge new structural connections between the Thai government and Thai society.
In many countries, the result of the governance debate was pressure to
adopt a New Public Management (Frederickson & Smith, 2003; Kettl, 2000;
McCourt & Minogue, 2001; McLaughlin, Osborne & Ferlie, 2002). Although there is
an extensive scholarly critique of the New Public Management, Frederickson (1997)
argues that it is a safe generalization that NPM’s principles have influenced
contemporary public sector reform.
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The NPM discourse also influenced Thai reforms, especially as public
officials sought to figure out new ways of relating society and government and
keeping public officials accountable to the public. For example, the reform-minded
bureaucrats visited New Zealand, Australia, and England to examine their
experience as exemplars of New Public Management reforms. The concept of a
performance agreement (a written contract) between the ministers and the chief
executives in public agencies emerged in the Thai public sector reform model.
Another key piece of legislation was the 1999 State-Owned Enterprise Reform Act,
which aimed at more effectiveness in the privatization program. In line with the
macro-economic prescriptions being advocated by the World Bank and the IMF, a
new State Enterprise Committee was created to facilitate and review all privatization
proposals before forwarding them on to the cabinet for approval.
However, the business elites and the majority of the public who supported
the Chuan administration in the early days of his term withdrew their support when
the reform of financial institutions brought more harm to the domestic economy.
The Chuan government’s crisis management was blamed for not sufficiently
protecting domestic businesses and financial services. During the late 1990s, the
public had turned against the IMF and against the Chuan administration’s
agreement on the IMF’s mandate especially the bankruptcy bill and privatization of
public enterprises (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 167-69). In the parliament, the
opposition’s no-confidence debate advertised the government’s management failure
to a wider public. On the street, the state enterprise workers and others organized
groups and held anti-government rallies. The Chuan administration failure on
financial reform brought about an adverse political outcome in the January 2001
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general election when the incumbent Democrat Party ran against the newly formed
Thai Rak Thai Party.

The Thai Rak Thai Party and the Arrival of Thaksin Premiership

Thailand’s electoral reform, which was adopted in the 1997 constitutional
charter, had far-reaching implications for Thai political transformation (Ockey, 2003).
In part, the electoral system introduced the new rules for the election of the House
of Representatives and the Senate, where the latter formerly had been an appointed
body. One important and unprecedented aspect of the electoral system is the
application of the proportional rule for the election of the party-list members of the
House of Representatives. The party-list members are believed to be good and
capable candidates representing all constituencies. Hence, the Prime Minister and
the cabinet are supposed to come from the party-list members, rather than the
regular candidates that are based on single-member constituencies. The electoral
reform was also aimed at reducing high party fragmentation in the House of
Representatives that the Thai parliament had experienced in the past.
The January 2001 general election was the first election under the reformed
1997 constitution. Essentially, the election presented the contest between the
incumbent Democracy Party and the new Thai Rak Thai Party which emerged soon
after the collapse of Chavalit's government in November 1997. The Democracy
Party was established in 1946 during the earlier period of power struggle among
groups of competing military elites (Riggs, 1966, pp. 64-69). The Party can be seen
as a complex organization with a substantial historical development. Its relatively
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high degree of internal democratic participation allows capable individuals to rise
through the party’s hierarchical structure. This was evident when Chuan Leekpai,
who had been advancing his political career without family business support, rose to
be the party’s leader. The Democracy Party succeeded in consolidating its
provincial base in the South, in additional to its original Bangkok support.
Unlike the Democracy Party, the Thai Rak Thai Party was originally tied to a
telecommunication tycoon politician, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was involved in the
cabinet since the mid 1990s (in both Banharn’s and Chavalit’s administrations).
When Chavalit resigned as the Prime Minister following the July currency crisis that
precipitated the Asian financial crash and the constitutional promulgation in late
1997, Thaksin started to form his own party (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, pp. 62-65).
Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party attempted to capture the reaction to Chuan’s
Democracy Party that was perceived as supporting globalization at the expense of
domestic social stress and economic hardship. The Thai Rak Thai Party sought to
define itself through the images of successful entrepreneurs who wanted to revive
the economic situation and to improve the situation of the rural poor. Hence, a set
of mixed political campaign themes were aimed at the urban middle-class voters
and the rural voters (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, p.19).
In the 2001 election, The Thai Rak Thai party sought to win rural voters,
especially in the Northeast, by proposing an “economic platform” including a million
baht revolving fund for countrywide rural villages, a debt suspension program for
farmers, and a public health-care scheme based on treating basic ailments for a 30
baht-per-visit charge (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2002). The campaign was different from
Chuan’s Democracy party’s policy platform and it made Thai Rak Thai attractive to a
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large majority of rural and poor voters. The electorate's strong disaffection with
Chuan's pro-International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic policies and the promises
of Thai Rak Thai Party were instrumental to Thaksin's victory. Table 6 reports the
dominant party in Thai parliament between 1979 and 2001).

Table 6
Majority Party in Thai Parliament between 1979 and 2001

Parliament

Largest Party

No. of Seats

Total Seats

1979

Kitsangkhom Party

83

301

1983

Kitsangkhom Party

92

324

1986

Democratic Party

100

374

1988

Chat Thai Party

87

357

1992a

Samakkhitham Party

79

360

1992b

Democratic Party

79

360

1995

Chat Thai Party

92

373

1996

New Aspiration Party

125

393

2001

Thai Rak Thai Party

248

500

Source: Adapted from Pongpaichit, P. & Baker, C. (1995). Thailand Economy and Politics.
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, p. 343.

Following the 2001 election, the Thai Rak Thai entered the parliament with
nearly half of the seats to become the parliamentary majority (248 seats including
party-list candidates). The new election provision effectively eliminated small
parties since they did not meet the rule of five percent popular vote from all
constituencies, which is required to be eligible for a parliamentary seat. In addition,
the coalition with the Chat Thai and Chart Pattana Parties consolidated Thai Rak
Thai’s control of the parliament. The only opposition was the Democracy party, the
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second largest party, that won 128 seats. Of the 500 possible MP votes, Thaksin
received 339, making him the Premier. Thaksin’s government, with nationalist
rhetoric and populist policy, gained significant support from major conglomerates,
many supporters of earlier reform movements, and provincial people (Conners,
2003, p. 172-74).
In fact, when Prime Minister Thaksin was accused of failing to properly
declare his assets at the time of the previous administration by the National Counter
Corruption Commission (NCCC), the court’s decision presented a controversial 8-7
verdict that freed Thaksin from guilt (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, pp. 1-7). Since
Thaksin was perceived by many influential leaders to be able to manage the country
in a time of trouble, the court’s announcement seemed to side with the majority of
public sentiment that saw the need for a strong and charismatic leader like Thaksin.
McCargo and Pathmanand (2005, p. 16) argue that the court’s decision to ignore
Thaksin’s charge indicated an alarming failure of the 1990s reform movement and
the charter of 1997 that sought to strengthen oversight institutions and advance
democratic reform. This interpretation suggests that the new political class had
failed to embrace the system of checks and balances in the 1997 constitution.
Thai Rak Thai’s addition to the Thai political dynamic has to be seen in the
context of the long heritage of Thai politics and the rhetoric of policy-based political
parties. On the one hand, it is tempting to see Thai Rak Thai as a genuinely
reformist political party through its substantive policy platform and its relatively
coherent organization uniting various factions. The executive character of Thaksin
and his billionaire telecommunication business, Shin Corporation, reinforced the
perception that he was seeking to offer a way out of the country’s crisis, to help the
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bankrupted businesses, and to improve the life of the rural poor. On the other hand,
McCargo and Pathmanand (2005, pp. 10-11) argue that the Thai Rak Thai’s
cabinet with Thaksin as the Prime Minister was not different from former Thai
cabinets composed of provincial business politicians and urban-entrepreneurs. Like
other businessmen turned politicians, members of Thai Rak Thai approach politics,
these authors argue, as a way to further their business interests through a partisan
association while bypassing formerly dominant bureaucracy. Similarly, Pongpaichit
and Baker (2004, pp. 75-80) contend that Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai stood for a
force of wealthy entrepreneurs and groups of reformers who were willing to follow
the “vision” of a successful business leader.
The arrival of the Thaksin administration indicates the change from
dominance of the technocrats and military in the past decades to the democratically
elected business elites centering on the Prime Minister’s Office and the cabinet.
How reformist that change really is and what agenda this new set of elites supports
is still a matter of debate and subject for scholarship.

Conclusion

During the 1990s, continuing socio-economic transformation has rendered
Thai government institutions more complex. The period saw rapid economic growth
with increasing liberalization policies. The thrust toward financial globalization
created new marketing opportunities, but it also widened the gap between reality
and expectation among the technocrats, new business class, and various social
groups. Consequently, each succeeding administration initiated some institutional

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

142

and administrative reforms, but the government clearly lost control over economic
governance and lacked the ability to direct political and administrative improvement.
The international organizations’ technical assistance provided Thai government
elites with guidance toward liberalization, but the implementation process did not
easily yield a satisfactory result. Importantly, the good governance measures and
the reduction of public sector spending became recurring themes.
The advent of the 1997 economic crisis partially reflected the mismatch
between social transformation and institutional advancement. The past experience
of high economic growth of the 1980s saw the political role of civil society begin to
change. The slowing of economic growth in 1996 and the economic collapse in
1997 sparked a wave of demands for political and administrative reform. The
solution to the fiscal crisis has resulted in unintended consequences, policy reforms
that created a new round of problems. New interest groups have emerged since the
1990s, including social activists, provincial business associations, and farmers’
groups, and have become increasingly active and a source of social capital for the
democratic process (Unger, 1998). The civic movement provided support for the
1997 constitutional charter.
With the new opportunity for the state transformation following the aftermath
of the financial crisis, the Thai government moved quickly to reorganize public
sector operations, political institutions, and political processes. The changes were
implemented in the late 1990s. The period following the revision of the constitution
the financial crisis caused harsh criticism against the strategies proposed by the IMF
and the policy implementation of Thai government. The impact of the economic
crisis and the policies to address it, along with the new constitutional framework,
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paved the way for the rise of public sector reform. The Thai Rak Thai party and
Thaksin were seen to be capable of solving the unanticipated consequences of prior
policies. The Thai Rak Thai’s political platform for social policy and economic
revival came to dominate Thai public discussion through a new style of political
campaign that emphasized a mix of economic nationalism, populist policy, and
public sector improvement, while supporting financial liberalization.
The Thai Rak Thai Party’s landslide victory in the 2001 general election was
possible because of the alliance with new provincial elites, the support of major
conglomerate businesses, and the Thai Rak Thai’s rhetorical campaign that pledged
to mitigate the impact of prior economic liberalization policies and pressures from
international capital. The name Thai Rak Thai (Thais love Thais) reflected the tone
of old-fashioned nationalism that rejected the post-crisis policy direction under the
Democracy Party. With the new election provisions, the result of the election
effectively reduced the instability of government that had occurred in the past,
resulting from shaky multi-party coalitions that consisted of weak and fragmented
parties resulting in policy contention. Thus, the reform made possible an
unprecedented single-party government and political stability in the history of the
democratically elected parliament of Thailand. Prime Minister Thaksin and the Thai
Rak Thai Party have become a new force of domestic capital that captured the
center of political power. Equally important, the relationship between the Thai
politicians and public servants became more focused on the consequences of
structural reform, and on the interactions between elected officials and civil servants
in the administrative reform process.
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CHAPTER 5
THE INTEGRATED PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

Introduction

Historically, Thailand has long been characterized by competing tendencies
towards democracy and authoritarianism. Such tendencies were evident between
the post-1932 period and the military coup of 1991. The authoritarian period saw
political and administrative development which was dominated by bureaucratic elites
and especially army officers. The success of democratic forces culminated in the
promulgation of the 1997 reformed constitution which opened up political
participation while seeking to restructure the Thai administrative system to respond
to and keep pace with socioeconomic change.
Equally important, economic globalization has presented a series of
challenges to the Thai government to adapt its institutions, public policy, and
government operation to new situations. On the one hand, a series of reforms was
introduced to respond to the cycle of economic and financial crises, especially in the
1980s and the late 1990s. On the other hand, the idea of public sector development
has shifted away from the traditional practice to unexplored areas.
The new political situation following the 1997 financial crisis presented the
rationale for administrative reorganization and reforms of governance that were
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unlikely in the past decades. This change allowed the Thai state to examine and
adopt to a substantial degree the public sector reforms which have been available in
the international community (Bowornwathana, 2004). As a result of Thailand’s
involvement with the foreign countries and awareness of global developments, its
reforms have been a hybrid of traditional public administration and new public
management (McLaughlin, Osborne & Ferlie, 2002).
With a regional economic crisis and political challenge in the 1990s, NPMrelated ideas about administrative reform were reflected in the clauses of the 1997
constitution’s mandates such as the downsizing of central government ministries,
the creation of new autonomous public organizations, the empowerment of people’s
participation, and the promotion of local government authorities. The
implementation and consequences of Thaksin’s administrative reform were
controversial and stirred intense debates.
The significance of Thaksin’s administrative reform was that the ongoing
decentralization plan for regional and local government authorities was shifted
toward the reorganization of central ministries with heavy focus on a wide range of
management arrangements. The administrative reform encompassed sub-national
governments across provincial administrations that share jurisdictional territories
with numerous local authorities. This reform was introduced under the title
“Integrated Provincial Administrative System” (IPAS), generally known as “CEOgovernors.” The Thai Rak Thai’s overwhelming election victory in 2001 facilitated
the process of administrative reform that claimed to de-concentrate central power to
provincial administrations and the appointed governors. The IPAS’s devolution of
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power to sub-national governments and various management changes deserves
closer scrutiny.
There have been significant changes in administrative process since Thaksin
assumed power. This chapter begins with the analysis of Thaksin's political
grouping, government policy shift, and administrative reorganization which is
important to the understanding of the political dynamics of the government
administrative reform. Having described the government effort to reform the public
sector, the next section examines key aspects of management strategies
implemented in the provincial administrations and the sub-region governments.
This section investigates the rhetoric and nature of IPAS reforms that occurred in
provincial administration. This section is then followed by an analysis of the IPAS’s
impacts on the existing local government decentralization program and some
lessons learned about Thaksin’s IPAS reform.

The Politics of Thaksin’s Administrative Reorganization

The efforts to reform the Thai administrative system during the Thaksin
aministration were a paradoxical mixture of old politics and new management
initiatives. Following the 2001 election, the Thai Rak Thai party led by Thaksin won
nearly half of the seats of parliament. Before the election, the Thai Rak Thai party
tried to improve its chances by admitting politicians from other competing parties
into Thai Rak Thai. Since the Chavalit government and his New Aspiration Party
collapsed in the 1997 crisis, factions from that party shifted to the Thai Rak Thai.
Changing parties and recruiting potential candidates from other parties was an old
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electoral strategy in Thailand. With the party’s policy platforms and popular
promises following the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, the Thai Rak Thai attracted new
and old politicians to become members of the party. Pongpaichit and Baker (2004,
pp. 82-3) estimated that around 100 sitting members from other parties ran in the
2001 election under the Thai Rak Thai ticket. In early 2002, Chavalit’s New
Aspiration Party merged with the Thai Rak Thai. As a result, Thaksin’s government
gained an unprecedented parliamentary power which the past civilian governments
had never experienced.
Arguably, the Thai Rak Thai’s new “populist policies" presented some
departure from the traditional Thai party’s policy orientation. Thailand’s policy
formation and implementation have long been associated with technocrats where
bureaucracies were principal instruments. In retrospect, public policy initiatives
were fragmented in nature and they were typically made by individual public
organizations, especially before the 1997 financial crisis. After the 1997 crisis, the
reformed constitution changed the electoral and party system in a way that
encouraged a large and well-funded party. Old-style party politics in which internal
factions competed for pork-barrel policy and minister positions were superseded by
tight party control. The extent of Thai Rak Thai’s electoral success in 2001, by
constructing a policy platform that appealed to various social groups and business
elites, and the change of electoral system allowed the party to be more proactive
about government policies (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, pp. 97-98).
Thai Rak Thai’s core policies addressed the problems of farmers and the
urban poor while the image of Thaksin Shinawatra, the party’s leader, as a
successful businessman, drew urban middle class and bureaucrats’ interest. In a
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sense, Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai are creations of the 1997 crisis. Hence, the
group of Thai Rak Thai entered parliament with an initial goal to revive the Thai
economy. The Thaksin administration pursued this ambition in three main
directions: stimulating economic growth, reducing social problems, and shaping a
new administrative style. Recognizing that the Thai economy had to survive the
severe crisis and progress to a connected international economy, the Thaksin
administration employed various populist policies to maintain political support and
revived the small and medium entrepreneurs through domestic economic stimulus
programs such as creating an SME bank (Small and Medium Enterprises), a
“People’s Bank” which provided micro-credit loans for the poor, and an “OTOP: One
Village, One Product” which supported villages’ job creation activities (McCargo &
Pathmanand, 2005, pp. 89-93).
Apart from the government’s populist policies, Thaksin declared that his
government sought to win three wars: the war on poverty, the war on drugs, and the
war on corruption (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, p. 91). Thaksin’s policy
initiatives were undoubtedly beneficial to the majority of Thai people. Government
run by one dominant party can be more effective than a weak coalition cabinet as
had typified previous administrations.
There were some serious problems with the Thai Rak Thai’s policies. One
was that the administration sought to enlist political support through unreformed tax
policy to support the interests of business elites and middle-class groups. A second
problem was due to the underfunded 30-baht healthcare charge program. A third
implementation problem arose due to poor management control of the one million
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baht village and development fund. Even the handling of the drug traffickers proved
controversial.
Painter (2004, pp. 376-81) argues that in order to achieve these rather
dramatic policy initiatives, the administration politicized government policies in a way
that enhanced the power of political executives. Political power was concentrated in
the circle of Prime Minister Thaksin (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, pp. 108). This
circle includes business people, experienced politicians, police officers, military
men, high-ranking civil servants, academics, and social activists. It soon became
apparent that the administration substantively controlled normal government
procedures. For instance, McCargo and Pathmanand (2005, pp. 223-32) analyzed
the September 2003 police promotion list and reported the number of officers who
used to be Thaksin’s classmates from the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory
School Class 10 and the Police Cadet Academy Class 26. In part, the politicizing of
police activity was used as an instrument to pursue the anti-drug policy and to
suppress so-called provincial “dark influences.”
In fact, the government’s policies improved the popularity of Thaksin while
undermining the political base of opposing groups both inside and outside the Thai
Rak Thai party. Not only did the government’s populist policies like the war on
drugs rely on an inner circle of senior police officers who worked on an operational
level, but they also implicitly served as a way of weakening provincial power brokers
who engaged in local politics and illegal businesses. Thaksin’s ambitious war on
drugs forced narcotics suppression officers, police, and provincial governors to
compete to achieve the prosecution goals embedded in Thaksin’s policies, resulting
in controversial extra-judicial murder cases in which both the drug dealers and
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manufacturers were killed without trials (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, p. 189). In
other cases, this type of concentration of power enabled the administration to initiate
a wide variety of reform initiatives while simultaneously politicizing civil officials to
respond to government policies.
To a certain extent, high civil servants were both confronted by Thaksin’s
new policies and subjected to strong pressure for organizational change. New
proposals for ministerial arrangements were linked to the government’s social and
economic policies since this organizational apparatus was a central part of the
Thaksin’s policy implementation and necessary for the success of those policies.
Before the political party reforms, rural infrastructure improvements and
government services such as roads, schools, and irrigation projects could be
initiated by individual elected politicians within their constituencies. This pattern of
pork-barrel has changed under the government of Thai Rak Thai when the cabinet
became the legitimate source of decisions that channeled government budget
through its populist policies. This shift of political patronage forced local civil officials
and provincial politicians to cooperate with Thaksin’s cabinet and the government’s
policy directions.
The administrative arrangements under Thaksin were also important.
Generally, the continued improvement of the public sector required that both political
executives and bureaucrats work together through the process of negotiation and
bargaining. Following a long discussion with the Civil Service Commission and
involving central agencies, the Thaksin administration finalized a comprehensive
change of the bureaucratic structure in October 2002, through two royal decrees: 1)
the Government Administration Act of 2002, which sought to define the aim of the
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Thai state in relation to the effectiveness and efficiency of administrative authorities,
and 2) the Administrative Organization Act of 2002 that defined the structures and
functions of government organizations. These new laws were the charters for a new
ministerial structure of government, the creation of new reform agencies, and the
revision of administrative procedures (Bowornwathana, 2005).
Since the ministerial reorganization scheme was central to the government’s
policy implementation, the Thaksin administration mobilized Thai Rak Thai’s PMs to
pass the bureaucratic reform bills, which marked a more dramatic reform than other
administrations in past decades. As a result, the Government Administration Act of
2002 expanded the administrative power of the Office of the Prime Minster and also
created the Office of Public Sector Development (OPDC) as a reform clearing house
while the Administrative Organization Act of 2002 made a new structure of
government functions, ministries, departments, and offices. The latter provision
created seven new central ministries, increasing the number from 15 to 20, while the
departments under all ministries expanded from 126 to 143 (Painter, 2005, p. 13).
One of the new ministries, the Ministry of Information and Communications
Technology, was created to regulate rising digital infrastructure and telephone
services while it seemed to benefit a mobile phone and satellite company
associated with Thaksin's family (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, pp. 58-63). Table
7 shows the revision of the administrative structure of Thaksin’s administration.
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Table 7
Ministry Reorganization under the Thaksin Administration

Old Ministries

New Ministries

1. Office of the Prime Minister

1. Office of Prime Minister

2. Ministry of Defense

2. Ministry of Defense

3. Ministry of Finance

3. Ministry of Finance

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

5. Ministry of Agriculture and cooperatives

5. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives

6. Ministry of Transport

6. Ministry of Transport

7. Ministry of Commerce

7. Ministry of Commerce

8. Ministry of Interior

8. Ministry of Interior

9. Ministry of Justice

9. Ministry of Justice

10. Ministry of Education

10. Ministry of Education

11. Ministry of Public Health

11. Ministry of Public Health

12. Ministry of Industry

12. Ministry of Industry

13. Ministry of Science, Technology and

13. Ministry of Natural Resources and

Environment

Environment (new)

14. Ministry of University Affairs

14. Ministry of Science and Technology

15. Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare

15. Ministry of Labor
16. Ministry of Culture (new)
17. Ministry of Energy (new)
18. Ministry of Tourism and Sports (New)
19. Ministry of Information and
Communication Technology (New)
20. Ministry of Social Development and
Human Security (New)

Since 1997, the Office of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) had been
assigned as the secretariat of the Administrative Reform Commission (ARC) of
several administrations. Similarly, CSC played a significant role in proposing reform
blueprints for the ministry reorganization during the early Thaksin administration.
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Recurring suggestions given by CSC were to remove some of the duplicated
functions that caused coordination problems and increasing operating costs.
However, no former administrations could make as comprehensive a restructuring
project as Thaksin’s government. The scheme of ministry restructuring went
through a lengthy discussion in parliamentary committees and central agencies.
Different proposals were explained to seek a clear hierarchy of coordination and
control and a more logical grouping of functions and activities.
Both the political executives and senior bureaucrats were equally interested
in the outcome of ministry restructuring. The lengthy proposals and negotiations
before the final decision reflected less technical issues than politics in the process of
administrative reorganization (Painter, 2005). Further blurring the distinction
between technical and political concerns and issues, the secretary of the Civil
Service Commission, who was actively involved in the design of the reform, was
appointed by Thaksin as a permanent secretary of one of the new ministries.
Following the passage of administrative restructuring law, the number of
government functions and public agencies increased while the total number of civil
officials in the bureaucracy was not allowed to expand. Because there were more
government functions to perform, the reorganization of bureaucratic structure within
senior positions substantially provided Thaksin with discretionary appointment
power (Bowornwathana, 2005). In effect, the process of creating and reorganizing
departments disrupted the dominant power of the incumbent technocrats. The
rigidity and inertia of departmental operations were now relaxed by new
opportunities for senior and middle civil officials to be promoted and transferred to
opening positions. The increased number of ministry functions offered more
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discretion to Thaksin for the political appointments and selection of civil service
working in the expanded government. Not only did the reorganization strengthen
the prime minister’s power, but the effort reflected the politicization of the senior
officials in line with Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai’s policy preference.
Apart from the establishment of new ministries, the Thaksin government
started the comprehensive process of reforming the bureaucratic system in March
2003 as part of the existing Strategic Plan for the Thai Public Sector Development
scheme. As a new reform agency, the Office of Public Sector Development
(OPDC), which acts as advocate of administrative reform to initiate and follow up on
the revised structures and the processes of the overall administrative organization,
has become a significant agency in the government’s reform process. Like other
principal central agencies such as the Office of the Civil Service Commission
(OCSC), the National Economic Development Board (NESDB), and the Bureau of
Budget (BoB), the OPDC is under direct supervision of the Prime Minister’s Office
headed by Thaksin. The arrival of OPDC forced the OCSC to confine its former
dominant role on public sector reform initiatives to civil service planning and
personnel development.
Setting up the new ministries and departments including the OPDC
significantly revived groups of individual bureaucrats who sought to be promoted
and were eager to respond to the government’s policies. Unlike fragmented reforms
during the short-term administrations of Banharn Silpa-Archa, Chavalit Yongjaiyudh
and Chuan Leekpai during the period of the 1997 financial crisis, the new reform
agenda expanded and flourished under the leadership of Thaksin. In addition, the
administration adopted the “good governance” reform promoted by the World Bank
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by promulgating the 2003 Good Governance Act as part of the reform mandate in
the bureaucratic development process (Painter, 2005, p. 9). In fact, the law is broad
enough to comprise public management measures such as transparency,
accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and participation while, at the same time, it
is vague enough to allow discretion and flexibility in interpretation as to what issues
are included and how good governance should be evaluated.
The idea of “good governance” in the 2003 Good Governance bill reflected a
set of guiding principles of the World Bank. The World Bank was concerned that the
Thai government revised administrative processes in the handling of development
assistance and urged policy instruments that would foster preferred patterns of
interaction between the two parties. Essential to the idea was to promote statemarket relations and administrative structures that would ensure accountability, due
processes of law, and related safeguards (Grindle, 2004, pp. 525-48). The passage
of the 2003 Good Governance Act was seen to close the credibility gap from the
perspectives of the international organizations and domestic supporters as it
referred to the attempts at political improvement, while at the same time addressing
the revision of managerial dimensions of the Thai public sector. More important, the
bill gave more discretionary power to the Thaksin administration and the OPDC to
direct the approach and scope of public sector reform.
Prior to the Thaksin administration, there were individual public sector reform
innovations during successive governments. In part, these attempts can be seen
through the 1997 Public Sector Reform Master Plan of the Chavalit administration
and the 1999 Public Sector Management Reform Plan of the Chuan administration.
Although Thaksin’s government supplanted these reform provisions with the
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Strategic Plan for the Thai Public Sector Development revised by the OPDC,
principles and outlines remained mostly the same but the reform effort was
intensified. The bureaucratic experiences of administrative changes during the
1990s helped the reformers under the Thaksin government in initiating a variety of
ideas and tactics that were found in private management, particularly in the western
experience. The similarities can be seen in the effort to increase productivity and to
make public organizations more efficient through the use of private-sector
performance management and motivation techniques (Bowornwathana, 2004;
Painter, 2005). This approach to public sector reform is often referred to as new
public management (NPM) (Common, 1998).
The connection between the NPM approach to public sector reform and an
efficient public organization that facilitates a thriving business and industrial sector in
Thailand was embedded in the 1997 reform constitution following the 1997
economic crisis. The impact of the fiscal crisis raised the possibility of
comprehensive reform initiatives while pressuring the reforming process to seek
alternative approaches of management improvement.
As the Thaksin government committed to its ambitious policy goals, many
possible initiatives and management changes came together within the political
environment. One result was that NPM reform strategies were advocated without a
coherent intellectual underpinning (Painter, 2005, p. 18). In other words, senior
technocrats and the OPDC officers saw the advantage of NPM approaches as a
means of public sector improvement, but the administration at that time was seeking
different goals, including consolidating its administrative power through the
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bureaucratic reforms. This phenomenon was evident especially in the increase of
bureaucratic politicization under the leadership of Thaksin.

IPAS’s Management Strategies and their impacts

The Integrated Provincial Administrative System (IPAS) and its strategies
have not proceeded independent of the environment. Major events such as the
1997 Asian financial crisis, the change in the constitution, and the local context
where political competition was inherently contentious, paved the way for IPAS as
the new provincial administrative system. The initiative was intended to grant more
power to provincial administration as well as to effectively implement various
governmental policies through regional public agencies. In the political context,
IPAS strategies can also be seen as a path to secure a chance for future election.
As Thaksin’s major economic policy deals with popular social policy and domestic
spending, one can see the relationship between the reform of the regional
administrative arm and the government agenda.
There was a sign of the regional reform mandate when Thaksin appointed a
committee to conduct a comparative cases pilot project attempting to test the new
provincial reform early in his first term. The reason for the study was to explore
potential impacts and convince officials of its feasibility and usefulness. The pilot
study was never completed although there were some positive results in reducing
social problems such as drug selling. The sub-committee for regional reform was
hesitant to draw definite conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the reformed
provincial system. Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the evaluation
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research, the Thaksin government mandated the integrated administrative provincial
system in October 2003 following the announcement of the Strategic Plan for Thai
Public Sector Development in March 2003.
As part of the public sector development plan, IPAS was put under the
charge of a new Public Sector Development Commission (PDC), with the secretarial
support of the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC). The
OPDC is responsible for public sector development including training programs,
advising, monitoring, and evaluating reformed organizations. It operates under the
supervision of the Prime Minister’s Office and directly reports to the Prime Minister.
This reporting structure suggested that the involved public organizations would be
required to give quick consideration to the OPDC’s requests and recommendations
for reform of government-wide administrative rules and related laws issued by the
Prime Minister’s Office. The OPDC proved useful for Thaksin’s administration as a
method of integrating individual reforms among different public organizations into a
more comprehensive reform.
The attempt to lay out a new provincial administrative system gained
majority support, as it was generally agreed by most reformers that the territorial
administrative system needed to be reorganized (Mektrairat, 2004). The CEOGovernor scheme was widely touted across Thailand as a means to achieve
increased accountability, to manage provincial territories affectively, and to help
advance the government’s objectives in the provinces. As part of the government’s
propagation program, Thaksin talked regularly about CEO ideas, government
reform, and other changes in management methods in his weekly radio broadcast
as well as in many government seminars. In a symbolic act, the government hired
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Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter for management advice but
ignored his report that addressed the importance of economic decentralization to the
provinces (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, p. 175).
With the assistance of the OPDC, the government also held an intensive
training course for permanent secretaries, provincial governors, and department
heads as part of the overall bureaucratic reform scheme. The governors and senior
bureaucrats were required to attend the course given by international management
scholars as well as by Thaksin himself, his Deputy Prime Ministers, and the Minister
of Finance. Much of the discussion and the presentations in that training and those
seminars suggested that the governors should operate the provincial administration
like a business. Thaksin advocated the “CEO-Governor" as a symbol of the IPAS
reform and regarded it as an exemplar of his management style drawn from his
successful business conglomerate. He saw himself as the super CEO of the
country who, like any company's CEO, should have the freedom to manage his
company.
Thaksin's idea of CEO-governor included the theme that provincial
governors should assume the role of “prime minister’s assistants” and would acquire
more power over personnel and financial management in their jurisdictions
(Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, pp. 102-03). In conjunction with the ministry
reorganization, the CEO-governor scheme increased the power of provincial
administration that had previously been limited. Under Thaksin’s directives and the
guidance of the newly established OPDC, the government instructed the Interior
Ministry, the Office of the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of Budget, and the
National Economic and Social Development Board to ensure that necessary rules
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were adopted for the new governors and the Integrated Provincial Administrative
System. At the same time, the IPAS implementation provided the opportunities for
the Thaksin government to capture resources tied up in the reform process and
other reorganization measures. These resources included the exclusive budget for
governors to combat drug and to support the populist policies.
The IPAS model was the cornerstone of Thailand’s regional reform effort.
Typically, in the past, Thai provincial administration consisted of different
government organizations, the sub-government level of ministerial agencies. These
ministerial agencies and departments largely operated independently from one
another and they were accountable to their respective line of command in different
ministries. The central ministries were separated horizontally into both political and
administrative aspects. On the one hand, factions in the parliamentary cabinet
contested for ministerial offices to maintain potential political support and patronage
through public spending. On the other hand, each department had legal authority to
carry out public programs and services which, in part, led to functional duplication
and bureaucratic expansion (Chandarasorn, 1985, pp. 331-37). This was the
traditionally decentralized system of the Thai state in which territorial administrative
agencies represented central government policies and were subordinate to central
ministries in Bangkok. Because of this structural problem, the desire for
comprehensive government reform included revamping the national/provincial
relationship as well as improving the details of management.
The experiences of public sector reform under the Thaksin administration
reflected both political climate and management preferences. On the one hand, the
reform was largely comprehensive, with a very rapid implementation of the ideas of
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Thai Rak Thai’s social and economic policies. The most remarkable change was
management practices that the Prime Minister’s Office issued requiring that the
IPAS across all provincial administration be accompanied by strategic plans,
performance measures, and public service agreements. On the other hand,
government political agendas that were clearly aimed at the rural vote would need
effective bureaucratic mechanisms. The OPDC embraced strategic planning as a
top-down management reform tactic which started in the FY 2003 budget process.
This framework requires sub-government agencies to develop regional and
provincial strategic plans with frameworks for evaluation by the government.
The officials of the new OPDC were an important source of management
ideas and they directly supervised provincial administration in the process of IPAS
implementation. Since Thaksin was ambitious to overcome existing bureaucratic
problems, he made the OPDC serve as an inter-ministerial think tank on structural
changes of administrative modernization. As suggested by its responsibility, the
core belief of OPDC was that the Thai public sector could be reshaped by largescale reform in a continuing process. In fact, to a large extent the reform elements
and management tactics suggested by the OPDC reflected the influential model of
“New Public Management" (NPM). As the government attempted to achieve more
efficient and accountable provincial administration through non-traditional methods
of public management, significant components of the NPM that echo in the IPAS
such as a separation of strategic policy from operational management, a pursuit of
accountability through quantifiable performance measures, and an emphasis on
competition especially through internal markets and contracting public services to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

162

the private sector, were increasingly clear. Table 8 illustrates major elements of the
IPAS.

Table 8
Elements of Integrated Provincial Administrative System

Management Tactics

Characteristics

Strategic Plans

Integrated territorial and functional plan is
required for every provincial
administration. New appointed body of
“Integrated Provincial Administrative
Committee (CEO committee)” is
mandated to facilitate strategic planning
and management process.

Performance Measurements

Heavy use of quantifiable output
measurements. All provincial
administration as well as ministry agents
need to develop data collection related to
their respective responsibilities, services
outputs, and outcomes. As an evaluator
body, The Office of Public Sector
Development collaborates with provincial
administration to develop necessarily
data.

Performance Related Pay

Flexible money incentive is introduced as
opposed to the traditional standardized
civil service pay scale. This new reward
system is granted to successful provincial
administration that meets the agreed
service outputs and program outcomes.

Management Contracts

All governors and the Prime Minister’s
Office have to agree on “Public Service
Agreements” (PSA), which are the
executive summary of the provincial
strategic plans including performance
targets that each provincial administration
seeks to reach. The agreements become
the base of accountability.

(continued on the following page)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

163

(Table 8 continued)
Management Tactics

Characteristics

Service Delivery Units

Departments in different ministries are
encouraged to improve the efficiency of
some special operations related to their
responsibilities. Departments collaborate
to streamline work processes for a special
service delivery. This plan is to expedite
service delivery in a form of “one stop
service”.

Devolution of Administrative Power

The governors and the representatives of
ministry agents in provincial
administration are given more control over
personnel matters. The governors are
expected to exercise as much power as
the “CEO” in private organizations.

Developing and implementing provincial strategic planning for quality
improvements, better performance planning and outcome-based budgeting requires
change in organizational culture in sub-regional governments. The OPDC knew that
it would be difficult to change this culture rapidly. Both the OPDC and IPAS
supervising committee understood that the first year's plans by agencies would be
only a start in the process and that refinement would start occurring in the second
year. Provincial administrations differed in their approaches to preparing strategic
plans. In many cases, they assembled a rather large group of representatives, and
charged them to compile a plan for the strategic plans. This group became the
IPAS "committee" or "team." Some individuals reluctantly volunteered for this
assignment, while others eagerly sought it out. Typically, little guidance was
provided at first. However, with additional OPDC workshops and handouts, these
groups were better able to work out a useful approach.
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Strategic Plans and Management

One of the central tenets of the IPAS and other public sector reforms of the
Thaksin administration was to use strategic planning more effectively as a driver in
policy implementation. Provincial strategic planning served as a bridge by linking
the government policy that Thaksin sought to achieve to the program approaches
and resources that are necessary for provincial and regional development. In this
promotion of a strategic planning approach to regional administration, central
government agencies claimed to act as policy overseers. The provincial
administrations were assumed to recognize the role that strategic planning can play
in holding territorial governments accountable for agreed strategic goals and results
under one leadership, the CEO-governor. Toward this end, the OPDC took a further
step in this direction by requiring contractual agreements that separated the role of
policy provision by the central government and policy implementation provided by
CEO-governors.
The early symbolic beginning of IPAS was the Prime Minister’s Office’s
mandate for provinces to create a committee called the “Integrated Provincial
Administrative Committee” (IPAC). Like the Joint Public and Private Sectors
Consultative Committee (JPCC) in the past, the IPAC of each province was
appointed by the governor’s office and served as a planning and budget reviewing
body, but it had no legal authority concerning budget appropriation. Although the
IPAC played a role in guiding the provincial strategic planning process, it had no
power to control provincial policy implementation. Ironically, the committee was
divided into various sub-committees according to the specializations and expertise
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of territorial government agencies, which kept them from dealing adequately with
shared policy issues. In addition, non-public sector representatives invited to join
the committee were outnumbered by the civil officers. The CEO-governors who
acted as the president of IPAC continued to rely on the skills and substantive
knowledge of different ministerial representatives.
The emphasis on provincial strategic plans and regional plans (groups of
designated provinces) was closely associated with Thaksin’s policy agendas, “the
populist policies,” that addressed a variety of economic and social issues. Thaksin
assigned Deputy Prime Ministers to oversee and advise groups of provincial
administrators. The governors signed Public Service Agreements with these
political executives as part of IPAS’s protocol. An apparent consequence of this
advisory group on the territorial government was that the elected officials tried to
intervene in some policy areas by controlling the outcome of the provincial planning
process through IPAS implementation. This intervention turned out to be frustration,
as one of the respondents explains:

The strategic plan of our province includes many aspects of societal and
development plans, but Thaksin’s scheme has focused mainly on economic
growth. The governor will be evaluated whether he achieves the provincial
economic plan. Further, in a visit by Thaksin’s advisory team, he has
convinced the IPAS committee to adopt a sports development program as
part of the strategic plans which was not part of the original plan proposed by
the local committee of our province, (interview with a staff of provincial
strategic administration in province “A,” January 10, 2005)

The initial emphasis of the IPAS required by the OPDC concentrated on 4
frameworks for provincial operations. A list of these frameworks appears in Table 9.
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These evaluative frameworks divide into 4 major categories: 1) policy effectiveness,
2) quality of public services, 3) administrative efficiency, and 4) administrative
development. Table 9 summarizes the 4 major criteria of IPAS evaluation.

Table 9
Integrated Provincial Administrative System’s Policy Framework

IPAS’s Policy Compliance (100%)
1) The Effectiveness of Strategic Plans (60%)
- National Policy
- Regional Strategic Plan
- Provincial Strategic Plan
2) The Quality of Public Service (10%)
- Citizen Satisfaction
- Counter Corruption Effort
3) The Efficiency of Provincial Management (10%)
- Cost Saving
- Timely Service Response
4) The Development of Provincial Organization (20%)
- Knowledge and Learning
- Provincial Database
- Change Management

These points of evaluation introduced new management accountability that
made governors follow the provincial strategic plan and implement IPAS reforms.
The provincial reform pressed governors and various field ministries to improve
inter-organizational collaboration, to develop output indicators, and to report their
performance in the form of a Self-Evaluation Report (SAR card). Traditionally, such
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evaluative assessment of provincial administration had never been taken seriously
by the central-level agencies. This new institutional control devised by the OPDC to
encourage and constrain certain types of behaviors of provincial administration was
evident in the requirement of strategic planning and managing for results. The
OPDC took them as a means to control administrative output and to encourage
reform progress. It claimed that these requirements serve as focusing devices to
governors for better policy outcomes and for increasing overall administrative
competence (OPDC, 2004a). A respondent who has many years of experience
working with different provinces says:

The change that the CEO governor reform brought to provincial
administration can be considered as a turning point. Administrative
fragmentation was reduced and provincial officers clearly work harder than
before. Yet, their attitude toward the administrative reform has not improved
because they were pushed to do so. (interview with the head of provincial
commerce ministry of province “A,” January 12, 2005)

To remain parallel with Thaksin’s provincial initiatives, the Bureau of Budget
(BOB) attempted to modernize the budgeting system, creating a results-based
budgeting. In part, the Bureau of the Budget instructed provincial administrators to
use the strategic provincial plan as a basis for the budget request. Based on this
linkage, the goals, objectives, strategies, and performance targets from various
territorial governments were subjected to some scrutiny by a secretariat of the Office
of Governor, Provincial Strategic Administration Unit, prior to inclusion in the budget
appropriation request. However, decisions about the budget allocation remained in
the Bureau of Budget and the Prime Minister’s Office. Although provincial strategic
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plans provided a stronger link between sub-government’s spending and the
government’s policy objectives than traditional provincial budgeting, a major
problem arose because provincial strategic plans cut across the plans of ministerial
functions and central departments outside the provincial plans. This led to
confusion about the priority of the sub-government’s responsibilities toward the
governors and their responsiveness toward the ministerial functions.
A working staff member at the Provincial Strategic Administration Unit, the
Office of Governor, pointed out:

There were numerous obstacles at the beginning of IPAS implementation
that dealt with budget proposals according to provincial strategic plans. This
happened primarily at the operational level in provinces where the
representatives of the ministries at the sub-government level implemented
ministerial strategic plans which may not always agree with provincial
strategic plans, (interview with a staff of provincial strategic administration in
province “A,” January 10, 2005)

In this context, a respondent argues:

The problem of tension between ministerial plans and provincial level plans
was aggravated by outdated budgetary rules that failed to support the
provincial reforms during the hasty reform implementation in the first year.
As a result, the Thaksin government had to add 20 million baht to the IPAS
budget for the governor’s exclusive control, regardless of provincial plans
and needed projects. In fact, this amount of budget under the governor’s
authority was substantively small (less than 3 percent of the total budget
received by all territorial agencies for each province). The administration
promised a higher budget the following year when barriers of the IPAS
system were removed, (interview with a staff of provincial strategic unit, the
office of provincial governor in province “A,” January 10, 2005)
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In province “B” which was chosen as one of the IPAS pilot cases a year
before the mandate, the deputy governor argued:

Implementing IPAS while cross-ministerial functions were still under the
process of reorganization was a big barrier toward the governor’s power
devolution scheme. The ongoing change concerning various departmental
reorganizations such as transferring authorities and officials from the
Department of Forestry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, and
the Department of Mineral Resources the Ministry of Industries, to the new
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment significantly confused the
issue of governor devolution, (interview with the deputy governor of province
“B,” March 3, 2005)

The role of the IPAS committee was to work with all agencies and
subcommitees to anticipate future needs and trends and to help make sure that
provincial government realizes the implications of present decisions. This initiative
would hold agencies accountable for program results by requiring ministerial
agencies to clarify their mission, set program goals, and measure performance of
those goals. Starting in 2003, provincial agencies had to accomplish several
actions: (1) establish goals that define the level of performance to be achieved by
each program, (2) express the goals in an objective, measurable way, (3) describe
the processes and resources required to achieve the goals, and (4) provide a basis
for comparing actual program results with established goals.
Although provincial strategic planning was the cornerstone of IPAS, it did not
link the provincial plans and implementation to budgeting and performance
measurement during the first phase. The deputy governor of province “B”
concluded that “the mandate for provincial strategic plans compelled provincial
administrations to develop strategic plans, yet the planning process and cooperation
were left to agencies’ discretion. Not surprisingly, the quality and usability of the
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plans remained unsatisfying” (interview with the deputy governor of province “B,”
March 3, 2005).
In large provinces, administration appears to have experienced limited
success implementing of IPAS. The governor of province “C” reported:

It is commonly known that large and complex provincial administrations were
heavily involved with ceremonial duties which distracted the leaders from
important management issues. In the reality of working conditions, the CEOgovernors of large provinces were preoccupied with accommodating tasks
for central delegations and political executives, presiding over various public
functions and community activities, and examining document-based routine
decision making, (interview with the governor of province “C,” March 18,
2005)

However, these distractions were much more minor in small and remote
provinces like province “C.” Also, in C, the administration was less complicated than
in a large province where many sub-government agencies participated in provincial
administration. The governor argued that the small size of some provinces
permitted those governors to manage provincial programs and to oversee policy
implementation better than could be done in the large ones.
A major distinction stands out when analyzing IPAS adoption in small
provinces. The main element is the emphasis on cooperation instead of
confrontation and conflict with ministerial groups, local governments, and private
citizens. This cooperation was achieved by various means, such as the provision of
informal assistance and teamwork among sub-regional agencies, municipalities, and
businesses. By way of illustration, province “C” adopted a “Tea Council” (informal
talk outside a provincial office) technique to overcome obstacles to fostering
cooperation (interview with deputy governor of province “C,” March 15, 2005).
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Administrative and strategic leadership within provincial bureaucracies, the
organizational mission and culture, and the beliefs of administrators all had an
important impact on IPAS’s performance. But perhaps the most important problem
was the contradiction in IPAS between requiring the governor to lead the planning
but not granting governors necessary power to manage provincial administration.
This tension can be seen in the Thaksin government’s economic policies. The
provincial strategic plans are a five-year look into the future to establish the strategic
goals for individual provinces. The plans were required to indicate resources
needed for potential achievement of the strategic goals in each province. However,
the Thaksin government wanted provincial budget allocation that would shift
resources quickly to identified political priorities such as the government’s village
funds, the People’s Banks, the Small and Medium Enterprise programs (SMEs), and
other regional economic stimulation. The result was policy centralization on the one
hand, and inadequate resources to administer the provinces on the other.
The economic policy frameworks ran counter to power devolution for
governors. Although many ministerial agencies in the interviews agreed that they
benefited to some extent from provincial reform, they complained about inadequate
support received such as information technology improvement, staff for program
analysis, and consistent standard operation procedures. One of the provincial
governors contends:

Changes in the ministeral roles of sub-region administration into the more
economic role of national public policy imply that provincial policy
incoherence will be the eventual outcome as the process of ministerial
control through sub-regional representatives becomes more tenuous. If
provincial government and ministerial agencies are expected to receive their
policy direction from the central government, and, therefore, from above,
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there is less need to worry about devolution of power. Indeed, centralized
control may well be seen as legitimate, (interview with the governor of
province “B," March 9, 2005)

Thaksin saw the advantages of provincial strategic plans that are connected
to the administration’s political purpose. He demanded that the 2003 budget should
be linked to provincial output and performance. At the same time, he set up a
Budget Commission, chaired by himself and consisting of a Deputy Prime Minister,
a Finance Minister, the Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office, four other ministers
appointed by cabinet, two hand-picked experts and the director of BOB (Painter,
2005). During the revision of the budget rules, many reform measures were
implemented by prime ministerial order. Effectively, the new commission
supplanted the task of the BOB in finalizing and submitting the budget bills including
governors’ budget proposals. The Budget Commission also became the final arbiter
for determining budget allocations before they were submitted to the cabinet. This
episode reflected a change in the operation of the provincial administrative reform to
facilitate accomplishing the government’s objectives. Indeed, the Thaksin
administration was less interested in the reform of budgeting techniques in relation
to the rational strategic development efforts of provinces. The attempted budget
control by the administration contradicted ideas about decentralizating central power
and responsibilities.
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Performance Target Measurements

The previous section on dealing with IPAS’s strategic planning had an
implicit assumption that provincial strategic plans would help improve the
management of Thai provincial administration. The application of strategic plans in
the Thai public sector was not new, but the Thaksin administration pioneered the
provincial reform by creating more formal links between budget allocations for public
agencies and the data required by the central government agencies to measure the
attainment of program objectives. In fact, this effort to improve the results of
government spending had concerned individual public agencies since the early
1980s. The earliest reform attempt using this approach was the introduction of the
Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) when the oil price crisis in the
early 1980s began to place pressure on General Prem’s administration (Dixon,
2005). Caught in a financial crisis in the late 1990s, the Thai government was
confronted with the need for more accountability and improved resource allocation
decisions.
The renewed pursuit of budgeting reform by the Thai government since the
1997 Asian economic crisis can be seen through the introduction of results-based
budgeting. The 1997 crisis forced sharp spending cuts in response to decreasing
revenues, and it changed the normal budget surplus of Thai finance into deficits.
For the attempt at results-focused budgeting, Thaksin permitted a “laboratory”
scheme for transforming highly centralized, input controls to budgeting for results.
Using this approach, the BOB offered to reduce line itemization for spending
agencies based on “conditional devolution” considerations.
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The important financial standards addressed by the BOB included: 1) clear
objectives and expected level of service delivery and outputs related to expenditure
requests, 2) identification and costing of agency outputs, 3) timeliness of financial
and performance reporting, 4) better procurement management, and 5)
development of an internal audit. This shift was part of the budgeting revision from
PPBS toward Results-Oriented Budgeting (ROB) (Office of the Bureau of Budget,
2003).
A major element of the IPAS’s budget-related reforms was its application of
quantifiable targets to outputs and measurement of the achievement of those
targets. These changes were intended to introduce a comprehensive performance
reporting system in the provincial administration. The OPDC pushed the reform
tactic across all governmental organizations. The OPDC and the BOB issued a
number of guidelines and provided consultations to governors and sub
government’s representatives in each province concerning the new evaluation
framework. The development of performance data and its definitions represented a
changing approach to central control over provincial administration.
The stated purposes of the IPAS’s guidelines are to make the provincial
governments improve program effectiveness and public accountability; set program
goals, measure program performance against those goals, report their progress,
and provide more objective information relating the effectiveness and efficiency of
provincial programs to spending. To this end, the IPAS requires provincial agencies
to develop and submit to the OPDC a variety of documents that report past
performance and detail expected performance targets. When the information from
these reports is combined, the data can form a basis for making decisions on
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performance benchmarking. However, the combination of target indicators has the
potential to confuse the OPDC, as well as provincial officers. Complexity of various
agency objectives as well as complexity of the performance indicators contributes to
this problem. A major factor that seems to limit IPAS measurement is a lack of
consisent indicator definition, as this quote suggests:

We really don't understand how the OPDC define their key performance
indicators. Last year, the provincial revenue on rubber goods was calculated
from small factories’ operation, but this year it includes all related revenue
generated by the whole provincial rubber industry. We had tried to get
feedback and negotiate but the officials at OPDC don’t know the working
definition of such things. We don't expect to get much out of it. ...our staffs
are somewhat confused with things, (interview with a head of provincial
agriculture and cooperative ministry in province “A,” January 17, 2005)

The IPAS reforms under the Thaksin administration reflected his private
sector management background. Faced with slow progress concerning budget
system improvement and the lack of strong leadership from BOB, Prime Minister
Thaksin demanded that agency outputs were to be identified and be linked to
management cost by late 2003.
For the 2004 budget, each agency, including all provincial administrations,
was required to determine expected service outputs and make contractual
agreements about service targets consented to by respective ministers. Because it
was critical for the spending agencies that their accountability be partially
determined by service levels, the politics of creating indicators and negotiation over
those indicators became a salient issue in the reform implementation process. This
integration of performance output measurement into the budget system became a
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large step forward for the Thai public sector that reinforced the idea of contractual
management and a separation between policy makers and service providers.
The OPDC proposed to use provincial output indicators to maintain
accountability in the face of enhanced governor power devolution. At the same
time, an ongoing negotiation about standard performance for control measures was
developed to meet the government mandate. This shift toward a formal public
service performance measurement needed an effort to set up new procedures for
data collection, new definitions with regard to indicators, and new patterns of
information usage in government documentation. The OPDC applied these data to
develop the benchmarking of provincial performance and to inform the political
executives about policy achievement among different provincial administrations.
The government also initiated new incentives such as performance pay and
promised higher CEO budget allocations to push competition among provincial
administrations. With all these changes, the enhanced policy role of Thaksin’s
government in the provincial reform implementation process was highly visible.
The OPDC required the submission of provincial strategic plans every year.
To provide for increased responsiveness, the OPDC suggested provincial agencies
should consult with major social groups and stakeholders during the plan
development process. The operational definitions of important aspects of the plan
development process, such as consultation and stakeholders, were left to agency
discretion. Not surprisingly, different components of committees were apparent
across provinces and, as a result, the quality and applicability of their strategic
planning varied.
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Formal compliance dates for IPAS’s implementation were set by the OPDC.
For example, in December 2004, provincial administrations were required to update
the strategic plan created in the previous year. A six-month self-evaluated
performance report was to be submitted to OPDC, followed by a full twelve-month
report at the end of a budget year. Information contained in these documents was
designed to be integrated so expected and actual performance levels could be
compared. Table 10 reports the 2005 IPAS’s schedule.

Table 10
Schedule for Integrated Provincial Administrative System

Schedule for Implementing IPAS (FY2005)

December 15, 2004

Provincial Strategic Plan be sent to the Office Public Sector
Development

December 22-23, 2004

Central agencies and individual provinces agreed on Key
Performance Indicator (KPI), target, and scoring system

December 27-30, 2004

Public Service Agreement (PSA) for FY2005 be signed
between provincial governors and designated deputy Prime
Ministers

January 4, 2005

The cabinet approved regional strategic plans.

April 15, 2005

Provinces submitted 6-month report (Self Assessment
Report: SAR card)

September 1-30, 2005

Evaluation of service satisfaction by outsourcing agency
(Thai Rating and Information Services Co Ltd: TRIS)

October 31, 2005

Individual province submitted 12 month report (SAR card)
and administrative performance report (PSA)

November 1-30, 2005

Office of Public Sector Development evaluated the
implementation of Public Service Agreement.

Office of Public Sector Development, December 3, 2004
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Performance measurement was a new step in regional government reform
even though territorial governments had used it sporadically before the mandate of
IPAS. The creation of IPAS’s performance indicators posed something of a
paradox, but the government embraced it since it helped in communicating the
CEO’s management results. The CEO governors are accountable for the result of
performance outcomes at provincial level but central ministries and their delegations
at the provincial level do plan and implement most of provincial programs.
However, an overemphasis on creating output targets and performance
measurement created numerous efforts at documentation and generated many
reports that may not translate to an improved provincial administration.
Although the provincial administrations produced key performance indicators
to reflect the collective goals of various sub-governments led by the CEO Governor,
there were differences between agencies’ goals and intended outputs. It was not
feasible to incorporate all agencies’ outputs into one comprehensive measure of
IPAS. Hence, the OPDC allowed provincial administration to propose a set of
agreed performance targets as long as they complied with the required four-point
measurement frameworks. Because of limited staff resources and since numerous
sub-government units were part of the provincial administration, the OPDC hired the
Thai Rating & Information Service (TRIS) to do much of the work, including
negotiating output targets and measuring the IPAS’s performance.
TRIS’s experiences in assessing various corporate companies and major
national public enterprises were applied to an unprecedented process of
performance indicator development and quantifiable outputs for provincial
governments. It collaborated with all ministries and provincial administrations to
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create numerous definitions concerning the performance measurement of IPAS's
outputs that each governor agreed to produce in the form of public service
contracts.
Unlike the traditional command and control hierarchy, the contracts were
made with Thaksin’s Deputy Prime Minister instead of the Minister of Interior. TRIS
was the change agent who introduced various private sector models of performance
measurement to the staff of the provincial administration. For example, internal
performance outputs in the form of a “balanced scorecard,” which had been used in
business firms since the early 1990s, was promoted as part of the IPAS reform.
This concept was directly converted into the four-point provincial policy
measurement framework mentioned earlier (OPDC, 2004b). The four sets of
measures were assumed to balance in the sense that the CEO-governor had to pay
attention to the entire policy framework mandate, not just one group of all
administrative issues.
One of the chief problems the OPDC faced was that it was difficult to agree
on a common ground about how performance targets were defined and
implemented. The OPDC needed a structured approach to performance
assessment, including a set of standard measurements and mandatory elements.
These mandatory elements were necessary to make performance comparison
possible between provinces or groups of provinces. The establishment of
performance definitions and output targets was mostly accomplished by the OPDC
through the contractual work with TRIS and through communication with the
provincial strategic planning unit under the office of the governor. In this case, the
office of the governor clearly played an important part in the assessment process
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although the office’s operations did not pay attention to the improvement of man
power for the new tasks and the restructuring of the office to effectively implement
the IPAS plans. In fact, the only change of the core unit at the office was its name,
from Provincial Policy and Plan Analysis Unit to Provincial Strategic Planning Unit.
All staff and divisions remained unchanged.
Concerning the IPAS’s monitoring, staff at the sub-government offices had
responsibility to report their performance to central ministries for which they were
held accountable as well as to provide information and reports for the governor’s
office. The collection of data and documentations dealing with different levels of
performance schemes required by the central ministries and the CEO-Govenor
became overwhelming since the provincial staff was to be assessed by the OPDC
as part of provincial performance under the CEO reform and also the sub
government unit in the individual ministers. The governor of province “B,” who
replaced a former governor when the IPAS’s pilot project ended in 2002, pointed out
that the data requirements for the performance output measurements were not
realistic (interview with the governor of province “B," March 9, 2005). In fact, many
interviews with the representatives of central ministries in the observed provinces
showed that data gathering required by the OPDC brought about uncomfortable
extra work for the provincial staff because new data had to be collected in the
provinces, while critical parts of the data were only available at central agencies
(interview with head of provincial labor ministry in province “A,” January 6, 2005).
The issue of unrealistic data requirements was seen in a controversy about the
definition of gross provincial product (GPP) because the data existed only at the
national level and only in an aggregated form.
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The emphasis on GPP in the IPAS reform reflected Thaksin’s policy
preferences. As mentioned above, his policies were rooted in an attempt at reviving
the rural Thai economy through the government’s populist policies. Specifically, his
policy focused on increasing economic activities designed to increase the
purchasing power of Thailand's majority rural lower class. Apart from this, the CEOgovernors and the IPAS's plans were aimed at reinforcing the regional economic
programs. A second theme in Thaksin’s economic policy focused on "mega
projects," which involve investing over 50 billion dollars in public works, including
roads, public transit, and a new international airport. Supporters of Thaksin argue
that these policies had driven a stable, demand-driven recovery of Thailand's
economy, which was previously dependent on exports, making it vulnerable to
external shocks (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, pp. 66-70).
However, GPP measurement is difficult since the central government has
dominated the economic development of Thai regions for decades. In addition,
provincial administrations varied considerably in their size, management capacity,
and approach to collecting the newly required GPP data. The head of the provincial
commerce ministry in province “B” related that the 2003 provincial GPP was
overestimated since the data was created to seek potential support from the
government (interview with a representative of commerce ministry in province “B,”
March 9, 2005).
Because the province is a large site of government-supported industries,
especially ceramics, and that business owners were articulate stakeholders, the
businesses were pressing for higher estimates of economic growth while it was
difficult to collect and report business data. In addition, an effect of the cross-border
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economy was largely missing since the data inquiry in the calculation of GPP data
tended to rely more heavily on easier-to-obtain proxy data than the richer data.
Consequently, economic data was highly dependent on information provided by
central agencies such as the National Economic and Social Development Board.
Because of inadequate data to estimate GPP, province “B” as well as most of the
other provinces requested permission from the OPDC to change key estimated
indicators. Province B adjusted the target for gross provincial commerce from 10%
to 6% and revenue from tourists was also reduced to reach the more realistic target
in order to avoid a negative performance evaluation.
The negotiation of target measurement between TRIS and provincial staff
occurred in every provincial administration and in most sectors where the
performance indicators were used. A staff member of the strategic planning unit in
province “A” argued that OPDC’s performance measurement overemphasized
economic competition, and this put stress on all governors to win the government’s
approval of the provincial public service agreement and the end-of-year evaluation
of IPAS (interview with a working staff of Provincial Strategic Administration Unit at
province “A,” January, 25, 2005). One frequently voiced problem discussed by the
interviewees was that they needed a clear and complete guideline from the OPDC,
rather than implementing the performance reform by trial and error, with frequent
changes. Contrary to the bureaucrat’s experience, statements given by the
secretary of OPDC in several public media claimed that the course of public sector
reforms featured a clear set of planned stages and they were moving in the right
direction.
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In publishing the 2005 report on government reform, and particularly the
assessment of IPAS, the OPDC revealed benchmarking data that listed
performance scores of all provincial administrations according to the four-element
evaluation framework. The benchmarking sought to encourage provincial
administrations to improve their operations and the report was openly accessed by
the public. The report can be seen as a form of oversight that ranks provincial
performance on required key evaluative areas of management. According to the
report, the average score for all 75 provinces scored was 4.26 out of a possible 5.
Individual province’s benchmarking scores generally fell in a narrow range. The
report failed to provide detailed information on how the four-point evaluative
framework was scored. The three cases in this study were marked below the
average score even though one of them, province “B,” had been part of the IPAS
pilot project. It is not clear if these case study provinces complied less well than the
average or if they negotiated for changes in the measures less successfully and
therefore inflated their results less (see Table 11).
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Table 11
Integrated Provincial Administrative System’s Rating in 2004

Performance Benchmark
(a total of 5 score)
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Highest

4.68

Average

4.26

Lowest

3.68
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Office of Public Sector Development: Report on the assessment of provincial performance
agreement (September 26, 2005)

Devolution and Accountability

Redefining public sector accountability and the devolution of central power
are key components of the IPAS scheme. Traditionally, the representatives of
central ministries under the governors’ leadership largely ignored the provincial
policy-making process because they were accountable to their ministries more than
to the province. Due to the functional specialization of each ministry, their policies
and management regarding regional development were incoherent. This was
because central ministries left administrative functions to various departments and
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sub-national governments in the provinces. This structural flaw was a major
concern of public sector reform advocates and of the Thaksin administration.
Efforts to fix this problem were part of the IPAS initiative. The Thaksin
administration promised that CEO-governors under the IPAS reform would have
more power that included the promotions and punishments of middle-level officers
who were assigned to provinces by central ministries.
In light of these issues, a new model of provincial government strategic
planning was needed. In particular, there had to be a close link between the
strategic planning and devolution processes so that provincial program priorities
could be made more coherent. Furthermore, there had to be clear alignment
between the needs of ministerial representatives who set part of the strategic
direction of the province and the focus of the operational front-line services who
deliver service to the public.
To make this work, provincial decision makers have to set organizational
priorities and clearly identify the process for executing the strategic plan. Also, to
establish strategic alignment, a performance measurement system should be
implemented that establishes performance measures that apply at the high levels of
the organization and cascade down to operational measures at the departmental
level. Ideally, provincial administrators should get continual feedback on how the
plans are working, so that they can adjust the strategic direction as necessary
(Office of Public Sector Development Commission, 2004a).
The goals of IPAS’ power devolution for regional government were
ambitious, but the parallel reorganizational operation of the central ministries
became a barrier to IPAS’s implementation. As mentioned earlier in this chapter,
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there was an increase in the number of functional agencies and a number of
transfers of high-ranking positions as part of Thaksin’s reorganization program.
Additional legislation was also drafted to clarify functional roles and power of newly
established ministries and departments. Within this reorganization program, some
major tasks and responsibilities were not transferred to the regional and local
government.

The IPAS seeks to empower provincial governors, as well as ministerial
representatives, for example, by cutting regulations and easing restrictions
on those administrators.. . . One purpose of the governors’ and ministerial
representatives’ empowerment is to enhance coordination among incoherent
multiple programs in the exercise of provincial authority. However, the
revised roles and responsibilities of central ministry and sub-regional
agencies are far from complete. The results are predictable-more role
conflicts, task uncertainty, and government operation that is open to more
descretion. (interview with a staff of provincial strategic administrative
devision in province “A,” January 10, 2005)

The difficulty of the CEO-Governor’s power devolution is reinforced by
another:

There are a couple of provinces whose governors do not delegate their
power to middle-rank officers possibly because the governers want to control
short-term program outcomes. In our province, delegation attempts are still
far from perfect. I would say personally, that this is one area that really
gripes me. Our role is not clear and we do not have a clear understanding of
some parts of the delegated tasks that involve ministeral management
power. You don't see a solution in just one or two years since we must rely
on formal channels of dispute resolution, (interview with a secretary of
provincial governor in province “B,” March 8, 2005)
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The decentralization of power from the central government to lower level
governments had been an important item on the national agenda since the 1997
constitution was promulgated. However, the dual track of ministerial reorganization
and provincial reform ran counter to the devolution and decentralization scheme. In
the management of expenditure, the reforms included performance-based
budgeting for line ministries; a strengthening of the capacity of central agencies to
construct and review strategic plans; and a progressive expansion of fiscal
transparency. These measures suggest that central policymaking under devolution
will is likely to engender competition between line ministries and provincial
administration.
By themselves, the ministerial devolution measures might have been useful,
but in context, these apparent benefits of power devolution were illusory. That is to
say devolution does not necessarily increase governors' autonomy to establish
provincial policies that respond to particular local needs. Rather, national social
policy protects line ministries from competitive pressures and urges department and
program managers at the provincial level to maintain core functions and
responsibilities in order to gain their program funding. This suggests that provinical
governors, left to their own descretion, will tend to marginalize the devolution
scheme.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Thai reform strategies emphasized a more
contractual, performance based, discretionary style of organizational management.
In line with this strategy, the relationship between different levels of organizational
hierarchy such as the central ministries and the sub-regional operating units shifted
toward contractual agreements with quantifiable performance measurements. As a
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result, new forms of administrative accountability that emphasized an outputoutcomes model of accountability gradually superseded traditional forms of
accountability that were based on a hierarchy of command. But these reforms did
not address a variety of problems that remained, including limited scope of the
governor’s controls, changing rules of implementation, personalism, and political
interventions.

The CEO-governor has been presented like a man on horseback expected
to cure all problems in a province. But there are still many important
problems he can not manage. As I knew it, military, education, and local
government issues are beyond the responsibiliites of the CEO. Inherent
negative cultures dealing with patron-client relationship, nepotism,
ceremonial tasks, politician influence, let alone conflicting rules and
guidelines issued by different central agencies are all big problems we are
still facing, (interview with the governor of province “B,” March 9, 2005)

Given these difficulties, much of the ability to coordinate the subnational
ministry offices at the provincial level depended on the personality, skills, and
personal networks of the governors. Their recruitment thus becomes a central focus
of the analysis. The OPDC revised the recruitment and selection of governors.
Whereas in the past, governors had been picked from within the Ministry of Interior,
now recruitment was to be open, based on competition between candidates from
various ministries. According to the OPDC’s recruitment change, the IPAS’s
governor selection was subject to a special national recruitment committee presided
over by Thaksin’s Deputy Prime Ministers. Although the OPDC suggested that
governors could be chosen from outside the Interior Ministry, none of the incumbent
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CEO-governors were from the outside. This aspect of reform initiative was not
implemented at the time of this research.
While the new selection process did not necessarily open the position to
competition and assure the most skilled governors, it did enable the Thaksin
government to decentralize control and simultaneously maintain accountability by
using a more open competition and then selecting candidates for governor. In part,
this strategy helped assure that NPM approaches would be integrated into the top
ranks of the civil service in the Thai public sector. The new recruitment process
reinforced the OPDC’s structural arrangements that attempted to influence behavior
within provincial administration, determine the performance of provincial outputs and
outcomes, and structure its relationships based on contractual agreements. More
concretely, appointed CEO-governors were forced to manage increasing provincial
economic targets according to the government policy framework.
Thai public sector has seen a rise of accountability in its administration
following the 1997 reformed constitution, with greater use of various institutional
arrangements and political processes. Following the constitutional framework, the
2003 Good Governance Act gave greater opportunity for Thaksin’s public sector
reform agenda. The first section of the Good Governance Act decreed that the
public sector must respond to the state’s policies, manage public affairs efficiently,
streamline the administrative process, be adaptive to changing situations, and
regularly evaluate organizational performance. The implication of this law for
provincial administration and accountability was that it increased a great amount of
monitoring through stringent assessments and other control mechanisms. The form
of accountability was especially illuminated in the OPDC’s promotion of performance
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targets as part of IPAS implementation. The rise of performance measures
reflected the changing nature of accountability in the Thai public sector.
It is logical to assume that devolution and performance measurement and
contracting are two sides of the same coin, that devolution could occur only if the
goals of the lower levels of government were consonant with those above and their
performance in carrying out those policies was routinely measured and reported. As
it worked out, though, the need to control policy trumped the devolution of authority.
The need to implement macro economic goals watered down and to some extent
replaced the goal of devolution and regional administrative reform. The governor’s
CEO scheme and power devolution were weakly designed and organized. Large
parts of sub-government organizations maintained their domain of responsibilities
under their respective functional ministries.
As an example of economic policy goals taking priority over devolution goals,
in Province B, the governor and his office were held responsible for policies and
programs that were important at the national level, but were not included in the
provincial level plans. A head of the provincial commerce ministry in Province B
asked in an interview how the governor and his office could be accountable for the
empowerment program for small and medium-sized businesses when there were
no related performance targets and goals specified in the provincial plan (interview
with the representative of commerce ministry in province “B,” March 9, 2005).
Interviews with most representatives from central ministries suggested that
their perspectives on accountability were quite different from that of governors.
Sub-government units in provincial administrations engaged in public service
contracts with respective central departments in the same way that governors had
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the agreement with the office of prime minister. However, the ministerial contracts
were driven by departments’ programmatic concepts which operated exclusively in
term of their expertise. Hence, the devolution of personnel power for the governor
did not effectively restructure the accountability between governors and provincial
staff. This observation was confirmed by the governor of province “B” as he argued
that the least problematic task concerning the devolution of central power to the
governor was civil service promotions for which he normally requests the opinion of
respective ministerial heads (interview with the governor of province “B,” March 9,
2005).
Concerning budgets, most of the central ministries hesitated to leave the
decision to governors even though the OPDC did suggest that budgetary decision
making should be transferred to the CEO-governor (interview with head of provincial
agriculture and cooperative ministry of province “C," March 17, 2005).
The new accountability framework implied a new relationship between
government ministers and the provincial governor. First, the governors understood
that their tenure in “good” provinces (relatively large population provinces)
depended on their performance in implementing IPAS reforms. Now known as
CEO-governors, provincial governors worked under performance-based public
service contracts that they negotiated with the responsible Deputy Prime Ministers.
The OPDC monitored performance on behalf of the office of prime minister.
The governors were free to manage their provincial administration in the ways they
deemed best suited to meet the government performance goals. It was evident
from the interviews that the bureaucratic inertia including traditional practices in
provincial administration remained an obstacle to regional reform. In fact, the
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governor’s position in Thailand used to have secure tenure and limited authority;
now it seemed that they had limited tenure and overwhelming responsibilities.
Second, provincial administrations were placed under the same rules and
regulations as the private sector. That is to say, the traditional rules of public sector
and service employment regulations were replaced by dynamic regulatory change.
The governor of each province was forced to operate under the rhetoric of private
sector management, like a chief executive officer of a private company, managing
policies and decisions on the number of outputs and service delivery contracts.
However, these structural changes did not lead to good accountability because
vague or unachievable performance specifications undermined performance
arrangements. It was necessary to say that the output performance that CEOgovernors were expected to deliver was substantively selective and negotiable. The
CEO-governors were assumed to be accountable for the output results while the
political executives were responsible for the outcomes.
By preference, the government was interested in achieving political
outcomes and maintaining political support. However, policy outcomes were often
not within the control of political executives, partially because the complexity of
performance measurement and vague specifications of output targets allowed
provincial administrations to determine what they wanted to produce.

IPAS and Local Government Decentralization

Local government in Thailand has been known for having limited power
under the control of the central government. Since the end of absolute monarchy in
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1932, central ministries played a principal role in the production of public services
across provincial and local government jurisdictions. Rapid economic growth since
the 1980s has placed an increasing burden on the highly centralized administration.
As addressed in Chapter 4, the period following the1980s saw the establishment of
Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committees (JPPCCs) which sought to
facilitate regional social and economic development in regional Thailand. This
collaboration provided local business associations and the private sector
opportunities to become involved in local government politics and in the national and
regional policy-making process (Laothamatas, 1992). Such a collaborative
framework continued afterwards, reflecting the relaxation of stringent centralized
policy-making process. In part, this process emerged from the political
transformation during the 1970s’ anti-military rule period, and it was reinforced by
economic factors in the 1980s (Connors, 2003, pp. 229-232).
During the late 1990s, the Thai government introduced ambitious public
sector reforms that redefined roles and resource allocation between central
governments and local government authorities. This effort was specified in the Thai
Constitution of 1997, in Section 282, that mandated a decentralization law that
reorganized the respective powers and duties between central government and
local authorities and among local authorities themselves. Subsequently, seven
entirely new laws were enacted in order to fulfill the 1997 constitution’s provisions
(Nelson, 2002). These laws included the 1999 Decentralization Plan and Procedure
Act that called for the transfer of public service responsibilities to local authorities
and for increasing shared revenue to all local governments to no less than 35% of
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total local spending by the year 2006. Table 12 illustrates important acts concerning
the decentralization plan between 1999 and 2001.

Table 12
Law Reform for Local Government Decentralization

Acts

Enacted Year

The Act for the Request of Local Ordinances

1999

The Decentralization Plan and Procedure Act

1999

The Act on Voting for the Removal from Office of Members of
a Local Assembly of Local Administrators

1999

The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration Civil Servants
Administration Act

1999

The Administration of Pattaya City Act

1999

The Local Personnel Administration Act

1999

The Act on the Elections of Local Councils and Executives

2001

The Decentralization Plan and Procedure Act defined six functions to be
transferred from central ministries to local administrative authorities. These
functions and responsibilities were: 1) infrastructure, 2) promotion of quality of life,
3) maintenance of social order and peace, 4) planning and investment promotion,
commerce and tourism, 5) management and conservation of natural resources and
the environment, and 6) promotion of arts, culture, tradition, and local wisdom. The
transfer of these functions was based on the powers and duties of various local
administrative authorities, ranging from small rural local governments to urbanized
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municipalities. A National Decentralization Committee, which was created in 1999,
was given responsibility to define the overlapping functions between the central and
local governments. It was also created to oversee transfers of financial resources
and responsibilities from the central ministries to the local governments. See Figure
2.

Reform of key
central
administrative
svstems

Allocation of
service
responsibilities

Reform of
regional
administration

Strengthening
local
administration

Revitalizing
laws and
regulations

Devolving service
responsibilities

Monitoring,
assessment, and
review
decentralization
plan and process

Figure 2. Oversight Roles of the National Decentralization Committee

Responsibility for sub-region governments is both through the governor and
through the ministerial appointees at the provincial level. Since both are controlled
from the center, final decision-making authority rests with the central government,
which can give orders to and control the scope of responsibility of the regional
government. Since the 1997 constitution, a large and complex body of
administrative laws emerged that required a rebalancing of administrative power
among the different levels of government.
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According to the Government Administration Act of 2002, all the provinces
except Bangkok remained sub-regional governments considered regional branches
of central ministries. This new law slightly increased the power of The Prime
Minister’s Office dealing with the administrative power to cope with substantive
reform implementation processes. In part, this can be seen in the assignment of the
OPDC to oversee the reform under the authority of the Office of Prime Minister.
However, the change in regional and provincial administration that could have been
anticipated did not succeed, as was evident in government’s total general
expenditures in which over 80 percent was spent by various central ministries
through cabinet decisions and a special fund given to the Prime Minister. See
Figure 3.

Provincial Governor

Deputy Governors

Ministerial and Central
Agencies in Province

Sub-region
Governments

Provincial Level Agencies

Local Government
Authorities

District Level Agencies

Figure 3. The Structure of Provincial Administration
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Beyond central and sub-regional governments, local governments are
statutory bodies of the national government. The local authorities divide into 4
major categories: 1) Provincial Administration Organizations (PAO; 75 units), 2)
Municipalities (1,125 units), 3) Tambon Administrative Organizations (TAO or sub
district; 6,744 units), and 4) Special Administrative Organizations (SAOs)
designated by laws, specifically Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and Pattaya
City (Suwanmala, 2004). Under the 1997 constitution, the local authorities are
governed by elected local councils and elected executive committees. Each
possesses distinct internal structures. Other than this, a course of responsibility
transfer from central ministries to local bodies has occured incrementally.
After the 1997 financial crisis, local government authorities, Municipalities,
PAO, and TAO have been increasingly promoted by democratic movements as well
as international assistance organizations such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. However, the progress of decentralization specified in
related laws covering functional transfers, civil service transfers, and financial
resource allocation has been gradual and problematic (Weist, 2002). Potentially,
decentralization could lead to substantial reduction of service responsibilities and
resource needs on the part of sub-regional administrations at the provincial and the
district levels. However, local governments’ services and internal management,
especially thousands of small and fragmented TAOs, are largely undeveloped, while
local officials have limited knowledge about financial regulations and legal process
(Nelson, 1998). Most TAOs are too small and fragmented to be efficient, viable or
accountable local government units. Instead of strengthening local governments
through the existing decentralization framework, Thaksin’s idea of the CEO
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Governor unified provincial administration and worked to strengthen provincial
management in lieu of strengthening the local governments.
With the IPAS reform and the CEO-governors, the Thaksin administration
gave an ambiguous signal for the ongoing decentralization plan. There were at
least two reasons that the local government decentralization process did not gain
much attention from the government.
First, Thaksin’s overwhelming election victory was not based on strong
support for a pluralist and decentralized polity. On the contrary, Thaksin was
presented as an image of a successful conglomerate business person who sought
to save Thailand in the aftermath of economic crisis. Hence, strong leadership and
centralized power seemed to fit the political and economic climate. Accordingly,
Thaksin made the governors directly responsible to the Prime Minister instead of the
line of command of the ministry of interior. Since a number of local governments’
development and service delivery plans were hampered by poor coordination and
lack of horizontal collaboration (Suwanmala, 1999), the IPAS bypassed the role of
local governments and sought the solution of fragmented local authorities by
strengthening CEO-governors.
The Deputy Governor of Province “C” explained why he thought that reform
ought to be directed by the provincial leadership rather than by local leaders.

The CEO concept emphasizes the leader of an organization who must have
exceptional knowledge and skills to lead an organization. However, only a
small number of village heads sucessfully lead their community. The
leadership of TAOs have insufficient experience working with the local
community. This is not the case for provincial governors that have had long
experience and have skills in managing bureaucratic operations. As a result,
the reformed CEO-governor is well suited to and the most effective for the
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new role of regional leadership, (interview with the deputy governor of “C,”
March 15, 2005)

Second, the Thaksin administration’s major policies involved a number of
populist promises such as a revolving fund for every village, a local initiative incomegenerating project, a farmer’s debt suspension program, and a 30-baht-per-visit
charge health-care scheme. In fact, substantive portions of these policies were
parallel to the roles of local government authorities.
The administration’s recentralization in these policy areas marked a shift
from the course of local government decentralization.

The Thaksin government

became silent about its decentralization plan and reiterated that a strategy for
appropriate provincial administration had to be revised for better results. The
government budget had been channeled through the central ministries and their
field operations in the provinces and the districts to the local governments. With the
IPAS reform, provincial administrations did not simply pass funds on to local
government bodies, but also coordinated local government planning to achieve
provincial expenditure plans, which they would draw up and submit as part of
provincial strategic plans.
Several interviews with local political executives in province “A” provided a
sense of the reaction to this aspect of the government’s IPAS reform. An executive
member of the PAO in province “A” made the following observation:

Whether the CEO-governor reform and the local decentralization policy went
together is questionable. Despite increases in responsibility transfers from
central ministries to the PAO, the ministries did not transfer their civil service
staff and related budget to local authorities. The role of the central
government becomes insecure when local governments are given more
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authority under the decentralization plan. Hence, the central government
has reversed its role to control the local governments instead of supervising
them, (interview with a president of PAO in province “A," January 18, 2005)

Another local official pointed out:

According to the government reform framework, the central ministries would
change their roles to focus on policy and technical assistance while allowing
local government authorities to produce public services. However, the
objective of 35% of the national budget transferred to local government this
year was impossible to fulfill, as currently the allocation was only 23.5 %.
This happened because the central ministries maintain their control over
budget power and policy implementation, rather than letting things go out to
the hand of local governments. The CEO-governors have a substantive
power to review local development programs within their provincial
jurisdictions.” (interview with the mayor of the largest municipality in province
“A,” January 19, 2005)

These narrations given by the local government authorities show the
contradiction between local government decentralization policy and the CEO reform
that strengthens provincial governors and sub-government ministerial agencies in
provinces. That overarching provincial strategic policies took precedence over local
government policies had become a major concern of local politicians. Local
government authorities are responsible for tax collection, local planning, and
budgeting while being held accountable to the local people. Even after the
decentralization policy was apparently implemented, the Department of Local
Administration Promotion (DLAP), the Ministry of Interior, continued to oversee the
local governments through general guidelines and advice for local planning,
budgeting, and financial management (Suwanmala, 1999).
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Provincial governors are influential in supervising local government
administration particularly through the implementation of provincial strategic plans
that include substantive infrastructure projects and social programs. For example,
the assessments of CEO-Governors’ performance were higly centralized at the
central government: the OPDC, the Office of the Prime Minister, and the Ministerial
Offices. The establishment of the CEO-governor system reinforced an attempt to
curb the rise of local government authorities as part of the IPAS reform. Underlying
the provincial changes was a desire on the part of the Thaksin administration to
ensure that both provincial-level bureaucracy and local authorities deliver what the
government wanted.
The CEO-style provincial governor and the dominance of national policy
implementation took priority over local democratic accountability. The CEOgovernors acting as the prime minister’s direct subordinates gave the administration
enormous additional means to exert policy control countrywide.

What is the role of local accountability supposed to be when the CEOgovernors challenge the local government constituencies in providing public
services while the local people do not have democratic means to hold the
governor accountable to them? In fact, the provincial reform potentially
contradicts the constitutional mandate of supporting decentralization and of
developing large-size local government authorities, but increased the
tendency of political patronage and politicization on part of bureaucracy,
(interview with a president of the PAO in province “A,” January 18, 2005)
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Conclusion'

Thailand has often been described as a bureaucratic polity, where the
bureaucracy dominates the government. That characterization has probably been
correct for most recent Thai history. However, as management ideology has tended
to favor the private sector, especially during periods of economic crisis, nontraditional approaches to administrative reform have increased. There has been a
pronounced economic component within the reform policy of the Thaksin
government. Early in Thaksin’s first term, he introduced a major administrative
reorganization involving all central ministries and regional governments. This
included initial pilot projects that brought provinces into an “Integrated Provincial
Administrative System” and set up “CEO-governors.” The administration claimed
these reforms would make the provincial governors and sub-governments operate
more effectively to implement central policy and to manage provincial organizations
like businesses.
The provincial reform included eliminating much of the traditional oversight
from the central ministries, adopting new contract-based agreements between the
ministries and senior bureaucrats, establishing performance target measurement as
a tool for accountability, and replicating management tactics of private sector
management. This reform has precipitated a fundamental shift in relationship
between political executives and the civil service and their relative roles and
responsibilities in providing public service. On the one hand, the administration saw
advantages in de-concentrating central responsibilities to the lower tier of
governments in provincial administration when the economic situation pressed for
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downsizing the central agencies. On the other hand, the regional reform sought
greater control over the bureaucracies and their programs through a variety of
management tactics, especially output target performance. However, all
responsible parties had a difficult time delivering accountability while wrestling with
constant changes and unclear definitions of outputs and outcomes.
Observation of provincial administration and interviews provided some
evidence about how IPAS reform became problematic and elusive. The clearest
instance of this problem was the service delivery agreement through which
Thaksin’s ministers were accountable for objectives and outcomes, contracting with
the CEO-governors and heads of departments for performance measurement. This
research uncovered many occasions when the lack of agreement between strategic
plans, unclear definitions of measured outputs, muddled responsibilities, and lack of
financial and staff support hampered the IPAS implementation. The administration
claimed to give more unified power to the governors and strengthen provincial
control over ministerially controlled sub-governments. However, many interviewees
recounted that confusion and contradictions pertaining to rules and discretion on the
part of reformed provincial agencies were prevalent during the reform
implementation process. Further, tension arose in those situations where
management innovations and reform tactics became counterproductive.
Before the arrival of Thaksin in 2000, the Thai administrative system was
slowly progressing toward the direction of democratic governance that supported
local government decentralization and multiple autonomous organizations. When
Thaksin assumed power, public sector reform advanced only where it served the
goals of his political expediency. The reform attempts resulted in absolute control of
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the government over provincial governors and hampered the progress of local
authorities. Considerable decentralization of responsibilities and resources to local
government has taken place, but this process was interrupted by a politicization
strategy aimed at asserting administrative control on the part of the central
government.
The local governments could not simply be treated as central government
agencies, because they are political bodies accountable to a local constituency.
The governors, on the other hand, were responsible to the Thaksin administration,
not to the public. These two sets of reforms clashed because the governors needed
to control the local governments to achieve their performance goals in economic
development. Together, management and political reforms were being deployed to
reshape the bureaucracy into an instrument of the Thaksin government’s political
programs.
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CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND SUGGESTIONS

Introduction

This concluding chapter builds on the earlier substantive chapters in order to
present critical findings of Thaksin’s Integrated Provincial Administrative System
(IPAS reform). In Chapter 1, this study posed significant questions, such as
whether international organizations and global economy affect Thai administrative
reform in general, whether or not the Thai public sector reform clings to the New
Public Management approach of governance, and what type of implications and
impacts would arise from the IPAS’s implementation process. While the IPAS
undoubtedly made an important contribution to sub-government administration,
there were points of contradictions and implications in such efforts to replace
traditional provincial structure by private sector managerial strategies. Given the
frustrating complexity of the IPAS implementation, the conceptual dominance of
New Public Management (NPM) was evident in the recent Thai public sector reform.
This underlying change was made through the Government Administration Act of
2002, the Administrative Organization Act of 2002, and the Good Governance Act of
2003. The term Integrated Provincial Administrative System (generally known as
CEO-Governors) was used in academic, governmental and organization
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discussions in Thailand, but it was not clearly defined. Central to the IPAS reform
ideas were the changes in both governance and public management that sought to
respond to perceived needs and demands, particularly in the post-economic crisis in
1997. Hence, much of the reform implementations had been concerned with
changing bureaucratic rules and a set of compliances to governmental policies.
Essentially, the belief of the reformers, which can be discerned as influential in the
progressive reform movement following the 1997 constitution amendment and the
aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, is that the Thai public sector organizations
were inefficient, fragmented, and often ineffective. These assumptions led to the
managerial preoccupation in the IPAS reform with strategic plans, performance
measurement, output indicators, balance-scored card, public service agreement,
and the like.
Conversely, the regional reform introduced a greater degree of devolution for
governors in the management of provincial and regional affairs. The devolution
scheme had prominently included a new initiative to “public service agreement” in
which a command and control system based on performance measurement was
added to the old traditional hierarchical structure. Within this new reformed
structure, the management of governors stressed a comprehensive set of output
indicators, including required internal and external performance evaluations. The
implication of this change was that the structure of provincial administration was to
move from traditional hierarchy under functional ministries to a new accountability
system based on a contractual agreement with the Thaksin administration. One
crucial link in the relationship between governors and the administration was
provincial strategic plans that must comply with Thaksin’s policy agendas.
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The IPAS scheme and power devolution, therefore, introduced a
sophisticated set of reform elements that created an opportunity for politicization,
recentralization, and new control measure on the part of sub-regional governments
simultaneously. Thaksin’s public reform tactics were fused with politics, in which
Thai Rak Thai’s political agendas were integrated into the reform rhetoric, a portion
of senior bureaucrats were politicized, and the local government decentralization
plans were delayed. Although the IPAS reform was simply presented as the
management improvement of provincial administration, the processes generated
multiple conflicting agendas and substantive impacts in the Thai public
administration. This concluding chapter discusses three issues dealing with IPAS’s
impacts and implications in light of what this researcher has observed.

Thaksin’s Reform Strategies and the Implications

Why did Thaksin perceive central and regional bureaucracy as such a barrier
to government transformation? Why did he launch a new reform agency, the Office
of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), to guide and oversee the
reform implementation? Before answering these questions one should be reminded
that the characteristics of Thai public bureaucracy had remained central to the study
of the contemporary Thai public sector. That means that the changing element of
Thai bureaucracies implies the interruption of bureaucratic influence over the public
policy-making process. Before the Thaksin administration, bureaucrats retained
considerable leverage power in their relationship with politicians. Instead, the
ministerial reorganization and the creation of OPDC under Thaksin changed an inert
bureaucratic structure which has been left in the past to new agencies in order to
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develop specific procedures and regulations necessary for government policy.
Although a portion of reform-minded technocrats had been active in the
development and implementation of reform plans, the new reforms would not have
fully materialized without the distinct leadership of the Thaksin administration.
While there was wide public support for change in organizational structures
of the government, Thaksin's reform appeared to face the challenge of political
interference in the public sector operation. This does not necessarily mean that
administrative intervention exclusively produces conflicts between politicians and
civil servants, but it refers to politics that are inherited in the process involving an
administrative reform by the engaging parties. These gradual resistances include
some sections of politicians who operate at local-level government politics and a
number of frustrated bureaucrats. Within this context, Thai administrative reforms
have been caught in the paradox of reform measures such as decentralizing
responsibilities and result-based performance targets, on the one hand, but on the
other hand the reforms sought greater control over the management of bureaucratic
operations. In another case, the technocratic reformers may seek to distance public
sector operation from the political executive through explicit management tactics
and a quantifiable approach, but the politicians in power may perceive the
advantage of such tools and tactics and exploit the reform in any available channels.
In analyzing the exercise of administrative power during Thaksin’s first term,
the study found that the Thai Rak Thai’s dominant party had introduced a farreaching program of social and economic reforms. Chapter 4 especially addresses
the “populist" policies that produced a kind of the “clientelism” of rural and lowincome class. This strategy, in particular, invigorated a large part of public service
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operations and established bonds of patronage with the Thai Rak Thai Party across
the Northern and Eastern regions, where the party’s representatives were dominant.
In addition, scores of political advisors, part of them from the leading section of
bureaucrats, formed the entourage of each minister and deputy minister, which
reflected the increasing power of the Prime Minister and his cabinet. This form of
policy initiative and intervention from political executives undermined the existing
power of bureaucracy which has been in control of substantive policy areas in
Thailand for decades.
Given that both the Thaksin administration and reform-minded bureaucrats
had their special interest in particular reform attempts, the administration may
endorse the reforms for political opportunities while the bureaucrats assume career
advancement by participating in the process. Hence, the rationality of alleged
reform may become merely a symbol since the reform was hampered by different
conflicting interests and goals by the involving parties. In analyzing a functional
reorganization in the first term of Thaksin, there was evidence that the
administration used its discretional power to transfer and promote senior
bureaucrats while a group of senior bureaucrats who participated in the reform
benefited from this politicization. By this method, the cabinet approved a ’’challenge
system" under which government agencies which chose to take part in the public
sector reform programs were rewarded for meeting the government performance
targets. In fact, enthusiastic compliance with Thaksin’s political agendas and
priorities was virtually a key assessment criterion.
Provincial administrative reform through the IPAS reflected decisive political
executives over parliament factions and sub-region governments. Along with the
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IPAS, provincial plans had to comply with Thaksin’s policy priorities. This is a point
where policy making continued to be highly concentrated, partially because the
1997 constitution strengthened the power of the prime minister. The provincial
bureaucrats had some discretion for program implementation, but this power was
limited under national government policy agendas. Although the fragmentation of
sub-government bureaucracy may have deep roots in the provincial administration,
the IPAS performance frameworks and government agenda clearly indicate the
control of political executives over the regional bureaucracy which resurfaced more
recently during the leadership of Thaksin. In this case, strategy for government
transformation was defined as top-down and grand reform mandates tended to
defeat prior incremental ones. Shifts in control elements in the complex control of
sub-government can be seen through the IPAS’s implementation to develop
strategic planning, contractual agreement, and performance indicators and
measurement across all levels of government, for example.
In the case of contemporary Thai public administration, politician-bureaucrat
relationships are crucial to the understanding of recurring public sector reform. It is
also in this context that this research examined the implications of Thaksin’s
administrative reform, particularly when a number of public agencies were
reorganized resulting in the transfers and promotions of many high-ranking public
servants. Particularly in the case of the IPAS reform where top-down attempts to
transform the public sector occurred, it was evident that the regional administrative
reform process was trumped by Thaksin’s political agendas. In part, this study finds
that a degree of coordination takes place between the head of provincial ministries
in the operation of provincial administration. During the implementation of IPAS
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reform, much inter-agency collaboration was reported which may result from parts of
the measures that forced organizational collaboration. However, this sort of sub
government integration ran counter to local government authorities that had been
undergone an increasing transfer of functions and responsibilities mandated by the
1997 constitution and the 1999 Decentralization Plan and Procedure Act.
One of the contradictions with the approach of Thaksin’s public sector reform
outlined in Chapter 5 was that local government authorities had been negatively
affected by IPAS measures such as strategic planning and provincial power
devolution. After 1999, there were decentralization frameworks and a
decentralization committee for the strengthening of local government authorities,
particularly the efforts to transfer functions, resources, and personnel from central
ministries to those local governments. Instead, Thaksin’s government reforms at
the central and regional governments generally neglected cooperation across local
government authorities. It should be stressed that the IPAS reform played down the
emerging roles of Provincial Administrative Organizations, which represent local
constituency in provincial regions. The provincial administration led by governors
thus assumed greater roles on regional developing programs than the local
governments. Indeed, as the IPAS reform proceeded, provincial administration had
come to act as the intermediaries between the central agencies and the local
government authorities while the government policies surpassed local needs and
responsiveness.
The strengthening of regional government through IPAS measures while the
local government decentralization program was ignored produced a political impact,
particularly the effect on democratic processes and local government institutions.
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Essentially, the drive of Thaksin’s regional reform is not political equality and
popular control, but efficiency in a context of fragmented bureaucratic structure that
was outstripping the goals of national policies and the cost of public services. As
addressed in Chapter 5, the most important criterion for provincial benchmarking
was economic value. The principal area that had been promoted in the IPAS’s
implementation was related information about gross provincial product. These
aspects on the IPAS’s reform reflected the way in which the New Public
Management approach to public administration implies changes through market,
contract, and competition. Certainly, there was no evidence that the IPAS’s
strategic development plans were influenced by various local constituencies and
local government authorities. This is because policy determination in the IPAS
reform was simply top-down, the product of elite thinking, not a democratic principle.

Internationalization: Origins and NPM Elements

The international organizations and the donor agencies in general have been
pushing for institutional reforms for over a quarter of a century. As addressed in
Chapters 3 and 4, the impact of international organizations on the Thai public sector
institutions had been clearly evident since the Second World War, particularly when
Field Marshall Sarit’s authoritative regime (1959-63) modernized administrative
organizations to cope with communist ideology through centralized socioeconomic
institutions. The IMF and the World Bank had acquired entrenched authority during
the cycle of the Thai economic downturn between the 1980s and 1990s. With the
assistance of these global economic organizations, Thai institutional reforms had
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been propelled by successive administrations, partly in pursuit of a market-based
macro economic policy agenda, and partly in order to develop institutions with some
leverage over the private sector.
In fact, the Thai domestic reform movement originated simultaneously in the
early 1990s as part of the attempt to reposition Thai democracy to cope with its
increasing vulnerability to global economy. The devastating impact of an
undemocratic regime had increased popular mobilization and participation in
government and demanded constitutional reform following the military coup in 1991
by General Suchinda. The Thai public sector reform measures that were promoted
after the oust of Suchinda appeared to mirror the efforts of the West in terms of
reducing the size of the Thai public sector and the guidance principle of donor
bodies in term of decentralizing central power over the policy-making process. The
latter measure can be seen through privatization programs, devolution of power,
and “good governance” following the Anad administration (1991-1992). Thus, while
international institutions have evolved as a result of the internationalization of global
economy which can both resolve collective problems and act as a counterweight to
an undemocratic regime, these institutions have over time acquired a high degree of
influence over Thai domestic politics. The influence of international institutions was,
thus, a bilateral relation.
This reform movement led to the 1997 “people’s constitution” in which the
Thai political process was changed and a variety of new institutions were created.
Promoted by the IMF and the World Bank, elements of good governance appeared
in the 1997 constitutional mandates. As described in Chapters 4 and 5, these
included the creation of new independent bodies, a local government
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decentralization scheme, and other public sector improvement projects such as
financial management, accountability, and effective reforms. Interestingly, the
adoption of governance issue was linked to Thai administrative capacity that was
deemed essential for economic growth. In addition, the increasing
internationalization of the economy and the desire for economic growth have
encouraged the change to include businessmen as government leaders, and
increased the role of organized businessmen as an interest group. In this regard,
changes from simple demands for privatization of enterprises became more
complex demands for improved governance institutions. Considering these drives
as well as the business background of Thaksin, the newly established Thai Rak Thai
Party was not denied in the 2001 general election.
With the bureaucratic problems so defined, the Thaksin administration and
reform advisors contemplated the shift from traditional administration to the new
public management which sought out the private sector for advice on how to effect
reform change. Also, the NPM approach to public sector reform has been
introduced through the circulation of ideas from other countries, including Australia,
New Zealand, and the UK. These Western countries have contributed to the NPMstyle of reforms in Thailand through a policy learning process and inter
governmental assistance programs. As analyzed in Chapter 5, there is clear
evidence that the Thai public sectors were experimenting with a variety of the NPM
approaches to public administration, including the concept of power devolution to
provincial governors, the introduction of public service agreements across the Thai
public sectors, the emphasis on the steering role of central governments, and the
preference toward private management practices. This does not necessarily mean
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that the Thai public sector reform committed to the NPM. But Thaksin’s reform
tactics and strategies implied an underlying similarity with the NPM movement.
As noted in Chapter 5, the problem of administrative accountability was
particularly large in the implementation of IPAS reform. The introduction of
separation of policy and operation which employed a concept of purchasing and
providing functions magnified the complex issues of hierarchy already inherent in
the Thai bureaucratic problems. This policy-operation dichotomy not only
characterized the IPAS and Thaksin’s public sector reform but also created a shared
problem of accountability. According to theoretical concepts of the NPM, public
officials should have high power and responsibility in order that it is possible to hold
them accountable to the government’s policy. The pronounced management
orientation of the reform was evident by the emphasis placed on the newly created
public service agreement between the Thaksin administration and public sector
chief executives, including CEO-Governors. Together with the service contractual
agreement, performance measurement and reporting requirements have also been
characterized by problematic output definitions and negotiations on the part of the
public agencies. These decisions to draw a sharp distinction between outputs and
outcomes made a major breakthrough in the Thai public sector because chief
executives are now held accountable for producing outputs.
Contrary to the NPM approach to public sector reform, the practices of
provincial reform led by Thaksin were implemented without a coherent perspective
of NPM-related ideas. As addressed in Chapter 5, the IPAS’s implementation had
resulted in fundamental changes in the provincial administration’s decision-making
process in that the emphasis of government economic policies counteracted other
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reform-related considerations such as the devolved power to governors. One major
implication is that the IPAS reform weakened the established administrative
hierarchy to a lesser degree than the traditional Thai civil service-based merit
system. At the same time, the civil services were less subjected to control by clear
rules and regulations while they exercised more discretion on negotiated output
indicators and self-assessment reform. This resulted in an increasing complexity
within the realm of Thai civil service, making political loyalty more important while
more attention was paid to outputs and results. Evidently, the increased in the
“central fund” which was allocated solely by the Prime Minister’s discretion (upon
cabinet endorsement) set a type of budget control over provincial administrative
plans rather than allowing professionalized decision plans made by technocrats.
Thus, recent provincial administrative reform has had a significant impact on
the traditional political and bureaucratic roles in Thailand. To some extent,
analyzing how the IPAS reform has changed the role of politicians is complicated by
a general shift from proactive dominant civil services in many policy sectors toward
an NPM model of pubic administration. Arguably, Thai political executives played a
different and more visible role than they previously had. In formulating a policy
agenda, the politicians were assumed to create long-term goals for the public
service and then let the bureaucracy operate as it sees appropriate toward those
goals. With increasing reliance on complex policy instruments and the emergence
of a subtler accountability between the politicians and bureaucrats, the role of
elected politicians has been gradually increased. But there were no indications at
the time when the IPAS was launched that it was the civil servants or the politicians
who would ultimately be held accountable for the administrative reform outcomes.
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Conceptualizing Thaksin’s Government Reform

The concepts associated with the word “public sector reform” are
increasingly important for public administration scholars. Although public sector
reform becomes a virtual synonym for improved governance pursued by all
governmental bodies, the reform implications are not generally agreed upon by a
number of scholars. Certainly, administrative reorganization and public sector
reform reflect the need to account for the changing relationship between
governments and citizens and among the public agencies themselves. Although
public sector reform has numerous variations across the world, it has several
universal themes which can be seen in the Thai’s reform experiences. The growth
and continuity of reform attempts have brought about a fundamental shift in the
process and nature of Thai public administration, particularly during Thaksin’s
government, where the New Public Management approach to public sector reform
followed from the promulgation of new laws that were intended to transform the
public institution in the late 1990s.
New Public Management (also being referred to as “new managerialism”)
has become an emerging framework and model for public sector reform since the
1980s. The discussion on NPM-related literature was presented in Chapter 1 and
this part will only focus on some specific aspect of the NPM in the context of current
Thai public administration. Typically, the NPM approach to public sector reform
runs counter to the bureaucratic tradition in most reformed countries. It rejects the
idea of a specific culture for public organizations and argues that the public sector
can be managed like the private sector. In most cases, the reasons for
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implementation of NPM strategies were either from the reactions to political
challenge or the economic necessity to control costs of public services. In both
cases, NPM strategies are deliberate political choices. It is these reasons that
characterize the IPAS reform under the Thaksin administration. Along with the
analysis of the IPAS reform, it is useful to draw some implications with special
reference to the NPM approach to public administration.
There had been experimentation on new managerialism for a decade, laying
some of the foundations for a major shift in the Thai public sector. However, a
fundamental change only proceeded in the late 1990s. The reform programs of the
Thaksin administration was susceptible to most Thai elites, as the aftermath of the
1997 economic crisis made clear the need for continuing transformation in the Thai
public sector and public administration. This coincided with the strong parliament of
Thaksin’s majority government in his first term. During this short period, the
administration reorganized functional ministries, established a public sector reform
agency, the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), and passed
a number of reform-related laws dealing with administrative process.
Under the Thaksin government, three aspects in reform programs were
distinguished. First, the organic model of NPM approach to public administration
developed by the OPDC and reform-minded bureaucrats was mandated across the
Thai public sector on a large scale. Essentially, the sub-government devolution
program and regional reform under the IPAS’s title was evident in these attempts.
This reform model included “senior executive services,” “performance incentive
pay,” “balance scored card,” “special service delivery unit,” “performance
measurement,” “public service agreement,” and the like.
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Several observations follow from the managerial approach to Thaksin's
administrative reform. The main question concerning how the regional bureaucrats
react to NPM-style reforms depends on their positions, levels of their hierarchical
status, and their experienced bureaucratic cultures, to conclude that they are likely
to serve as important factors for the reform implementation. The most significant
institutional differences are those in values, norms, and expectations that define the
success of reform implementation. While the OPDC tends to confirm that the
course of IPAS tactics was based on working experiences and a theoretical
foundation, the study found that the provincial bureaucrats saw that the IPAS reform
measures were not perfectly compatible with the existing Thai bureaucratic context.
As addressed in Chapter 5, there were some internal variations in the reaction of
provincial civil services on the effectiveness of IPAS reform measures. This
suggests the need for increased diversity in respect to government policy measures
and that uniformed measures based on a set of private management ideal is
unrealistic.
This also implies that it is important to study the public sector reform from
below, that is, how management and civil service in practice become changed within
the various branches of the administrative structures. Administrative reform policy is
not only a matter of effective implementation of centrally determined solutions but
also the extent to which the local response to central measures provides feedback
to the overall administrative policy. Information derived from the filed interviews of
this study shows that knowledge of the principles and practical initiatives of NPMlike reform were not well contemplated before the administration launched the IPAS
and other reform measures.
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Although Thai senior bureaucrats attended the course of trainings,
workshops, and seminars on managerial-style reform, the knowledge of the NPM
and practices did not necessarily translate into real-life applications. It is also
unclear how deep the discourse of NPM has permeated the Thai public services
and political elites. One interpretation is that the Thaksin reform elements were
adapted from the NPM’s menu of choice in which dominant international reform
doctrines were transformed when they met Thai domestic administrative policy.
Second, Thaksin’s reform aspect stressed the new relationship between
political executives and civil services, on the one hand, and the relationship between
the public services and the citizen, on the other hand. These changes given
attention here can be seen through the mandate of two important administrative
laws, the Government Administration Act of 2002 and the Good Governance Act of
2003. These laws provided a legal authority for the OPDC to act as a principal
advisor for the routine Thai administrative reform. In these laws, the mandate for
each public agency included strategic plans, performance outputs, and
effectiveness measures. In a sense, the managerial aspects prescribed in the laws
did not jeopardize the traditional operation of Thai bureaucracy.
The IPAS reform was eagerly pursued since it seemed to help promote the
head of provincial ministry and the governor, although the implementation of these
mandates overwhelmingly forced them to act in compliance with the new rules, to
develop key indicator outputs, and to be subjected to evaluation for accomplishing
defined goals. The contrast of the new managerial approach and the traditional
practice of the Thai bureaucracy is that the former required high bureaucratic
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capacity and professional public managers in the process of public administration.
However, it does not guarantee that the Thai public sector is improving.
According to a stated goal of the OPDC, the administration's public sector
reform sought to devolve the power of central authorities and relax political control
over public service for public managers at lower levels. These measures would
leave the political executives and central agencies with the responsibility for defining
the long-term goals and public policy agendas. At the time of the research, this
emerging relationship among politicians, central agencies, and operational public
agencies in Thai administration was far from clear in terms of public accountability.
As discussed in Chapter 5 concerning the overall assessment of IPAS
implementation with respect to national policy frameworks of Thaksin’s policy
agenda, it was very difficult to ascertain how the political executives and the
provincial governors would be held accountable for policy outcomes under the
separation of political accountability and public service operations. The indirect
model of political control that the OPDC introduced implies accountability avoidance,
particularly when the administration may reject responsibility whilst provincial
governors can avoid accountability beyond output results and performance
measures.
A final aspect which gave the Thaksin administrative reform momentum was
the overall political status. In fact, important keys to the reform lay in the political
institution and the character of Thaksin himself. One should not underestimate the
broad impact of the constitutional amendment in 1997, which sought to reform Thai
administrative institutions and to stabilize parliamentary democracy following
successive unstable governments during the 1990s. Partially, the shortfall of the
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Thai parliamentary system was caused by numerous small and situational parties
that organized internally around powerful factions.
As described in Chapters 3 and 4, the political heritage of the Thai
parliamentary system had been constrained by party shifting, contested factions,
and a preference for winning elections over policy platforms. With these recognized
weaknesses, the reformed political system revised electoral rules and a party
system to reflect the needed change. Despite the establishment of new laws to
strengthen the power of the prime minister, many negative elements continued as
the study showed that the roles of the Prime Minister’s Office increasingly expanded
to the regional government.
Thaksin and the newly established Thai Rak Thai Party gained control of the
changing laws by drawing politicians from existing parties in a short period before a
new election was mandated in 2001. This happened, in part, because the Thai Rak
Thai Party was free from skepticism in dealing with the unpopular economic
structural programs prescribed by the IMF. Within the deterioration of economic and
social programs administered by the Democrat Party, the business groups, middle
class, and civic groups shifted their support to the Thai Rak Thai Party in the 2001
general election.
During the election of 2001, the Democrat party countered the Thai Rak Thai
with a campaign based on the continuation of its economic policies which were
associated, in the public mind, with the IMF. On the contrary, the Thai Rak Thai
Party’s policies that stressed the lower classes, particularly in rural Thailand, while
consolidating the support from many financiers and businessmen proved very
successful. These policies and a promotion of nationalism in time of crisis made
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Thai Rak Thai a victory, in just a short month, far more than anyone thought
possible.
The comprehensive public sector reforms of the Thaksin administration had
been possible because the political institution and the 1997 constitution opened up
the climate of political and governemnt reform. Despite these opportunities and the
1997-1998 economic crises, the Thai public sector reform may have become
different from the current reform scheme. The rise of Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai
became a challenge to a long general cultural trait of Thai bureaucracy that was
deemed to be the center of politics and administration.
Thai Rak Thai’s distinguished policies and the assertive style of Thaksin’s
administration indicated how tactics and forms of administrative reform may vary
considerably across countries. As mentioned above, the Thaksin administrative
reform did have the potential to create permanent change in the Thai’s
administrative system by changing the relationship between politicians and
bureaucrats in some areas. However, the changes implemented thus far were not
stable enough to ensure permanent transformation in the Thai public administration.
Thaksin was elected to a second five-year term in office in February 2005
with a parliamentary majority and popular mandate. Instead, his government
became mired in corruption scandals associated with his family and his ministers,
culminating in the sale of his family's telecommunications empire to Singaporean
investors for over $2 billion, a transaction on which the family contrived to pay no
tax. The concentration of wealth and administrative power in Thaksin's hands
enabled him to undermine the institutions intended to provide constitutional checks
to executive power and preserve the integrity of Thai democracy. Thaksin’s
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administration had become increasingly divisive, and destabilization from the
mounting anger over these matters acted as a catalyst for discontent on a wide
range of other issues.
On 19 September 2006, the Thai Army executed a bloodless coup d'etat
against Thaksin while he was preparing to address the opening session of the
United Nations General Assembly in New York. General Sonthi, with commanders
of the other armed services and the police beside him, appealed for public support
and promised they would soon return power to the people. The king's public
response was emphatic as he announced that "in order to create peace in the
country" he was appointing General Sonthi to head a new council of administrative
reform. This coup dragged Thai democracy back to an era many Thais believed the
country had long since left behind: one where the military usurped constitutional
authority at will. Otherwise, the technocrats in Thailand still remain powerful
because of the inherent power of military-bureaucratic regimes from the past
decades.

Towards a Research Agenda

This chapter concludes and discusses a number of features of the Thaksin’s
public sector reform, as well as of the emerging patterns of Thai public
administration in the contemporary period. That having been addressed, there is
still a great deal of research that needs to be done in order to more completely
understand administrative reform in different forms and different political settings.
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This study does not claim to be comprehensive. However, some key issues have
been identified and analyzed by reference to selected literature.
The differences in the Thai public sector reform may also be related to
experiences in the political and administrative traditions of other countries.
However, this study has tried to avoid presenting that Thai administrative reform is
similar to reforms being implemented elsewhere. An important principle for this
research at the outset is that there are no formulas to be applied uncritically under
all circumstances in all public sector reform. Thus, the Integrated Provincial
Administrative reform under Thaksin was chosen to interpret a set of policies,
managements, and political elements.
While there are crucial differences in the interpretations of reform
implementations in many scholarly works, there are also some remarkably similar
elements that have already been addressed in this part and preceding chapters. In
relation to the New Public Management approach’s literatures, Thaksin’s
government reforms were analyzed by asking whether the reforms had impacts on
managerial freedom, performance efforts, and effectiveness as stated in the general
intended goals by the reformers. The answer is undoubtedly yes, especially the
implementation of performance measurement that became a formal structure of
Thai public administration.
In the case of the Integrated Provincial Administrative System, the study
identified that a number of managerial techniques closely associated with the NPM
had been adopted and applied to the provincial administrations. The introduction of
the new results-oriented management by the administration partially dismantled
hierarchical structures of the sub-region government which led to an emerging new

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

226

relationship between political executives and regional technocrats in Thailand. The
research on the issue of relationship between the two has been increasing, as the
NPM sought to modify an accountability system in public administration. However,
the unique context of Thai political and public sector development needs advanced
study.
As was generally known, Thai central bureaucracy has remained an
important factor in public policy making and public service providers. In the
meantime, a growing number of various types of local government authorities have
started to develop their local institutions and capacities. The transfers of the roles
and functions from central ministries to local government authorities, which now
have seen interrupted support from the administration, gave rise to an ambiguous
situation concerning the overarching principle of Thai political and administrative
reform specified in the 1997 constitution.
The overall situation can be interpreted that the central bureaucrats had
seized the opportunities of IPAS reforms to revise control mechanisms over local
government authorities, although the latter have more autonomy in local policy
making than the central government agencies. As a consequence, the transition
can be characterized by a more conflicted relationship between local government
leaders and national politicians, on the one hand, and local politicians and central
bureaucrats, on the other hand. This issue needs more study in order to explore the
pattern of relationships to explain Thai democratic transition in the nexus of
administration reform.
Thaksin’s government claimed that regional government had been improved.
Sub-governments and provincial governors also appeared to have led to a greater
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emphasis on strategic goals and management performance, particularly under the
impetus of IPAS initiatives. However, it is not clear how the improvement had been
interpreted and it is not always easy to tell to what extent the improvement had
actually let to the genuine goals of the reform plans.
However, those civil servants who were responsible for reform
implementation had complained that the goals and output indicators were constantly
moving. The debate is still in its early days but one must not confuse the issue of
whether genuine results have been achieved with that of whether those results were
advanced enough. It was suggested earlier that different local contexts tend to
display different government styles. There is a need to look at this issue in a
comparative perspective both domestically and internationally. It could be that
different government regimes are typical to specific public sector reform measures.
The transitional period also unveiled a discrepancy between the potential of
the Thai public sector reforms and the readiness and capacity of central technocrats
to assume a new role when they have to shift from long-standing players in pubic
policy-making processes to a steering body in accordance with constraints and
subtleties of the public or semi-pubic sector, which cannot exclude some form of
political oversight. To the extent that politics entered the reform processes, the
public servants did not see themselves as mere agents of the politicians or
guardians of the welfare of the society.
In this regard, they operated as trustees in exchange for high status or
relatively high rewards. In that sense, Thaksin’s administrative reforms implies a
larger, but classical issue of the politics-administration relationship. At the heart of
the debate about Thaksin’s government reform, there is also tension between
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political conceptions of efficiency and managerial conceptions of efficiency. While
the Thai public sector reform emphasized management techniques, which can be
important and useful, a more fundamental question is what the pubic sector ought to
do and where the demarcation between politics and administration exists. Only then
can one focus realistically on the best way to accomplish the goals of public sector
reform.
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Interview Approach

Prior to interview session, informed consent will be obtained through an oral
statement made by the researcher. The subjects will be informed of the nature of
the research, their rights, and asked if audio recorder is allowed during the
interview.

The complete statement below and the response to this statement by each
of the interviewee will be part of the interview. The purpose of this study is to
examine the Integrated Provincial Administrative System (IPAS). Interview
questions were primarily to investigate the processes and implementations of IPAS
and to describe the perceptions and experiences of the participant.

The interview will take between 45 and 60 minutes to complete.
Interviewee’s name and official position will be kept confidential. Any information
from the interviewee will not be available to anyone other than for the purpose of
writing this dissertation or other publication related to this research topic in the
future, in which case pseudonyms will be used. The interviewee is reminded that
his or her participation is voluntary. During the interview period, the interviewee can
choose to stop any time.
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Informed Consent Statement

You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of this
study is to examine the reform initiatives and implementation of the “Integrated
Provincial Administrative System” (IPAS), which has been mandated across Thai
provincial administrations since 2003. To conduct this dissertation research, I would
like to invite you for interviews and conversations dealing with the origin and
implementation processes of IPAS. Specifically, the questions involve IPAS as a
strategy of Thai reform and its impacts on different groups involved in the process.
According to Northern Illinois University’s policy, I am required to identify and
prevent risks that might be incurred by the interview subjects. There is some risk
that the questions could evoke some upsetting thoughts, feelings, or memories for
you. If you feel upset during the interview for any reason, you may choose not to
answer those or subsequent questions.
The interview should take between 45 and 60 minutes to complete. Unless
you prefer to be identified, your name will be kept confidential. Any information from
the interview will be used for the purpose of writing my dissertation or other
publication related to this research topic. In the dissertation and articles, I will use
pseudonyms rather than real names unless you choose to be identified by
name. As soon as this study is completed, the general findings of this study will be
presented to you.
You are reminded that your participation in the following interview is
voluntary. As, such, I would like to ask you if you understand your rights as a
participant in this study and agree to record this interview on an audiotape. Shall I
continue with the interview?

Contact Information
Investigator
Udomchoke Asawimalkit
Division of Public Administration
Political Science Department
Chiangmai University

Dissertation Advisor
Irene Rubin
Professor Emerita
Public Administration Division
Northern Illinois University

Thailand, 50300

131 E. Alden PI., Dekalb, III 60116

Phone: 53-943-525
Email: udomchoke@yahoo.com

Phone:815-756-6862
Email: irubin@niu.edu
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(English Translation)

Q1: What are the most serious problems that provincial administrations have been
confronting? Who should take the major roles in solving such problems?

Q2: Has there been any major change in the attempts to transform provincial
administration in the last five years? What are they? What is the heritage from the
previous reforms? How did they discontinue?

Q3: How does your organization (central governments) involve in provincial reform
initiatives and implementation? How does particular reform approach come to play
in the discussion of public sector reform? Why do certain strategies receive
attention?

Q4: How are members of your organization able to influence reform initiatives and
strategies? What are the values and philosophies held by the reform initiators?

Q5: What makes “The Integrated Provincial Administrative System” a priority? How
do the central governments influence the reform approach?

Q6: Can you identify any reform tactics or strategies that are mandated by the
Thaksin administration? What makes them relevant or not relevant to regional
government reform?

Q7: Are members of your organization able to involve actively during reform
processes? How your roles are considered important to the implementation of
“Integrated Provincial Administrative System”? What are the most important issues
involving the success of such reform?

Q8: How do you value the “Integrated Provincial Administrative System” and its
strategies? Could you identify some of the major reform tactics being applied in your
province? How do they work regarding to communication and collaboration?
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Q9: Has there been much change in the degree of organization collaboration,
planning, and performance evaluation since the implementation of new reform?
How do the reform tactics affect local community and civic groups? How do you
describe the current relationship between central government and provincial
administration?

Q10: Can you think of any shift in organization norms and values after the
“Integrated Provincial Administrative System” was mandated? Can you give
examples of the event or behavior that reflects such the change?

Q11: What is your perspective on the status of current reform implementation?
What would you want to suggest what should have done to make the reform
process a success or avoid failure?

Q12: Is there anything else that you think I should know or I missed in our
conversation?
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Province “A”:

1. January 10, 2005, 16.20-17.40 p.m., A staff of Provincial Strategic Administration,
Office of the Governor
2. January 12, 2005, 15.20-16.30 p.m., Head of Provincial Commerce Ministry
3. January 13, 2005, 17.00-17.20 p.m., President of Province “A” Chamber of
Industry
4. January 17, 2005, 13.30-14.10 p.m., A staff of Planning Division, Provincial
Industrial Ministry
5. January 17, 2005, 16.20-17.40 p.m., Head of Provincial Agriculture and
Cooperative Ministry
6. January 18, 2005, 15.30-16.20 p.m., Mayor of Province “A ” Provincial
Administrative Organization
7. January 18, 2005, 9.30-10.50 a.m., Mayor of Province “A” City
8. January 19, 2005, 13.30-14.20 p.m., President of Province “A” Chamber of
Commerce
9. January 19, 2005,11.10-11-50 a.m., Head of Provincial Labor Ministry
10. January 20, 2005,17.10-18.20 p.m., President of Province “A” Tourist Business
Federation
11. January 20, 2005,10.00-10.40 a.m., Governor of Province “A”

Province “B”:

1. March 1, 2005, 11.00-12.00 a.m., A staff of Provincial Strategic Administration,
Office of the Governor
2. March 2,

2005,10.00-11.20a.m., Head of Provincial

Industrial Ministry

3. March 2,

2005,11.30-12.00 a.m., Head of Provincial

Finance Ministry

4. March 2,

2005,13.20-14.50p.m., Head of Provincial

Agriculture and Cooperative

Ministry
5. March 3, 2005, 11.00-12.00 a.m., Head of Provincial Social Development and
Human Security
6. March 3, 2005, 12.40-13.45 p.m., Deputy Governor of Province “B”
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7. March 4, 2005, 14.40-15.10 p.m., Head of Provincial Planning Department,
Ministry of Interior
8. March 4, 2005, 15.20-16.30 p.m., President of Province “B” Chamber of
Commerce
9. March 4, 2005, 15.20-16.30 p.m., President of Province “B” Chamber of Industry
10. March 8, 2005, 14.00-15.00 p.m., Secretary of Provincial Governor
11. March 9, 2005, 9.00-9.45 a.m., Governor of Province “B”
12. March 9, 2005,14.30-15.19 p.m., Head of Provincial Commerce Ministry

Province “C”:

1. March 15, 2005,11.00-11.50 a.m., Deputy Governor of Province “C"
2. March 16, 2005, 11.00-12.12 p.m., Head of Provincial Commerce Ministry
3. March 16, 2005, 13.20-14.10 p.m., President of Province “C” Chamber of
Commerce
4. March 17, 2005, 9.10-10.00 a.m., Head of Provincial Office, Office of the
Governor
5. March 17, 2005, 13.20-15.00 p.m., Head of Provincial Strategic Administrative
Unit
6. March 17, 2005,11.40-12.30 p.m., Head of Provincial Social Development and
Social Security
7. March 17, 2005, 10.10-11.30 a.m., Head of Provincial Agriculture and
Cooperative Ministry
8. March 18, 2005, 10.00-11.00 a.m., Governor of Province “C”
9. March 19, 2005, 11.00-12.00 a.m., Mayor of Province “C" City
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